Griffiths, Application of

• Citation: 294 A.2d 281,162 Conn. 249
• Parties: Application of Fre Le Poole GRIFFITHS, for Admission to the Bar.
• Decision Date: 26 January 1972
• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut

Page 281

294 A.2d 281

162 Conn. 249

Application of Fre Le Poole GRIFFITHS, for Admission to the Bar.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Jan. 26, 1972.

Probable Jurisdiction Noted June 7, 1972. See 92 S.Ct. 2413.

R. David Broiles, New Haven, for applicant.

George R. Tiernan, New Haven, for the State Bar Examining Committee.

Before HOUSE, C.J., and THIM, RYAN, SHAPIRO and LOISELLE, JJ.

HOUSE, Chief Justice.

The petitioner is an applicant for admission to the bar. She is a resident and taxpayer of New Haven and has complied with all the conditions and requirements for admission to take the bar examinations except that she is not a citizen of the United States. Although she could easily become a citizen of the United States by reason of her marriage to a United States citizen, she has elected to remain a citizen of the Netherlands and has not filed and does not intend to file a declaration of intent to become a citizen of this country. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1427(f), 1430(a). She filed with the clerk of the Superior Court an application for admission to the bar and the standing committee on recommendations for admission to the bar of New Haven County recommended to the bar of that county that her application be denied as she was not a citizen and thus failed to meet the requirements of the rules of the Superior Court for admission as an attorney. At a meeting of the bar of New Haven County, the report of the standing committee on recommendations for admission to the bar was presented and the members of the bar voted to accept the report of the committee denying her application. She thereupon petitioned the Superior Court for New Haven County for a decree that she be permitted to take the examination as a candidate for the bar and that she be declared eligible for such admission. Her petition was denied on the ground that she did not meet the necessary qualification of being a citizen of the United States which is the first requirement provided by § 8 of the rules of the Superior Court governing admission to the Connecticut bar. Practice Book § 8(1).

From this judgment the petitioner has appealed to this court. Her assignment of errors claims that the court erred in not declaring § 8(1) of the Practice Book to be unconstitutional; in not exercising its inherent power to waive the provisions of § 8(1), in order to avoid injustice to the petitioner and in overruling the several claims of law which she made as follows: 'a. Rule 8(1) of the Superior Court Rules discriminates unreasonably against aliens situated as is the petitioner, depriving them thereby of their Constitutional Right to equal protection of the law. b. All forms of discrimination against aliens are presumed invalid unless the State shows an overwhelming or compelling interest in maintaining discrimination. c. Superior Court Rule 8(1) interferes with the Federal power over immigration. d. Superior Court Rule 8(1) as applied to the petitioner violates international public policy and the First Amendment of the United States Constitution by burdening petitioner's right freely to determine her nationality. e. Superior Court Rule 8(1) creates an unreasonable and arbitrary classification without rational relation to the petitioner's fitness or capacity to practice law. f. Superior Court Rule 8(1) violates equal protection in that it treads upon fundamental personal rights without satisfying the more stringent tests established for such regulations. g. Superior Court Rule 8(1) does not promote a compelling governmental interest. h. Superior Court Rule 8(1) imposes an impermissible burden upon interstate travel.'

Before considering the specific assignments of error which are all predicated on a claim that limiting admission to the Connecticut bar to citizens of the United States violates the constitutional rights of the petitioner, it is pertinent to note the historical and legal development of the rules for admission of attorneys to practice law in this state. The early history is traced in Heiberger v. Clark, 148 Conn. 177, 169 A.2d 652, and at length in O'Brien's Petition, 79 Conn. 46, 63 A. 777; see also Loomis & Calhoun, Judicial and Civil History of Connecticut, pp. 183, 184.

The inherent power of the Superior Court as a constitutionally established tribunal to promulgate rules for the admission of attorneys and to fix by rule the qualifications necessary for the practice of law and the procedure to be followed for admission to practice is no longer open to doubt. Conn. const., art. 5 § 1; In re Application of Dinan, 157 Conn. 67, 71, 244 A.2d 608; In re Application of Warren, 149 Conn. 266, 272, 178 A.2d 528; Heiberger v. Clark, supra, 148 Conn. 185, 169 A.2d 652; State Bar Assn. v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 232, 140 A.2d 863; Rosenthal v. State Bar Examining Committee, 116 Conn. 409, 415, 165 A. 211. Although much assistance in connection with admission to the bar is provided by the local committees of the bar, the decision on standards of admission rests with the judges of the Superior Court. Heiberger v. Clark, supra, 148 Conn. 186, 169 A.2d 652; In re Application of Dodd, 132 Conn. 237, 243, 43 A.2d 224; Rosenthal v. State Bar Examining Committee, supra, 116 Conn. 414, 165 A. 211. It was in the exercise of this judicial power that the Superior Court established the requirement of United States citizenship for admission to the bar. The rule first appears in the 1879 Practice Book §§ 4(3) and 8. It has remained substantially unchanged through the later revisions of the Practice Book in 1890 (see 58 Conn. 561, 590), 1908, 1922, 1934, 1951 and now § 8(1) of the 1963 edition.

