Grim v. Rhinebeck Cent School Dist.

• Decision Date: 08 October 2003
• Docket Number: No. 02-7483.,02-7483.
• Citation: 346 F.3d 377
• Parties: Joan GRIM and Steven Grim, parents of a disabled child, Chelsea, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. RHINEBECK CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

346 F.3d 377

Joan GRIM and Steven Grim, parents of a disabled child, Chelsea, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. RHINEBECK CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 02-7483.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Argued January 13, 2003.

Decided October 8, 2003.

As Amended October 24, 2003.

Mark C. Rushfield (Michael K. Lambert, on the brief), Shaw & Perelson, LLP, Poughkeepsie, NY, for Defendant-Appellant.

RosaLee Charpentier, Family Advocates, Inc., Kingston, NY, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Before: LEVAL and CABRANES, Circuit Judges, and AMON, District Judge.^*

JOSÉ A. CABRANES, Circuit Judge.

Defendant appeals from the District Court's award of $51,603.13 in private-school tuition reimbursement to plaintiffs under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. The District Court held that the individualized education programs proposed by the defendant school district for the education of the plaintiffs' daughter were insufficient to provide the student with a "free appropriate public education" as required by the IDEA. In so holding, the District Court reversed decisions denying reimbursement rendered by two Impartial Hearing Officers ("IHOs") and affirmed by a State Review Officer ("SRO") of the New York State Education Department.

Having reviewed the record before the District Court, we reverse the judgment of the District Court and enter judgment affirming the administrative determinations of the New York State Education Department.¹

BACKGROUND

I. The IDEA

The IDEA offers federal funds to states that develop plans to assure "all children with disabilities" a "free appropriate public education," 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A). To meet the requirements of the IDEA, a school district must provide each student with a disability with "special education and related services" designed to serve the student's needs. Id. § 1401(8). Such services must be administered according to an "individualized education program" ("IEP"), which school districts must implement each year for each student with a disability. Id. § 1414(d).

IEPs are subject to numerous procedural and substantive requirements, id., but they are not required to "furnish[ ] ... every special service necessary to maximize each handicapped child's potential," Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 199, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982). Rather, the IDEA requires that IEPs provide a "basic floor of opportunity," consisting of services that are "individually designed to provide educational benefit" to a child with a disability. Id. at 201, 102 S.Ct. 3034.²

The IDEA further imposes on school districts developing IEPs a strong preference for "mainstreaming," or educating children with disabilities "[t]o the maximum extent appropriate" alongside their non-disabled peers. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5). We have interpreted this provision as a requirement that special education be provided in the "least restrictive setting consistent with a child's needs." Walczak v. Florida Union Free School District, 142 F.3d 119, 122 (2d Cir.1998).

New York parents who believe an IEP is insufficient under the IDEA may challenge it in an "impartial due process hearing," 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f), before an IHO appointed by the local board of education, see N.Y. Educ. L. § 4404(1). At that hearing, the school district has the burden of demonstrating the appropriateness of its proposed IEP. See, e.g., Walczak, 142 F.3d at 122 (collecting cases). The decision of an IHO may be appealed to an SRO, see N.Y. Educ. L. § 4404(2); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(g), and the SRO's decision may in turn be challenged in either state or federal court, see 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A).

II. Facts and Procedural History

Plaintiffs-appellees Steven and Joan Grim enrolled their daughter, Chelsea, in defendant-appellant Rhinebeck Central School District for first and second grades. Toward the end of her second-grade year, Chelsea was tested at her parents' request and classified as "learning disabled." Accordingly, the school district developed an IEP outlining a program of special education for her. Chelsea began receiving instruction pursuant to the IEP during the final month of her second-grade year in June 1995.

During the summer of 1995, the Grims concluded that the IEP was insufficient to meet Chelsea's needs, so they unilaterally removed her from the Rhinebeck public schools and enrolled her in the private Kildonan School ("Kildonan"), which specializes in the education of dyslexic students. Kildonan teaches according to the Orton-Gillingham method, "a language based remedial program for students who have specific difficulties in the phonological encoding and decoding of the language." See Grim v. Rhinebeck Central School District, No. 98 Civ. 4854, slip op. at 20-21 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2002) (citation omitted).

