Griggs v. C & H, 2264, September Term, 2004.

• Decision Date: 15 August 2006
• Docket Number: No. 2264, September Term, 2004.,2264, September Term, 2004.
• Citation: 905 A.2d 402,169 Md. App. 556
• Parties: Randolph GRIGGS v. C & H MECHANICAL CORPORATION, et al.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

905 A.2d 402

169 Md. App. 556

Randolph GRIGGS v. C & H MECHANICAL CORPORATION, et al.

No. 2264, September Term, 2004.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

August 15, 2006.

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Bruce A. Goldstein (Cooper & Tuerk, L.L.P., on the brief), Baltimore, for Appellant.

Andrew T. Nichols (Jonathan P. Stebenne, on the brief), Baltimore, for Appellees.

Panel: HOLLANDER, ADKINS and THEODORE G. BLOOM (Retired, Specially Assigned), JJ.

ADKINS, Judge.

On January 2, 2002, appellant Randolph Griggs was injured while working construction. On February 20, 2004, more than two years later, Griggs filed a worker's compensation claim. His employer, C & H Mechanical Corp., and its insurer, One Beacon Insurance Company, appellees, filed a Contesting Issues Form, raising inter alia "statute of limitations."

After an evidentiary hearing, the Workers' Compensation Commission ruled, by order dated May 25, 2004, that Griggs "sustained an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of employment on 1/2/02," that he gave his employer adequate notice of the injury, and that, following shoulder surgery, he suffered temporary total disability "from 5/12/04 to present and continuing."

Appellees filed a timely Request for Rehearing, on the ground that

[t]he claimant was found to have sustained an accidental injury on January 2, 2002 but did not file his Notice of Employee's Claim form until February 20, 2004; over two years later. As a matter of law, the claimant's claim is barred by statute of limitations. This issue was not addressed in the decision although it was raised as a contesting issue by the insurer.

By order dated June 17, 2004, the Commission denied this motion without explanation.

Appellees petitioned for judicial review of "the Order of the Workers' Compensation Commission dated June 17, 2004." Griggs moved to dismiss this petition, on the ground that appellees only requested review of the June 17 order denying reconsideration on the limitations issue, instead of seeking review of the May 25 order addressing the substantive issues raised by the case. Griggs argued that, because appellees never asked to review the May 25 order, the circuit court could not review the substantive decisions made in that order.

While Griggs's motion to dismiss their petition for judicial review was still pending, appellees moved for summary judgment on the basis of Md.Code (1991, 1999 Repl. Vol., 2005 Cum. Supp.), section 9-709 of the Labor and Employment Article (LE). This section provides that, "if a covered employee fails to file a claim within 2 years after the date of the accidental personal injury, the claim is completely barred." Appellees asserted that, as a matter of law, Griggs's claim is barred because he filed it on February 20, 2004, more than two years after the January 2, 2002 accident.

At the conclusion of a hearing on both motions, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City denied Griggs's motion to dismiss, and granted appellees' motion for summary judgment on limitations grounds. Griggs noted this timely appeal, raising two issues for our review:

I. Did the circuit court err in denying Griggs's motion to dismiss?

II. Did the circuit court err in granting appellees' motion for summary judgment on limitations grounds?

We shall answer "no" to both questions.

DISCUSSION

I. Motion To Dismiss Petition For Judicial Review

Petitions for judicial review of a decision by the Workers Compensation Commission "shall ... identify the order or action of which review is sought[,]" Md. Rule 7-202(c), and must be "filed within 30 days after the date of the mailing of the Commission's order[.]" LE § 9-737. Renewing his unsuccessful argument to the circuit court, Griggs contends that appellees' petition for judicial review should have been dismissed because (1) it challenges only the Commission's June 17 denial of appellees' motion for a rehearing, rather than the May 25 order awarding workers' compensation; (2) the June 17 order is not a final appealable order because it does not grant or deny some benefit under the workers' compensation laws; and (3) it is too late to petition for review of the May 25 decision granting his claim. See Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Havenner, 33 Md.App. 326, 332, 364 A.2d 95 (1976)("the term `final order' or `final action,' within the ambit of the Workmen's Compensation Law, means an order or award made by the Commission ... determining the issues of law and of fact necessary for a resolution of the problem presented in that particular proceeding and which grants or denies some benefit under the Act").

