Grimes v. Jones

• Decision Date: 13 March 1991
• Docket Number: No. 04A03-8910-CV-457,04A03-8910-CV-457
• Citation: 567 N.E.2d 858
• Parties: 65 Ed. Law Rep. 1229 Douglas M. GRIMES, Victor Thornton, Martin S. Yuriga, and Mae Tyler, As Administratrix of the Estate of Glenn Tyler, Deceased, Appellants (Defendants Below), v. Ernest JONES, Appellee (Plaintiff Below).
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 858

567 N.E.2d 858

65 Ed. Law Rep. 1229

Douglas M. GRIMES, Victor Thornton, Martin S. Yuriga, and Mae Tyler, As Administratrix of the Estate of Glenn Tyler, Deceased, Appellants (Defendants Below), v. Ernest JONES, Appellee (Plaintiff Below).

No. 04A03-8910-CV-457.

Court of Appeals of Indiana Third District.

March 13, 1991.

Dock McDowell, Jr., Gary, for Gary Community School Corp. and Mae Tyler, as Administratrix of the Estate of Glenn Tyler, Deceased.

Julian B. Allen, Gary, for Douglas M. Grimes, Victor Thornton and Martin S. Yuriga.

Charles H. Graddick, Gary, for Ernest Jones.

STATON, Judge.

The appellants appeal an adverse judgment for $400,000 in punitive damages, presenting twenty-three issues for our consideration. We address only the following issue, however, because our treatment of it merits reversal:

Whether a judgment for only punitive damages may stand absent an award of compensatory or nominal damages.

In January of 1980, Ernest Jones was appointed Superintendent of the Gary Community School Corporation (GCSC). His contract was extended for four years in 1983. On December 18, 1986, the School Board voted not to renew Jones' contract, and on July 28, 1987, the Board voted to reassign him to a position as Special Assistant to the Board to serve out the term of his contract. Upon reassignment, he would receive the same salary and benefits as he did in his previous tenure as superintendent.

On July 30, 1987, Jones filed a Verified Complaint for Injunctive Relief and Damages against GCSC and various members of the School Board ("Board Members"). A preliminary injunction against the reassignment was granted on September 14, 1987, but a stay was later entered. In the interim, Jones amended his complaint to include a count for punitive damages and remove his request for an injunction. An appeal of the grant of a preliminary injunction was taken by the GCSC and this court continued the stay of the injunction, eventually dismissing the appeal as moot since Jones' contract had expired. Gary Community School Corporation et al. v. Jones (July 28, 1988), Ind.App., No. 04A03-8709-CV-277 [526 N.E.2d 752 (table) ].

Prior to trial, the trial court entered summary judgment dismissing Jones' claim for compensatory damages and partially granted GCSC's motion for judgment on the pleadings dismissing GCSC. ¹ The trial judge allowed the case to go to trial on the claim for punitive damages against the Board Members. The jury returned a verdict for Jones in the amount of $400,000 in punitive damages. Judgment was entered on the verdict, and the Board Members appeal.

The general rule is that a party must establish actual damages before he may recover punitive damages. Indiana & Michigan Elec. Co. v. Terre Haute Indus., Inc. (1987), Ind.App., 507 N.E.2d 588, 613, transfer denied 525 N.E.2d 1247. The granting of affirmative equitable relief will also support a punitive damage award. Indiana and Michigan Elec. Co. v. Harlan (1987), Ind.App., 504 N.E.2d 301, 307, transfer denied; Dotlich v. Dotlich (1985), Ind.App., 475 N.E.2d 331, 346, transfer denied; Hedworth v. Chapman (1963), 135 Ind.App. 129, 192 N.E.2d 649, 651. However, this court has indicated that the rule allowing punitive damages to be supported by affirmative equitable relief should be strictly construed. Voelkel v. Berry (1966), 139 Ind.App. 267, 218 N.E.2d 924, 926.

The actual damage requirement has elicited frustration from bench and bar, one commentator referring to it as a "teapot tempest." Dobbs, Remedies Sec. 3.9 at 210 (1973). However, the proffered rationale for the rule is persuasive: a court will not punish conduct, no matter how reprehensible, which in fact causes no legal injury. Dicker v. Smith (1974), 215 Kan. 212, 523 P.2d 371. This rationale holds true when the remedy sought is equitable:

The reason for such a requirement is that it first insures that some legally protected interest has been invaded. It prevents the assessment of punitive damages against one who may have caused damage without legal injury. There is no reason why an award of equitable relief may not fulfill this same function, for in either case it is necessary first to show an invasion of some legally protected interest.

Village of Peck v. Denison (1969), 92 Idaho 747, 450 P.2d 310, 314-315.

Although somewhat circular, another reason given for the rule is that there is no separate cause of action for punitive damages; they are derivative of actual damages. Broadacre Trailer Lodge, Inc. v. Johnson (1982), Ind.App., 439 N.E.2d 684, 686, transfer denied. This is rooted in the notion that it is not the primary office of the civil law to punish; such is the province of criminal law. Tort law seeks to make the wronged party whole, and any deterrent or punitive effect which its remedies may work on the tortfeasor is more incidental than intentional. Thus although the civil law allows damages to be imposed for punishment and deterrence incident to damages imposed for invasion of a recognized legal right, to allow an action solely for purposes of punishment to be brought by a private individual would frustrate these purposes. It is often said that a litigant has no right to punitive damages, but that they are a mere "windfall" to the fortuitous recipient. Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Armstrong (1982), Ind., 442 N.E.2d 349,...