Grillo v. Sidney Wanzer & Sons, Inc.

• Decision Date: 26 February 1975
• Docket Number: No. 60029,60029
• Citation: 326 N.E.2d 180,26 Ill.App.3d 1007
• Parties: Nick GRILLO, Individually and d/b/a Nick's Dairy Service, and Ludwig Milk Company, Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. SIDNEY WANZER & SONS, INC., an Illinois Corporation, Defendant-Appellant, and Board of Education of the City of Chicago, a body politic and corporate, and Joseph Bertrand, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 180

326 N.E.2d 180

26 Ill.App.3d 1007

Nick GRILLO, Individually and d/b/a Nick's Dairy Service and Ludwig Milk Company, Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. SIDNEY WANZER & SONS, INC., an Illinois Corporation Defendant-Appellant and Board of Education of the City of Chicago, a body politic and corporate, and Joseph Bertrand, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 60029.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Fourth Division.

Feb. 26, 1975.

Donald E. Egan, Alan L. Unikel, Chicago, for defendant-appellant, Sidney Wanzer & Sons, Inc. (Rothschild, Barry & Myers, Chicago, of counsel).

Fred I. Shandling, Chicago, for plaintiff-appellee, Nick Grillo.

Kenneth E. Steffan, Elgin, for plaintiff-appellee, Ludwig Milk Co., Inc.

BURMAN, Justice.

This is an appeal from an action brought by plaintiff, Nick Grilo, individually and d/b/a Nick's Dairy Service (Grillo), for injunctive relief against Sidney Wanzer & Sons, Inc. (Wanzer), the Board of Education of the City of Chicago (Board) and Joseph Bertrand as Ex officio School Treasurer of the Board of Education. Prior to a hearing on plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction, Ludwig Milk Company (Ludwig) was granted leave to intervene as an additional party plaintiff. On January 14, 1974, the court entered a mandatory injunction against the Board prohibiting the payment to Wanzer of certain monies owed for milk received and directing that they be paid to Ludwig. Wanzer appeals.

Grillo is an independent milk distributor who purchases milk and milk products from dairies for resale to consumers. In November of 1970 Grillo became a Wanzer distributor. He continued to purchase his entire milk requirements from Wanzer through October 31, 1973, with the exception of one three month period wherein he purchased from Borden. Shortly after associating with Wanzer, Grillo obtained credit financing. In exchange therefor, Grillo executed a security agreement dated January 1, 1971, granting Wanzer a security interest in Grillo's 'contract rights, accounts receivable, milk routes, as described in Schedule A attached hereto, and other collateral and in the proceeds and products thereof.' Additionally, Grillo granted Wanzer a security interest in one of his trucks which was partially financed by Wanzer. On January 11, 1971, Wanzer filed a financing statement with the Secretary of State covering this collateral.

Milk contracts for a large number of schools are submitted by the Board to public bid. In accordance with this procedure, the Chicago Board of Education has contracted to purchase milk from Grillo for use in its school milk program for the past four to five years. The present action arose out of a bid submitted by Grillo in November of 1972 on a portion of the Board's milk requirements for 1973. Pursuant to his bid, Grillo was awarded a contract to deliver approximately 16,000 half-pints daily to 18 schools. The deliveries were to commence on March 1, 1973. As of that date, Grillo was indebted to Wanzer in the amount of approximately $17,000.

At the hearing on plaintiffs' request for a temporary injunction, Wanzer alleged that Grillo executed an assignment to it of all rights under the contract. The assignment was to secure payment for milk delivered to Grillo. While Grillo alleged that the assignment was a forgery, his testimony was contradicted by one of his own witnesses who stated that he saw Grillo execute the document.

Pursuant to his contract with the Board, Grillo supplied milk to the schools which he purchased from Wanzer. In accordance with the terms of the assignment, the Board issued warrants directly to Wanzer in full payment of all monies due Grillo. Because of the Board's administrative procedure, the warrant for a given month's milk delivery was not issued until the following month. Thus, March milk was paid through the issuance of a warrant in April and so on thereafter.

Grillo remained a Wanzer distributor until October 31, 1973. At that point in time he owned Wanzer the sum of $78,792. Pursuant to the security agreement and the assignment, the Board issued a warrant to Wanzer in November of 1973 for the October milk delivery. The warrant was in the amount of $20,584.41, leaving a balance due Wanzer of $58,207.59.

On November 1, 1973, Grillo discontinued his association with Wanzer and began purchasing all milk requirements from Ludwig. On that day, Ludwig obtained an assignment from Grillo of all contract rights under the 1973 contract with the Board. The assignment was identical in form to that given Wanzer. It was immediately forwarded to the Board's purchasing department and subsequently was approved on November 15, 1973. Ludwig, however, did not obtain a security agreement, nor did he file the assignment or a financing statement with the Secretary of State. Furthermore, neither Grillo nor Ludwig obtained a release of the prior assignment to Wanzer. Pursuant to the prior assignment, the Board thereafter issued its December warrant to Wanzer for the November milk delivery, which milk was supplied by Ludwig to Grillo. Consequently, Grillo's debt to Wanzer was reduced to approximately $34,081.

The present law suit was filed on January 2, 1974, and at that point in time the Board had not yet issued its January warrant for milk delivered in December of 1973. Plaintiffs commenced this action seeking an injunction against the Board to stop payment of the December warrant, to issue a replacement warrant to Ludwig, and for other additional relief. Prior to an evidentiary hearing on plaintiffs' complaint for a preliminary injunction, Wanzer informed the court that the warrant for November's milk had already been delivered to it, negotiated and paid by Bertrand. After a full hearing, the court accordingly dismissed Bertrand as a party defendant and denied plaintiffs' prayer for relief insofar as it requested a stop payment of that warrant. The court further enjoined the Board from issuing further warrants to Wanzer and ordered the Board to issue all subsequent warrants to Ludwig for milk supplied by Ludwig to Grillo and resold to the Board.

We first must stress that the substantive issues of the instant case are not before us for resolution. They were not decided in the trial court, and we will not decide them now. The sole role of an appellate court in addressing the grant or refusal of an interlocutory decree is narrowly restricted to a determination of whether the judge correctly exercised his broad discretionary power. Toushin v. City of Chicago, 23 Ill.App.3d 797, 320 N.E.2d 202. Therefore, each issue will be considered only so far as is necessary to determine whether the judge acted within the parameters of his authority.

Wanzer first contends that the trial court erred in granting the extraordinary remedy of a mandatory preliminary injunction since the decree had the effect of granting plaintiffs all relief they could possibly obtain at a full trial on the merits, and since the requisite showing of urgent need for such relief was not established. We agree.

The purpose of an interlocutory, preliminary or temporary injunction is quite clear. Such a decree is granted before a trial on the merits of a case for the purpose of preventing a threatened wrong, or any further perpetration of injury, in order to preserve the Status quo with the least injury to the parties concerned. John Deere Co. of Moline v. Hinrichs, 36 Ill.App.2d 255, 183 N.E.2d 309. It is not the purpose of such an injunction to determine any controverted rights nor to decide the merits of a case. John Deere Co. of Moline v. Hinrichs, 36 Ill.App.2d 255, 183 N.E.2d 309.

While plaintiffs argue that the court's order of January 14, 1974, had the effect of maintaining the Status quo, we fail to see how. The Status quo has been defined as 'the last, actual, peaceable, uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy.' (O'Brien v. Matual, 14 Ill.App.2d 173, 187, 144 N.E.2d 446, 453.) By enjoining the Board from issuing warrants to Wanzer and directing that payment be made to Ludwig, the court in effect...