Griffon v. Congress of Racial Equality, Misc. No. 690.
| Decision Date | 20 September 1963 |
| Docket Number | Misc. No. 690. |
| Citation | 221 F. Supp. 899 |
| Parties | C. A. GRIFFON, Jr., Dennis Songy, Charles P. Schnebelen and Edward T. Supple v. CONGRESS OF RACIAL EQUALITY, John Doe and Mary Doe. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana |
Samuel C. Cashio, Dist. Atty., 18th Judicial Dist., Maringouin, La., Charles H. Dameron, Asst. Dist. Atty., 18th Judicial Dist., Port Allen, La., Paul G. Borron, Jr., Edward N. Engolio, Plaquemine, La., for plaintiffs.
Robert F. Collins, Nils R. Douglas, Lolis E. Elie, New Orleans, La., Murphy W. Bell, Baton Rouge, La., Beverly Axelrod, San Francisco, Cal., Eric Rosenfeld, Carl Rachlin, New York City, F. B. McKissick, Durham, N. C., for respondents.
This matter is before the Court on the motion of respondents, Congress of Racial Equality, to dissolve the temporary restraining order issued herein on September 1, 1963. The temporary restraining order was issued because, in the considered opinion of this Court, the sworn affidavits and the verified complaint filed herein showed, to the satisfaction of this Court, that unless a temporary restraining order was issued immediately, irreparable injury, loss and damage would result to applicants before a hearing could be held thereon. I further felt that such a restraining order was necessary in order to preserve law and order in the Town of Plaquemine, Louisiana, pending the hearing on a request for the issuance of a preliminary injunction.
A prior temporary restraining order had been issued by me on August 21, 1963, and had been set aside on August 29, 1963 by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals because of the fact that due to the temporary absence of the Trial Judge from the State, the defendant, Congress of Racial Equality, had apparently been unable to obtain a hearing on its motion to dissolve as provided for under Rule 65(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Consequently, upon application of petitioners, the temporary restraining order of September 1, 1963, was issued by me, specifically reserving to respondents the right to apply for and to have an immediate hearing on a motion to dissolve, should they see fit to file one, all pursuant to the provisions of Rule 65(b). Such a motion was filed on the afternoon of September 3, 1963, and this hearing resulted.
I have given much thought to this matter, and have carefully considered and weighed the argument of counsel for both sides. These are difficult cases; these are difficult times. We simply cannot lose sight of the overall principles involved in these civil rights matters. This temporary restraining order was issued by me because, in my considered opinion, and in the exercise of the discretion vested in me, I sincerely felt that it was absolutely necessary that such an order issue to preserve the status quo until such time as a hearing could be held on the application for the issuance of a preliminary injunction, and subsequently a permanent injunction.
As stated by Judge John Minor Wisdom, the author of the majority opinion in McCain v. Davis, D.C., 217 F.Supp. 661, at page 666, "What all Louisianians know, this Court knows." Under that theory, I believe that I can take judicial cognizance of the live pictures on television, and of the radio broadcasts, which, together with the sworn affidavits and verified pleadings filed herein, left no doubt in my mind whatsoever that a temporary restraining order was necessary in order to prevent violence and possible bloodshed in the Town of Plaquemine.
Now, the restraining order which I issued in this case has been referred to as "a sweeping restraining order"; it has been so characterized by defendants and by certain other news media. A reading of this restraining order will reveal that it is not at all "sweeping" in nature. It is actually restrictive in nature, and carefully designed to enjoin only such unlawful activities as are designed to deliberately violate existing law. It does not, in any way, prevent or enjoin defendants from peaceably assembling, from freely speaking or from freely writing, as long as those activities are engaged in in a lawful manner and with due regard to existing law and with due regard to the constitutionally guaranteed rights of others.
The right to petition for redress of grievance is, of course, protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. But just as the right to freedom of speech and freedom of the press is not absolute and unencumbered by corresponding duties, neither is the right to assemble or the right to petition for the redress of grievance so absolute as to allow their exercise with complete disregard for the constitutionally guaranteed rights of others.
