Griggs v. Riley

• Citation: 489 S.W.2d 469
• Decision Date: 31 October 1972
• Docket Number: No. 34331,34331
• Parties: Lawrence Edward GRIGGS, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Forest Leroy RILEY, Defendant-Respondent, Stanley Joseph Martin, Defendant-Appellant. . Louis District, Division Two
• Court: Court of Appeal of Missouri (US)

Page 469

489 S.W.2d 469

Lawrence Edward GRIGGS, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Forest Leroy RILEY, Defendant-Respondent, Stanley Joseph Martin, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 34331.

Missouri Court of Appeals, St. Louis District, Division Two.

Oct. 31, 1972.

Motion for Rehearing and for Transfer to Supreme Court

Denied Dec. 11, 1972.

Application to Transfer Denied Feb. 12, 1973.

Glen C. Schomburg, Kirkwood, for defendant-appellant.

Ray B. Marglous, Marglous & Marglous, Clayton, Warren Grauel, St. Louis, for plaintiff-respondent.

James S. Collins, II, Whalen & O'Connor, St. Louis, for defendant-respondent.

SMITH, Judge.

This automobile accident case reaches us upon a judgment of $5000 for plaintiff in accord with a jury verdict.

Although defendant has raised eleven points in this court, three of them relate directly to the most serious question of law presented--the applicability of Kennedy v. Dixon, Mo., 439 S.W.2d 173, to the facts here.

In Kennedy Missouri abandoned the rigid doctrine of lex loci delicti in determining the law to be applied in tort cases in favor of the more liberal approach advocated by Restatement (Second) on Conflict of Laws, § 145. There, two Missouri residents took a trip to New York and were returning. An accident occurred in Indiana and the passenger brought suit in Missouri against the administrator of her driver's estate. Our Supreme Court held, in utilizing the Restatement (Second) approach that the most significant relationship as to the rights and liabilities of the parties was in Missouri and the Indiana guest statute would not be applied to defeat plaintiff's recovery.

The case at bar presents what is purported, and at first blush appears, to be the opposite situation. At the time of the accident plaintiff-passenger and defendant-driver-owner were residents of Illinois. ¹ They embarked upon a social trip from that state into Missouri with an anticipated return to Illinois the next day. While in Missouri, plaintiff was injured when the automobile being driven by defendant collided with another vehicle as defendant's car made a left turn off Lindbergh Blvd. in St. Louis County into a motel driveway. The driver of the second car was a Missouri resident and was joined as a party defendant. The court directed a verdict in his favor at the close of the plaintiff's case. At the time of the accident Illinois had a guest statute which would cover the relationship here, if applicable. ²

In Kennedy v. Dixon, supra, the court gave the following guideline for future cases: '. . . (T)here occasionally may be factual situations in which it will be difficult to establish clearly that a particular state has the most significant relationship as to a particular issue or issues. If and when such situations arise, then the trial court should continue, as in the past, to apply the substantive law of the place of the tort.' (l.c. 185).

The issue we are dealing with here is the relationship of the parties, and the liability to suit of the defendant, as a result of that relationship. It should be emphasized that as was true in Kennedy the substantive law of the place where the accident occurred is to be applied in determining whether defendant's actions constituted a tort sufficient to permit recovery by the plaintiff.

It must be noted that Kennedy involved what is frequently referred to as a 'false' conflict of laws. This because the state of Indiana has no real state concern in whether a Missouri court permits a recovery by one Missouri resident against another Missouri resident simply because the accident fortuitously occurred in Indiana. Guest statutes and some other liability precluding rules are aimed either at the relationship between citizens or domiciliaries of the state or the circumstances under which the courts of that state will permit recovery. Neither was involved in Kennedy.

