Grimes v. Housing Authority of the City of New Haven

• Decision Date: 29 July 1997
• Docket Number: No. 15518,15518
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Delores GRIMES et al. v. HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF NEW HAVEN.

Page 302

698 A.2d 302

242 Conn. 236

Delores GRIMES et al. v. HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF NEW HAVEN.

No. 15518.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued May 1, 1997.

Decided July 29, 1997.

David N. Rosen, with whom Stephen M. Pincus, New Haven, for appellants (plaintiffs).

Edward T. Krumeich, with whom, on the brief, Miles F. McDonald, Jr., Greenwich, for appellee (defendant).

Before BERDON, NORCOTT, KATZ, PALMER and McDONALD, JJ.

BERDON, Associate Justice.

This certified appeal raises two distinct issues: (1) whether the commencement of a class action tolls the statute of limitations for all individual claims by purported members of the class who would have been parties had the class not subsequently been limited; and (2) whether the statute of limitations set forth in General Statutes § 52-584, ¹ was, under the circumstances of this case, tolled until the class finally was certified.

On March 11, 1988, the plaintiffs, Delores Grimes and her mother, Ethel Grimes, brought an action for damages for personal injuries they received on September 4, 1982, as a result of the alleged negligence of the defendant, the housing authority of the city of New Haven, due to its failure to provide hot water to the plaintiffs' residence at the Elm Haven Extension Apartments (Elm Haven) in New Haven. On February 21, 1992, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment claiming that the plaintiffs' claims were barred by the two year period of limitations in § 52-584, because the plaintiffs' negligence action was not brought until more than five and one-half years after the alleged injuries were sustained. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment thereon, and the Appellate Court affirmed. Grimes v. Housing Authority, 42 Conn.App. 324, 679 A.2d 397 (1996). We granted the plaintiffs' petition for certification to appeal from the Appellate Court limited to the following issue: "Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the class action statute of limitations tolling rule, as articulated in American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 [94 S.Ct. 756, 38 L.Ed.2d 713] (1974), and its progeny, did not apply so as to toll the statute of limitations applicable to the plaintiffs' class action claims?" Grimes v. Housing Authority, 239 Conn. 918, 682 A.2d 1000 (1996). We reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The following undisputed facts are relevant to this appeal. ² On December 10, 1981, six Elm Haven tenants filed a class action ³ on behalf of all Elm Haven tenants against the defendant, the owner and operator of the apartment complex, the basis of which formed this court's opinion in Connelly v. Housing Authority, 213 Conn. 354, 567 A.2d 1212 (1990). The plaintiffs in Connelly (Connelly plaintiffs) alleged that the defendant violated General Statutes § 47a-7 (a), ⁴ and the New Haven housing code ⁵ by failing to provide sufficient and stable heat and hot water for the tenants. In count one of the Connelly complaint, the tenants alleged that "[a]s a result of the insufficient and erratic heat and hot water, [the] plaintiffs and their families have been subjected to unsanitary and unsafe conditions which materially affect their health and well-being." ⁶ The Connelly plaintiffs sought relief in the form of a temporary injunction to compel the defendant to make immediate repairs to the heating and hot water systems, and in the form of compensatory damages for the named plaintiffs and for the class. The defendant did not seek revision of the complaint to require the plaintiffs to particularize the damages the lack of hot water caused.

On December 22, 1981, the trial court in Connelly ordered that this "action provisionally be allowed to be maintained as a class action for all of the tenants in the buildings of New Haven Housing Authority collectively known as Elm Haven High Rises" and issued a temporary injunction ordering the defendant to make immediate repairs to restore heat and hot water to the tenants' apartments. (Emphasis added.) The trial court did not set inclusive dates with respect to the tenants who were covered under the class.

On September 4, 1982, the plaintiffs in this case were injured as a result of the defendant's failure to provide hot water in violation of § 47a-7 (a) and paragraph 300 of the New Haven housing code. The plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that "[o]n September 4, [1982] Delores Grimes [a seven year old child] attempted to remove a pot containing hot water from the stove, in order to take it into the bathroom for the bath.... The hot water spilled onto [the] plaintiff Delores Grimes ... [who] suffered serious permanent injuries, which have caused her and will continue to cause her pain, suffering, [and] distress, including: second and third degree burns covering approximately 22 percent of her total body area, including third degree burns over the anterior thighs, lower abdomen and vulva requiring multiple skin grafts and causing permanent scarring.... [The p]laintiff Ethel Grimes saw [the] plaintiff Delores Grimes seconds after she had been scalded, and as a result of seeing her daughter's injuries suffered and will continue to suffer anxiety and distress."

