Griggs v. Baumer, 7926
| Decision Date | 18 September 1942 |
| Docket Number | 7907.,No. 7926,7926 |
| Citation | 130 F.2d 899 |
| Parties | GRIGGS v. BAUMER. BARRAND v. SAME. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
Thomas N. Griggs, of Pittsburgh, Pa. (Griggs & Moreland, William A. Blair and Raymond F. Moreland, all of Pittsburgh, Pa., on the brief), for appellant in No. 7926.
Ella Graubart, of Pittsburgh, Pa. (Patterson, Crawford, Arensberg & Dunn and Charles F. C. Arensberg, all of Pittsburgh, Pa., and Alfred H. Sachs and Ezra Z. Shapiro, both of Cleveland, Ohio, on the brief), for appellant in No. 7907.
Philip N. Shettig, of Ebensburg, Pa., for appellee.
Before MARIS and GOODRICH, Circuit Judges, and BARD, District Judge.
In each of these cases the appeal is from an order of the court below, after hearing, dismissing the complaint.
Thomas N. Griggs is the plaintiff in the one action and Harry P. Barrand in the other. The defendant in both actions is Herman E. Baumer, the Receiver of the First National Bank of Johnstown, Johnstown, Pennsylvania. As Receiver, the defendant had in his possession as part of the assets of the bank, 10,639½ shares of the Climax Fire Brick Company.
On July 1, 1941, the defendant received from Barrand a written offer to purchase these shares at $25.00 per share. The offer was accompanied by a cashier's check in the sum of $26,598.75 as earnest money. The Receiver, having first had the approval of the Comptroller of the Currency to sell the stock at not less than $25 per share, presented a petition to the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County, Pennsylvania, to conduct a public hearing before the court, for the purpose of selling the stock at $25 per share or higher. The court granted authority to hold such a hearing, reserved the right to reject any bid, and declared that any sale was subject to the approval of the court. Due notice was given of the hearing.
On July 18, 1941, a hearing pursuant to the petition was held before a judge of the court, at which the counsel for the Receiver acted as auctioneer. In addition to the original bid of Barrand, bids were offered at the hearing by Griggs and one Harry V. L. Hager. Griggs was declared the purchaser by the acting auctioneer, for the sum of $27.25 per share, and directed to deposit the earnest money of $25,000. Immediately thereafter Griggs placed a certified check for $25,000 before counsel for the Receiver, but before the court had signed any order confirming the sale to him, counsel for Barrand addressed the court, claiming as the original offerer the right to purchase the stock at the highest price bid by any other party. The court rejected this contention, but allowed the bidding to be reopened. Counsel for Barrand, after consultation with his client, bid $27.30 per share. No further bids were made. Griggs thereupon stated that it was his position that the sale had been consummated to him and that no further bids could be accepted, and that he wished an exception noted to any further action. The court announced that the highest bid was $27.30 and signed an order of confirmation presented by the Receiver approving the sale to Barrand at that price, Barrand having previously made the necessary deposit. Griggs then requested the court for leave to file written exceptions to this order of confirmation within five days, which request the court granted.
Barrand went with the Receiver from the Court House at Ebensburg to the bank at Johnstown and delivered certified checks for the full amount of the bid, and the Receiver delivered to him a certified copy of the order confirming the sale, together with a bill of sale for the stock. Delivery of the stock was withheld pending the clearing of the checks.
Within the five days, Griggs filed his exceptions, seeking vacation of the order of sale to Barrand and an order confirming the sale to him, and Hager filed a petition to set aside the sale to Barrand and re-open the bidding, in which petition he offered to bid $10,000 (later increased to $15,000) in excess of the Barrand bid. The court issued a rule on all interested parties to show cause why this petition should not be granted. The Receiver answered that Barrand's checks for the full purchase price had cleared and that he was ready to deliver the stock to Barrand. On August 11, 1941, after hearing, the court dismissed Griggs' exceptions, but it vacated the order confirming the sale to Barrand and ordered a resale to Hager at the amount offered by him.
Griggs and Barrand thereupon each brought an action in the federal court against the Receiver, setting forth these facts and seeking to establish the validity of the sale to him and to compel the Receiver to deliver the stock to him. The court below, holding that the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County had not made a final order of confirmation to either Griggs or Barrand, granted the defendant's motions to dismiss their complaints.
In approving the sale of the assets of a national bank by the receiver thereof, the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County was acting under the authority of the Act of May 15, 1916, c. 121, 39 Stat. 121, as amended, 12 U.S.C.A. § 192. The relevant portion of this Act states: "Such receiver, under the direction of the comptroller, shall take possession of the books, records, and assets of every description of such association, collect all debts, dues, and claims belonging to it, and, upon the order of a court of record of competent jurisdiction, may sell or compound all bad or doubtful debts, and, on a like order, may sell all the real and personal property of such association, on such terms as the court shall direct; * * *."
It is established that a court in entering an order of approval of a sale under the authority of this act is not adjudicating a judicial controversy, determining the rights of adverse parties, but is acting in a merely administrative...
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