The case at bar involves, on the other hand, a true conflict situation. It is the policy of this state to compensate victims of negligent driving regardless of any host-guest relationship which may exist between the parties. It was ³ the policy of Illinois to protect gratuitous hosts from suit by ungrateful guests. ⁴ This essentially is a policy based upon a determination of what is the liability existing between persons entering into a relationship in its state. The parties here were residents of Illinois, and entered into their relationship in that state. Illinois has an interest in that relationship. Missouri is the state of the accident and more importantly, we think, the situs of the litigation. Because of its policy of compensation in the courts of this state, Missouri also has a real interest in the law to be applied.

Were we free to disregard the language of Kennedy v. Dixon, supra, we could resolve the conflict in one of two ways. First, we could adopt the positions taken in Wisconsin and Kentucky. Both of those states originally adopted the Restatement (Second) approach when confronted with the Kennedy fact situation. Each thereafter abandoned that method when confronted with the fact situation at bar in favor of what is called 'choice influencing considerations' advocated by Professor Leflar. ⁵ Health v. Zellmer, 35 Wis.2d 578, 151 N.W.2d 664; Conklin v. Horner, 38 Wis.2d 468, 157 N.W.2d 579; Arnett v. Thompson, Ky., 433 S.W.2d 109.

We find, however, that such an approach, much like the Restatement approach, tends merely to allow a court to weigh a list of possible considerations emphasizing those which permit a certain result, and deemphasizing those which lead to a contrary conclusion. It would appear better in this case to determine whether the relationship sought to be protected by Illinois is of sufficient actual importance to overcome the public policy of this state that seeks to compensate persons negligently injured on the highways of this state when the action is brought in the courts of this state. As to the transitory, temporary and occasional relationship which is involved in the guest-host situation we would have no hesitancy in saying it is not. ^l

In view of Kennedy and the constitutional mandate of Article V, Section 2, Mo.Const., V.A.M.S., we do not rest our decision on that ground. The court's decision in Kennedy abandoned, '. . . the inflexible lex loci delicti rule in favor of the rule set forth in § 145 of the Proposed Official Draft of Restatement (Second) on Conflict of Laws.'

That section provides:

's 145. The General Principle

'(1) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the principles stated in § 6 '(2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to determine the law applicable to an issue include:

(a) the place where the injury occurred,

(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,

(c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and

(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.

'These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue.'

But it is to be noted that Section 145 is framed in reference to Section 6. That section provides:

's 6. Choice-of-Law Principles

'(1) A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory directive of its own state on choice of law.

'(2) When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the choice of the applicable rule of law include

(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,

(b) the relevant policies of the forum,

(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue,

(d) the protection of justified expections,

(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,

(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and

(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.'

Since we are dealing here with the relationship between the parties, and since, as noted in Kennedy, the place of accident in this type of case is largely fortuitous, paragraphs 2(c) and (d) of § 145 would appear to provide the basis upon which determination is to be made. Those two paragraphs would, if considered alone, require that Illinois law governing the relationship be applied. But § 145 must be viewed from the proper perspective. The basic principles governing choice of laws are those enumerated in § 6. Section 145 simply provides that certain contacts may be taken into account in determining the choice of law under the principles of § 6. So we must examine the principles of § 6, paragraph 2. We now look at those principles.

As to (a) we can see little impact on interstate relations in the automobile accident filed arising from application or non-application of the guest statute.

Principles (b) and (c) will be discussed hereinafter.

As the comments following § 6 make clear, principles (d), (e) and (f) have little or no application to negligence actions where the conduct resulting in damage is not planned in advance nor usually taken into account when the relationship is established. And the comments also make clear that (f) and (g), while beneficial, are always subservient to the achievement of desirable results. Principles (b) and (c) therefore become determinative.

Missouri's policy of compensation has heretofore been referred to. There is one additional matter which should be mentioned. The driver of the other car involved in the accident was joined as a party defendant and is a Missouri resident. Missouri has a contribution statute ⁷ between joint tort-feasors and Missouri has an interest in protecting the rights of Missouri residents under that statute. Application of the Illinois guest statute would obviate that right...