In January, 1987, the trial court in Connelly limited the class to those tenants who resided at Elm Haven between November 1, 1981 and March 31, 1982, and who lacked adequate heat and hot water in their apartments. The establishment of this time frame had the effect of excluding the plaintiffs here with respect to the injuries they sustained as a result of the incident on September 4, 1982. On March 11, 1988, the plaintiffs commenced this action, less than fifteen months after they were ousted from the Connelly class. On May 22, 1995, the trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the ground that their claims were barred by the two year statute of limitations for personal injury actions in § 52-584. In granting the motion, the trial court concluded that the plaintiffs' claim for damages for personal injuries was not directly related to the cause of action asserted in the Connelly class action. The Appellate Court affirmed, concluding that "the claims raised in the class action that the defendant violated § 47a-7 ... did not provide notice to the defendant that negligence claims were being made by the [named] plaintiff and her daughter for personal injuries...." Grimes v. Housing Authority, supra, 42 Conn.App. at 330, 679 A.2d 397. More specifically, the Appellate Court concluded that the statute of limitations was not tolled because the "tolling effect given to the timely prior filings in [American Pipe & Construction Co.] ... depended heavily on the fact that those findings involved exactly the same cause of action subsequently asserted." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 329-30, 679 A.2d 397. We reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.

I

The plaintiffs argue that the tolling rule for class actions announced by the United States Supreme Court in American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, supra, 414 U.S. 538, 94 S.Ct. 756, 38 L.Ed.2d 713, should be adopted in Connecticut. In response, the defendant argues that because Connecticut class action rules are not identical to the federal rules, the American Pipe & Construction Co. rule should be rejected. Although this court previously has not had the occasion to consider this rule, ⁷ we now adopt the rule set forth in American Pipe & Construction Co. with respect to the tolling of statute of limitations for the purported members of a class action.

In American Pipe & Construction Co., the United States Supreme Court held that "the commencement of a class action suspends the applicable statute of limitations as to all asserted members of the class who would have been parties had the suit been permitted to continue as a class action." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 554, 94 S.Ct. at 766. In that case, the court approved the intervention of third parties on whose claims the statute of limitations would otherwise have run. ⁸

If the statute of limitations is not tolled by the filing of the class action, "class members would not be able to rely on the existence of the suit to protect their rights.... A putative class member who fears that class certification may be denied would have every incentive to file a separate action prior to the expiration of his own period of limitations. The result would be a needless multiplicity of actions--precisely the situation that [rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] and the tolling rule of [American Pipe & Construction Co.] were designed to avoid." Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 350-51, 103 S.Ct. 2392, 2395-96, 76 L.Ed.2d 628 (1983). Potential class members should not be induced to "file protective motions to intervene or to join [a class action] in the event that a class was later found unsuitable." American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, supra, 414 U.S. at 553, 94 S.Ct. at 766.

Connecticut's class action procedures in Practice Book § 86 et seq., like rule 23, are designed to increase efficiencies in civil litigation by encouraging multiple plaintiffs to join in one lawsuit. Many jurisdictions have recognized that in certain situations, class action suits are superior to individual lawsuits. See, e.g., Deposit Guaranty National Bank of Jackson, Mississippi v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 338-40, 100 S.Ct. 1166, 1173-75, 63 L.Ed.2d 427 (1980); Bryan v. Amrep Corp., 429 F.Supp. 313, 318 (S.D.N.Y.1977); In re Sugar Industry Antitrust Litigation, 73 F.R.D. 322, 358 (E.D.Pa.1976); In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 55 F.R.D. 269, 276 (D.D.C.1972); Philadelphia v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 45, 68 (D.N.J.1971); Minnesota v. United States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559, 572 (D.Minn.1968); Campbell v. Board of Education, 36 Conn.Supp. 357, 370, 423 A.2d 900 (1980). Class action suits: (1) promote judicial economy...