Like the circuit court, we find no merit in Griggs's argument. By statute, the period in which a party may petition for judicial review of a workers compensation decision is extended beyond 30 days, by the simple filing of a written motion for a rehearing. Under LE section 9-726(f), governing the effect of filing a written request for a rehearing "on [the] time for taking [an] appeal ... from the decision" of the Commission, a party who has done so begins counting the 30-day filing period from "the date on which the Commission mails notice of" either the denial of the motion or the rehearing date. Moreover, both the statutes and case law make clear that the "decision" being challenged on appeal is the final substantive disposition of the workers' compensation claim. See, e.g., Montgomery County v. Ward, 331 Md. 521, 526-27, 629 A.2d 619 (1993) ("the `decision' of the Commission which is subject to judicial review under the statutory language is the final decision or order in a case"); Paolino v. McCormick & Co., 314 Md. 575, 582, 552 A.2d 868 (1989) (only the order by which the Commission disposes of a case qualifies as a decision within the meaning of LE section 9-745(b)); Havenner, 33 Md.App. at 332, 364 A.2d 95 (same).

Griggs posits that the citation of the June 17 order in the Petition for Judicial Review means that the May 25 order was not challenged. We disagree. Although the petition sought relief "from the Order ... dated June 17, 2004[,]" Griggs understood that the Commission's failure to address the limitations issue was the stated basis for both the motion for rehearing and the Petition for Judicial Review. Cf. Kim v. Comptroller of the Treas., 350 Md. 527, 539-40, 714 A.2d 176 (1998) (recognizing that pleading identifying administrative decision from which relief is sought may be held to substantially comply with content requirement of Md. Rule 7-202(c)). Moreover, the de novo nature of the action means that the circuit court must consider all of the issues that were raised in the Commission proceedings. Because the content and nature of the Petition for Judicial Review were sufficient, we hold that the circuit court correctly denied Griggs's motion to dismiss.

II. Summary Judgment

Under Maryland's Workers Compensation Law, a covered employee must file his or her workers' compensation claim "within 2 years after the date of the accidental personal injury," or "the claim is completely barred." See LE § 9-709(b)(3). There are, however, two separate but related notice conditions that may bar a claim even if it was filed within two years of the accidental injury:

• Employee notice to employer. An injured worker must notify his or her employer in writing of any accidental injury "within 10 days[.]" See LE section 9-704(b). A claimant's notice obligation may be excused or waived if the Commission finds "there was a sufficient reason for the failure to comply" or "the employer or its insurer has not been prejudiced by the failure to comply." See LE § 9-706(a)(1). If unsatisfied and unexcused, however, a claimant's failure to notify his or her employer of an accidental injury in accordance with section 9-704(b) "bars a claim" for workers' compensation. See LE § 9-709(b).

• Employer notice to Commission. The employer is required to report to the Commission any injury that "causes disability for more than 3 days or death[.]" See LE § 9-707(a). If the injured employee notifies his employer of such an injury, the two-year limitations period established by LE section 9-709(b)(3) "does not begin to run until the employer files" such a report. See LE § 9-708(b); DeBusk v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 105 Md.App. 96, 102-03, 658 A.2d 1147 (1995), aff'd, 342 Md. 432, 677 A.2d 73 (1996).

In the Commission, appellees raised as "contested issues" the separate defenses of lack of notice by Griggs to his employer and Griggs's failure to file his claim with the Commission within two years of his accident.

In granting Griggs an award of compensation, the Commission found that Griggs did give C & H notice of his injury. Although it is undisputed that Griggs did not file his workers' compensation claim within two years of his accident, the Commission made no finding as to whether Griggs's claim is barred by LE section 9-709(b)(3). Indeed, the Commission's list of issues on which the hearing was held did not mention the two-year limitations period.

Appellees moved for a rehearing, arguing that, notwithstanding Griggs's notice to C & H, he filed his claim too late as a matter of law. They asserted that the Commission erred in failing to enforce LE section 9-709(b)(3). The Commission issued a one-sentence order denying the rehearing motion, without further explanation.

On de novo review in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, appellees moved for summary judgment on the ground that the claim was not filed within two years of the accident, that they did not waive this "limitations defense" at the Commission hearing, and that the Commission erred as a matter of law in failing to rule the claim barred by LE section 9-709(b)(3). In their view, "[e]ven with the focus of the [Commission] hearing being on the issue of notice, the statute of limitations issue was still a viable argument," and there was ample evidence in the Commission record on which that could be decided.

The...