Griggs v. Transocean Air Lines

• Decision Date: 04 January 1960
• Docket Number: No. 18450,18450
• Citation: 1 Cal.Rptr. 803,176 Cal.App.2d 843
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: , 45 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2779, 39 Lab.Cas. P 66,182 Marvin J. GRIGGS, Plalntiff and Appellant, v. TRANSOCEAN AIR LINES, a corporation, Defendant and Respondent.

Page 803

1 Cal.Rptr. 803

176 Cal.App.2d 843, 45 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2779,

39 Lab.Cas. P 66,182

Marvin J. GRIGGS, Plalntiff and Appellant, v. TRANSOCEAN AIR LINES, a corporation, Defendant and Respondent.

No. 18450.

District Court of Appeal, First District, Division 1, California.

Jan. 4, 1960.

Raymond N. Baker, Hayward, for appellant.

Ricksen, Freeman, Hogan & Vendt, Carl R. Vendt, Oakland, Richard Ernst, San Francisco, Richard G. Logan, Oakland, for respondent.

DEVINE, Justice pro tem.

Plaintiff, Marvin J. Griggs, appeals from a judgment which was rendered in favor of defendant upon the special defense that plaintiff had not submitted to arbitration the subject matter of the litigation and that the collective bargaining agreement which covered him required him to seek arbitration.

Appellant was employed as an air pilot by defendant in 1946 upon an agreement that all of the terms and conditions of his employment would be controlled by certain contracts between the Air Lines Pilots, a labor organization, and Transocean Air Lines, the employer. On March 9, 1951, appellant was discharged from his employment. On March 15, 1951, he wrote to the chief pilot of Transocean, setting forth what he termed 'claims and grievances,' requested a complete audit of flight records in order to determine the compensation to which he claimed to be entitled, and asked for prompt disposition of the grievances. Writing to the chief pilot would be the first step of compliance with the procedure for settlement of grievances under the collective bargaining agreement.

The grievances described in appellant's letter are the same claims as those made in the complaint in the superior court action, although they are expressed somewhat differently. The complaint contains a count for damages for alleged wrongful discharge, but appellant has abandoned that claim, conceding that on that subject the collective bargaining agreement is so specific in its requirement for arbitration, which appellant admittedly did not follow, that the sustaining of the special defense was justified.

Just how far he carried his other claims, which are described below, in the administrative procedure, does not appear clearly, but it is conceded by appellant that he did not seek arbitration, which is the last step established by the collective bargaining agreement for the settlement of grievances. At one point in his brief appellant suggests a failure of a hearing officer to make a final decision, but the point was not raised in the superior court and the record is silent on the subject, so the point is not considered further.

Not having recourse to arbitration, nor proposing it, appellant filed his complaint in the superior court. There is no allegation in the complaint of failure, refusal, or unwillingness on the part of appellant's labor organization to act on his behalf in arbitration, nor has that organization sought to intervene here. Besides the now abandoned cause of action for wrongful discharge, the complaint seeks judgment for alleged: (1) unpaid wages, generally; (2) wages unpaid under the terms of a certain decision of the National Labor Relations Board affecting pilots (appellant was not party to the N.L.R.B. case itself); (3) vacation pay; (4) wages due because of violation of appellant's seniority rights; (5) living expenses of appellant while he was assigned to a post away from his base station; (6) out of pocket sums paid by appellant for the maintenance and operation of his employer's aircraft.

In addition to general denials there was pleaded the special defense that appellant had not had recourse to arbitration, and this issue was tried separately under the provisions of section 597 of the Code of Civil Procedure and judgment thereon was rendered in favor of defendant.

It is appellant's contention that his claims are not arbitrable grievances and that he may demand adjudication by the courts without reference to arbitration. He argues that arbitrable grievances are disputes in the labor-management field which do not include individual or group money claims for alleged unpaid sums, such as are described in his complaint. He declares that he seeks no interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement, but simply pay, expenses and the like, as detailed above, and that such matters need not be arbitrated.

Section 25 of the collective bargaining agreement, under grievances, reads as follows: 'Any pilot, or group of pilots hereunder, who have a grievance concerning any action of the Company affecting them shall be entitled to have such grievance handled in accordance with the procedure established in Section 24 hereof, for investigation and hearing cases of discipline and dismissal.' Section 24 gives the procedure for cases of discipline and dismissal. The final step in the procedure is arbitration by a board of adjustment selected by both company and union and established in compliance with section 204, Title II of the Railway Labor Act (45 U.S.C.A. § 184).

The arbitration agreement provides that 'The Board shall have jurisdiction over disputes between any employee covered by the Pilots' Agreement and the Company, growing out of grievances or out of interpretation or application of any of the terms of the Pilots' Agreement.'

The fact that the collective bargaining agreement in section 25 uses the words 'shall be entitled' to arbitration does not mean that its use is merely permissive. An employee who is entitled to the benefit of arbitration must have recourse to it as to all claims which are arbitrable even though the agreement does not expressly require that to be done. Hagin v. Pacific Gas and Elec. Co., 152 Cal.App.2d 93, 312 P.2d 356; Williams v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co., 147 Cal.App.2d 1, 304 P.2d 715.

An arbitration agreement of the nature of that made by the parties hereto is made mandatory by the Railway Labor Act. 45 U.S.C.A. § 184. However, the question whether or not administrative remedies must be exhausted depends on the policy of the state in which a breach of contract action is brought. Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc. v. Koppal, 345 U.S. 653, 73 S.Ct. 906, 97 L.Ed. 1325.

The policy of the law of California is exceedingly favorable to arbitration in the matter of collective bargaining agreements. Levy v. Superior Court, 15 Cal.2d 692, 104 P.2d 770, 129 A.L.R. 956; Myers v. Richfield Oil Corp., 98 Cal.App.2d 667, 220 P.2d 973. Wherever arbitration has been agreed upon as the means of settling a dispute or grievance, and fair and effective arbitration is available, the parties must have recourse to it. A few recent cases, together with a very brief description of their subject matter, applying this rule are these: Williams v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co., supra, 147 Cal.App.2d 1, 304 P.2d 715, involving an employee's claim for displacement allowance when certain trains were discontinued; Cone v. Union Oil Co., 129 Cal.App.2d 558, 227 P.2d 464, concerning alleged denial of plaintiff's seniority rights; and Hagin v. Pacific Gas Elec. Co., supra, 152 Cal.App.2d 93, 312 P.2d 356, in which employees sought recovery for expenses to which they alleged they had been put.

That the law of California does require exhaustion of administrative remedies has been recognized by the Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, in a case involving an agreement executed under the Railway Labor Act. Barker v. Southern Pacific Co., 9 Cir., 214 F.2d 918.

Even the statements of subject matter of the California cases given...