Grimes v. Grimes

Citation200 A. 442
Decision Date30 June 1938
Docket NumberNo. 7982.,7982.
PartiesGRIMES v. GRIMES.
CourtRhode Island Supreme Court

Exceptions from Superior Court, Providence and Bristol Counties; Leonidas Pouliot, Jr., Judge.

Suit for absolute divorce by Charles A. Grimes against Mary B. Grimes on ground of extreme cruelty. To review a decision in favor of the petitioner, the respondent brings exceptions.

Exceptions sustained.

McKiernan, McElroy & Going, Peter W. McKiernan, and John S. McKiernan, all of Providence, for petitioner. Justin P. McCarthy, of Providence, for respondent.

FLYNN, Chief Justice.

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This petition for absolute divorce, based upon the ground of extreme cruelty, was tried before a justice of the superior court who rendered a decision for the petitioner. The case is before us on the respondent's exception to this decision.

It appears in evidence that the parties were married April 27, 1921. After living together for several years, they separated and a petition for divorce on the ground of extreme cruelty was filed by this petitioner in 1924. That petition was discontinued and the parties were reconciled in 1927. They separated later and the petitioner filed another petition on the same ground. The second petition was also discontinued, when the parties became reconciled in 1934. In August 1937, the third or present petition was filed.

The evidence discloses that both parties are well educated and talented, being versatile, industrious and of good earning capacities. Each contributed greatly to the success of various enterprises undertaken in common. The petitioner, shortly after the marriage, became afflicted with paralysis which resulted in certain physical infirmities not connected with the alleged cruelty. Notwithstanding such misfortune and handicap he has displayed admirable courage and succeeded in overcoming them in so far as industry and earning power is concerned. The evidence shows that, when walking, he is not very stable and frequently trips and falls, and usually requires the aid of a cane; that each party is nervous and hypersensitive, though perhaps from different causes; that neither apparently cared much for certain members of the other's family, each making this disapproval known to the other, on occasions, in no uncertain language; and that sharp, provocative and uncharitable observations by both in this regard apparently caused many of the personal quarrels and difficulties here involved.

There is also evidence that each indulged in some isolated acts of physical violence toward the other previous to the last reconciliation; and that there were disputes and exhibitions of temper and intolerance happening at various times over a period of years. On these occasions one or the other by word or act would provoke the arguments, but both almost always would spiritedly participate.

There was also evidence from disinterested witnesses which corroborated the petitioner in certain matters but did not corroborate him in some of his major charges of physical cruelty. On the other hand, the respondent was corroborated by disinterested witnesses in certain particulars, and there was also a conflict of testimony on other important facts. It is neither necessary nor desirable to elaborate the evidence concerning the petitioner's unfortunate disabilities, or to rehearse all of the details of the charges and counter charges of the parties which appear in the voluminous transcript.

Summarized, the petitioner contends that the evidence establishes, since the last reconciliation in 1934, a willful, persistent and malicious course of cruel conduct toward him on the part of the respondent, that impaired his health and threatened further injury thereto; that, if this evidence is not sufficient, of itself, to support a charge of extreme cruelty, it nevertheless is enough to avoid the respondent's defense of condonation, because less evidence is required for such purpose than to support a charge of extreme cruelty, relying on Grant v. Grant, 44 R.I. 169, 116 A. 481, Mason v. Mason, 46 R.I. 43, 124 A. 730, and Egidi v. Egidi, 37 R.I. 481, 93 A. 908, Ann.Cas.1918A, 648; and that, considering the evidence before and after the last reconciliation, it is sufficient to prove his allegation of extreme cruelty and to justify the trial court's decision in his favor.

The respondent, on the other hand, contends that the evidence does not show any physical cruelty or violence since the last reconciliation in 1934 and is not sufficient otherwise to avoid the defense of condonation; that the entire evidence from the date of the marriage to the trial at most proves isolated incidents happening many years apart and several years previous to the last reconciliation;...

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13 cases
  • Sullivan v. Sullivan
    • United States
    • Rhode Island Supreme Court
    • May 5, 1942
    ...in this respect in Hurvitz v. Hurvitz, supra, and reaffirmed in Salvatore v. Salvatore, 61 R.I. 109, 200 A. 438, and in Grimes v. Grimes, 61 R.I. 198, 200 A. 442. All of the respondent's exceptions are overruled, and the cause is remitted to the superior court for further ...
  • Gilbert v. Girard
    • United States
    • Rhode Island Supreme Court
    • August 5, 1971
    ...516, 517-518; Barlow v. Verrill, 88 N.H. 25, 183 A. 857; Poluski v. Glen Alden Coal Co., 286 Pa. 473, 133 A. 819. See also Grimes v. Grimes, 61 R.I. 198, 200 A. 442; McCormick, Evidence (1954 ed.) § 54 at 126-128. This general principle applies throughout all stages of a case, and according......
  • Thomas v. Thomas, 9577
    • United States
    • Rhode Island Supreme Court
    • June 29, 1955
    ...66 R.I. 382, 19 A.2d 307; Scullin v. Scullin, 65 R.I. 91, 13 A.2d 702; Hakonson v. Hakonson, 64 R.I. 276, 12 A.2d 215; Grimes v. Grimes, 61 R.I. 198, 200 A. 442; Standish v. Standish, 48 R.I. 179, 136 A. 484; McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 44 R.I. 429, 117 A. 649; Hurvitz v. Hurvitz, 44 R.I. 478......
  • Jackson v. Jackson .
    • United States
    • Rhode Island Supreme Court
    • July 20, 1944
    ...McKeon, 54 R.I. 163, 170 A. 922; Bastien v. Bastien, 57 R.I. 176, 189 A. 37; Tremblay v. Tremblay, 59 R.I. 401, 195 A. 596; Grimes v. Grimes, 61 R.I. 198, 200 A. 442. From these and other cases involving the issue of extreme cruelty, it appears that such issue must be decided upon the parti......
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