To peaceably assemble is one thing — to confiscate, for one's own individual use, to the exclusion of all others, the streets, sidewalks, and ways of a town is another. To petition for redress of grievance is one thing — to intimidate, to threaten, to take over, if you will, by unlawfully occupying another's home or place of business by completely blocking the means of ingress or egress thereto, is quite another.
It should be clearly understood, once and for all, by all parties to this suit and by all parties to other suits of a similar nature, that this Court will not be intimidated by anyone, regardless of race or color, nor will this Court be in any way influenced by mass demonstrations here or elsewhere. Anyone, be he white or colored, who takes it upon himself to violate the orders of this Court will be dealt with as harshly as the law permits. It is the function of this Court to protect, as far as possible, the constitutionally guaranteed rights of all people, and not just a favored few. I intend to perform that function by the issuance of such orders as I deem necessary and proper. The rights guaranteed by the First Amendment, particularly the right to peaceably assemble, the right of freedom of speech, the right of freedom of the press, and the right to petition for redress of grievance will always be respected and protected by this Court. That right belongs to everyone, white and colored alike.
The right to disobey existing law, however, to confiscate and misuse the property of another, to intimidate, threaten and abuse others and to frustrate and prevent public officials from performing the duties of their office other than by appropriate judicial proceedings, shall always be denied by this Court. In the performance of these functions, the temporary restraining order complained of was issued by this Court. The temporary restraining order issued herein prohibits only the unlawful acts which I have just referred to and nothing else. To dissolve it would be to say, in effect, that you are hereby given specific license to violate the law and that the constitutionally guaranteed rights of others are nonexistent.
This restraining order simply states this: CORE and people acting in concert with them are "hereby enjoined from financing, sponsoring, encouraging, or engaging in meetings or any other activities whereby violations of existing state, municipal or federal laws are suggested, advocated or encouraged." To set that aside at this time would, in effect, say that you are hereby licensed to violate existing state, municipal and federal laws.
The second section of the restraining order says that respondents are restrained from "financing, sponsoring, encouraging or engaging in meetings, demonstrations or other activities whereby the public ways, streets, sidewalks or highways of the City of Plaquemine, or of the Parish of Iberville, Louisiana, are blocked, or the unimpaired use thereof denied to other traffic lawfully attempting to use the same." To set that aside would simply say that you are now specifically licensed to block the streets, sidewalks, and highways of the Town of Plaquemine, and the Parish of Iberville, and that you are hereby licensed to deny the unimpaired use of those facilities to other traffic lawfully attempting to use the same.
The restraining order further says that respondents are restrained from "financing, sponsoring, encouraging or engaging in meetings or other activities wherein or whereby disobedience of the lawful orders of properly constituted law enforcing agencies and their personnel is advocated, suggested or encouraged." To set that aside would simply say that you are now licensed to disobey the lawful orders of the properly constituted authorities in the performance of their duties.
The next section of the restraining order says that you are restrained from "financing, sponsoring, encouraging or engaging in meetings or any other...
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Canlis v. San Joaquin Sheriff's Posse Comitatus
...to which plaintiff points in support of his contention for coverage of state officials under § 1985(1) is Griffon v. Congress of Racial Equality, 221 F.Supp. 899 (E.D.La.1963), which, as noted by defendants, has been repudiated on that issue by the Fifth Circuit in Congress of Racial Equali......
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DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., ETC. v. City of Chicago
...any act that was unlawful, that disturbed the public peace, or trampled on the rights of others. Compare Griffon v. Congress of Racial Equality, 221 F.Supp. 899 (E.D.La.1963). And it is clear that the defendant officials of the City of Chicago had authority, indeed, the duty to enforce the ......
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Baron v. Carson
...to which plaintiff points in support of his contention for coverage of state officials under § 1985(1) is Griffon v. Congress of Racial Equality, 221 F.Supp. 899 (E.D.La.1963), which, as noted by defendants, has been repudiated on that issue by the Fifth Circuit in Congress of Racial Equali......
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