Near the conclusion of Chelsea's third-grade year at Kildonan, the Grims formally challenged the adequacy of the IEP that had been developed the previous spring ("the 1995-96 IEP") by requesting an impartial hearing before an IHO, as authorized by the IDEA. They sought reimbursement from the Rhinebeck Central School District for the expense of sending Chelsea to Kildonan. After hearing extensive testimony, the IHO determined on March 14, 1997 that the 1995-96 IEP was appropriate and legally sufficient under the IDEA, and further, that Kildonan was not an appropriate placement for Chelsea because of the IDEA's preference for educating students in the "least restrictive environment." An SRO affirmed the IHO's decision on March 10, 1998.

In the summer of 1996, defendant school district again prepared an IEP to guide the provision of special education to Chelsea during her approaching fourth-grade year ("the 1996-97 IEP"), as required by the IDEA. Concluding that the 1996-97 IEP was insufficient to meet Chelsea's needs, the Grims enrolled Chelsea in Kildonan for a second year. They later concluded that defendant's proposed IEP for Chelsea for her fifth-grade year ("the 1997-98 IEP") was similarly insufficient, so Chelsea remained at Kildonan for a third year.

Plaintiffs' subsequent challenges to the sufficiency of the 1996-97 and 1997-98 IEPs were consolidated before a single IHO. The IHO held that both IEPs "offered an appropriate public education in the least restrictive environment," id. at 55, and that the procedures followed in their development adequately complied with the IDEA, id. An SRO affirmed the decision of the IHO. Id.

DISCUSSION

I. Judicial Review Under the IDEA

Federal courts reviewing administrative determinations under the IDEA must base their decisions on "the preponderance of the evidence," taking into account not only the record from the administrative proceedings, but also any further evidence presented before the District Court by the parties. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(B). The Supreme Court and our Court have interpreted the IDEA as strictly limiting judicial review of state administrative decisions. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 204-08, 102 S.Ct. 3034; Walczak, 142 F.3d at 129. Federal courts reviewing administrative decisions must give "due weight" to the administrative proceedings, "mindful that the judiciary generally lacks the specialized knowledge and experience necessary to resolve persistent and difficult questions of educational policy." Walczak, 142 F.3d at 129 (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206, 208, 102 S.Ct. 3034) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The Supreme Court in Rowley also held that the IDEA established a two-part inquiry for courts reviewing administrative determinations: "First, has the State complied with the procedures set forth in the Act? And second, is the individualized educational program developed through the Act's procedures reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits?" Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206-07, 102 S.Ct. 3034 (footnote omitted).

II. Procedural Violations of the IDEA

Conducting this two-part inquiry, the District Court first held that defendant school district had failed to comply with the procedures set forth in the IDEA with respect to all three challenged IEPs.

The first violation the Court identified was extensive delay in Rhinebeck School District's development and review of all three challenged IEPs—at least that measure of the extensive delays for which the plaintiffs were not themselves responsible. Grim, No. 98 Civ. 4854, slip op. at 64-67.

The District Court then proceeded to identify a further violation in all three challenged IEPs, namely, their formulaic articulation of goals and strategies for evaluating Chelsea's progress. Specifically, the Court held that "the rote use of [a single] phrase in practically every objective of [the 1995-96] IEP is facially insufficient to meet the requirements of the IDEA." Id. at 71. The 1996-97 and 1997-98 IEPs, according to the Court, "echo[ ]" and fail to solve the problems of this first IEP. Id. Therefore, reversing the SRO, the District Court found that, even though delays did not independently render the IEPs insufficient under the IDEA, id. at 66-67, the combination of the delays and this second violation was sufficiently serious to render all three IEPs inadequate under the IDEA, see id. at 70-71.

The District Court correctly noted that the Supreme Court in Rowley emphasized the importance Congress attached to the statute's procedural requirements as "safeguards" of the rights protected by the IDEA. See id. at 63. Specifically, the Rowley Court noted that compliance with the significant procedural provisions of the IDEA "would in most cases assure much if not all of what Congress wished in the way of substantive content in an IEP." Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206, 102 S.Ct. 3034. As the District Court recognized, however, it does not follow that every procedural error in the development of an IEP renders that IEP legally inadequate under the IDEA. See Grim, No. 98 Civ. 4854, slip op. at 63.

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