The general duties, obligations and privileges of a member of the Connecticut bar are commonly known, but it is highly relevant to a consideration of the claims of the petitioner to note the unique characteristics coincident with that status. A member of the Connecticut bar is much more than a lawyer in the sense of one 'whose profession is to conduct lawsuits for clients or to advise as to the prosecution or defense of lawsuits or as to legal rights and obligations in other matters.' Webster, Third New International Dictionary. In the English common-law tradition, he has often been loosely referred to as an 'officer' of the court before which he is permitted to practice. See, for example, Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158. Indeed, this court has referred to him as such on numerous instances in the past. See In re Application of Dinan, supra, quoting from Heiberger v. Clark, supra, 148 Conn. 182, 169 A.2d 652; In re Durant, 80 Conn. 140, 147, 67 A. 497. It was stated in Hennessy v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 74 Conn. 699, 710, 52 A. 490, 494: 'An attorney at law, as an officer of the court, speaks in a certain sense by its authority,' and in Cunningham v. Fair Haven & W.R. Co., 72 Conn. 244, 252, 43 A. 1047, 1050: 'An attorney represents his client as an officer of the court, (and is) responsible for the purity and fairness of all his dealings in court.' Yet an attorney is 'not an 'officer' within the ordinary meaning of that term. . . . The word 'officer' as it has always been applied to lawyers conveys quite a different meaning from the word 'officer' as applied to people serving as officers within the conventional meaning of that term.' Cammer v. United States, 350 U.S. 399, 405, 76 S.Ct. 456, 459, 100 L.Ed. 474 and footnote, with '(i)llustrations of the confusion and difficulty of courts in explaining what is meant when a lawyer is called an officer of the court'; see also 7 Am.Jur.2d, Attorneys at Law, § 3.

We noted in In re Application of Dodd, 131 Conn. 702, 705, 42 A.2d 36, 38, that '(a)ttorneys have a franchise which is regarded as a property right.' In State Bar Assn. v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., supra, 145 Conn. 234, 140 A.2d 870, we commented on the special qualifications required of members of the bar and mentioned the dual trust which is imposed on them to act 'with fidelity both to the courts and to their clients.' We also noted that part of their work involves appearance in court and part involves advice and the drafting of instruments which 'has profound effect on the whole scheme of the administration of justice.' Id., 235, 140 A.2d, 870. In Rosenthal v. State Bar Examining Committee, supra, 116 Conn. 414, 165 A. 213, the court remarked: 'The practice of law is not a craft or a trade; it is a profession whose main purpose is to aid in the doing of justice according to law between the state and the individual and between man and man. The occasions upon which an attorney may be required to act touch, in many instances, the deepest and most precious concerns of men, women, and children. They may involve the liberty, the property, the happiness, the character, and the life of his client.' Number 32 of the Canons of Professional Ethics refers (Practice Book, p. 12) to attorneys as 'ministers' of the law.

In addition, in Connecticut each attorney-at-law admitted to practice within the state, while in good standing, is a commissioner of the Superior Court and in that capacity, may, within the state, sign writs, issue subpoenas, take recognizances and administer oaths. General Statutes § 51-85; Amato v. Campano, 141 Conn. 247, 250, 105 A.2d 185. Mesne process in civil actions consists of a writ of summons or attachment which 'shall be signed by a commissioner of the superior court or a judge or clerk of the court to which it is returnable.' General Statutes § 52-89; Practice Book § 28. 'Such signing is one of the processes of law by which a man may be deprived of his liberty and property. It is carefully guarded. It is not to be done indiscriminately. Doolittle v. Clark, 47 Conn. 316, 322. The signing of a writ by a person as a commissioner of the Superior Court is not a mere ministerial act.' Sharkiewicz v. Smith, 142 Conn. 410, 412, 114 A.2d 691, 692. In the exercise of their power to issue writs as...