Griffitts v. Cope

• Citation: 17 Pa. 96
• Parties: Griffitts et al. versus Cope et al.
• Decision Date: 01 January 1856
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Page 96

17 Pa. 96

Griffitts et al. versus Cope et al.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

CERTIFICATE from the Nisi Prius.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

The case was argued at December Term, 1850, by Tyson and Williams, for the appellants, and by McMurtrie, with whom was Ellis Lewis, for the plaintiffs below; and at this term by the same counsel for the appellants, and by McMurtrie and Gerhard, with whom was Lewis, for the plaintiffs below.—The devise was not of a conditional estate; it merely imposed a condition precedent to the conveyance by the executors, which, when executed, made the devisees purchasers for value. As to the side lots, no question can arise; for the grantors, whether they were or were not bound to do so, have conveyed a fee simple untrammelled by any condition or trust. The main lot is held as a charitable use: 2 S. & St. 67; Duke 374; or if not so, as a trust not on condition: Cro. Eliz. 288; Duke on Ch. Uses 80; Poph. 6; Moore 594; Com. Dig. Condition, A. 4; Vin. Ab. Devise, F. E. As the one or the other, neither the misuser of the property nor any abuse by the trustees can work a forfeiture. But this is a case merely of nonuser. For there has been no destruction of the property nor sale of the building.

For the plaintiffs below it was argued: — That the question is what quantity of estate was given by the founder of the charity. A gift for a particular purpose implies that no greater estate is given than is necessary for the purpose. Thus a devise in fee, if intended only for payment of debts becomes a base fee ceasing on payment of debts: 1 Bla. 645. So of a grant to a corporation: 6 Ser. & R. 234; and similar instances in Vin. Ab. Esch. A. 3, n. C. 8; Cro. Eliz. 669; Vin. Ab. Estate I. 7, 7; T. 5, 2; Estate b. a. 9; Escheat F. 2. Reservation for a dwelling; a sale by the beneficiary destroys his estate: 9 Barr 52. For the use and service of a mill is a base fee: 5 Ib. 126. Such would have been the rule in England but from the disregard of the doctrine of resulting uses in cases of charities: Amb. 190; 2 J. & Walk. 307. The present is clearly a resulting use: 1 V. & B. 272. In this country the same construction is given to instruments creating charities as other estates: 10 Pick. 185; 11 Ib. 495; 16 Mass. 496. To say the testator did not intend the property to be continued in the use for which it was given, would be dangerous doctrine to charitable uses. The legal intent is clear if we suppose a contest in the meeting as to the continuance or diversion from the trust, referred to this court. That the beneficiaries may abandon such a charity cannot be doubted. For the persons entitled are those only who can claim lawfully through this organization. For all purposes the individuals as beneficiaries are represented by the monthly meeting. If the court would carry on the trust at the instance of individuals against the will of the meeting a schism is inevitable, and the trust violated. It is conceded there must be an acceptance to give an estate, and that can only be on the very conditions imposed: 3 Meriv. 353; 1 W. & Ser. 9; Cas. T. F. 222; 1 Dev. Eq. 276. The right to reject after acceptance must exist in the same parties unless there be a contract created by the acceptance capable of being enforced by the court. And being thus rejected for the uses for which given, the estate commensurate with the uses fails: 5 Pick. 528; 8 Metc. 238; 1 Dev. Eq. 276; 3 Barr 436. Wright v. Linn, 9 Barr, which overruled Kirk v. King, is a proof of our position. The rejection there was by trustees not competent to bind the beneficiaries. The fact of a determination no longer to use the building as a place of worship is not denied; and as the court cannot carry on the charity against the will of the society, the estate has ceased, and that of the grantor revives.

The opinion of the court was delivered by LOWRIE, J.

There is a very palpable distinction between a gift of land from motives of charity, and a dedication of land to charitable uses; and there are most intrusive reasons giving a judicial bias in favor of satisfying the motive without establishing a perpetual dedication.

Our law discourages the fettering of estates and putting them into mortmain, and therefore favors the construction which relieves from restraints upon alienation. And it seems unreasonable to suppose, that a devisor ever means that his heirs shall get back the land in such cases, except when he says so; or that, amidst the rapidly changing opinions of society, he means that his opinions shall be imbibed by others just as he left them, and shall for ever withstand the changes necessarily incident to the progress of society; or that he means that no change in the number, circumstances, and habits of the people, shall ever justify any sort of conversion of the gift.

It would seem contrary to public policy to favor a construction that would give to a man, who died a hundred or a thousand years ago, the control of land that ought to be controlled by the present generation. Such an intention ought to be expressed,...