Grimes v. Labreck

Decision Date24 February 1967
Citation108 N.H. 26,226 A.2d 787
PartiesArthur J. GRIMES v. John A. LABRECK. Nina L. LABRECK v. Claudia A. GRIMES.
CourtNew Hampshire Supreme Court

Wiggin, Nourie, Sundeen, Nassikas & Pingree, Dort S. Bigg and Charles Solms, III, Manchester, for plaintiff, Grimes.

Charles F. Hartnett, Dover, for defendant, John A. Labreck, and plaintiff, Nina L. Labreck.

Burns, Bryant, Hinchey & Nadeau and Robert P. Shea, Dover, for defendant, Grimes.

DUNCAN, Justice.

The collision which gives rise to these actions occurred at approximately 4:45 P.M. The defendant Claudia A. Grimes undertook to drive an automobile belonging to her father, the plaintiff Arthur J. Grimes, from the driveway of their home on the east side of Route 16 in Dover to travel south on Route 16. The defendant John A. Labreck was traveling north on Route 16. The vehicles collided just south of the driveway at approximately the mid-line of the highway. The Labreck vehicle came to a stop on the westerly shoulder, and the Grimes vehicle was turned about in the traveled way so that it was headed northerly.

The Court made findings and rulings in writing, in part as follows: 'The Court finds that Claudia A. Grimes negligently attempted to enter into the highway at a time when it was not safe to do so and that John A. LaBreck was traveling at a speed that was not reasonable and proper under all the circumstances, and that the negligence of both Claudia A. Grimes and John A. LaBreck contributed to and helped to cause the accident.' These findings were fully warranted by the evidence. While the defendant Claudia testified that there were no automobiles in view in either direction as she emerged from the driveway, there was evidence that she had an unobstructed view for a distance of at least 300 feet to the south, but failed to see the Labreck automobile approaching from her left until her front wheels had reached the center of the highway and the Labreck car was only 150 feet away.

The finding and ruling that the defendant Labreck was traveling at a speed that was not reasonable and proper under all the circumstances was likewise warranted. The applicable posted speed limit, which was posted a mile or more south of the scene of the collision was forty miles an hour. Labreck was familiar with the highway and with the comparatively heavy traffic prevailing at that time of day. He testified that he was traveling approximately 45 miles an hour before the applied his brakes. There was evidence that just prior to the collision he had passed another vehicle 'at a high rate of speed.' Tire marks left by his vehicle extended for a distance of 100 feet up to the point of collision and for a further distance of 30 feet beyond.

In support of his exception to denial of a motion for a directed verdict, Labreck argues that as a matter of law the conduct of Claudia Grimes was the sole cause of the accident; that she had 'an absolute duty' to yield him the right of way, and that his speed was in no way causal of the accident.

RSA 262-A:30 requires that a driver 'about to enter or cross a highway from a private road or driveway shall yield the right of way to all vehicles approaching on said highway.' While Labreck was entitled to rely upon Claudia's compliance with this statute until such time as he had reason to know that she might do otherwise) Eichel v. Payeur, 106 N.H. 484, 487-488, 214 A.2d 116), failure on her part to comply with the statute did not operate as a matter of law to relieve Labreck of the duty to exercise reasonable care, and to drive at a speed which was reasonable and prudent under prevailing conditions. RSA 262-A:54; Owen v. Dubois, 95 N.H. 444, 446, 66 A.2d 80. A finding that his speed was unreasonable (RSA 262-A:54 II, 262-A:56), and that the collision was caused in part by his inability for that reason to slow his vehicle...

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4 cases
  • Bellacome v. Bailey, 80-038
    • United States
    • New Hampshire Supreme Court
    • January 28, 1981
    ...the other motorist of the duty to exercise reasonable care. Dumas v. MacLean, 404 F.2d 1062, 1065 (1st Cir. 1968); Grimes v. Labreck, 108 N.H. 26, 28, 226 A.2d 787, 789 (1967). Likewise, failure on a motorist's part to exercise care does not operate to absolve a pedestrian of a reciprocal d......
  • Dumas v. MacLean, 7138.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit
    • December 20, 1968
    ...Plaintiff's failure to comply with the statute did not relieve defendant of his duty to exercise reasonable care. Grimes v. Labreck, 108 N.H. 26, 226 A.2d 787 (1967). Nor do we see any merit in defendant's contention that the trial court erred in not granting him a new trial. It is fundamen......
  • Glidden v. Butler
    • United States
    • New Hampshire Supreme Court
    • March 7, 1972
    ...his bailee. Sprague v. Bartlett, 109 N.H. 137, 140, 244 A.2d 202, 204 (1968), and cases cited. Unlike the situation in Grimes v. LaBreck, 108 N.H. 26, 226 A.2d 787 (1967), the operator of the vehicle in this case was engaged in doing an errand for the owner, at his request and by the means ......
  • Mechanicks Nat. Bank v. Parker
    • United States
    • New Hampshire Supreme Court
    • May 29, 1968
    ...did not operate to deprive the bank of its validly constituted lien. Bosen v. Larrabee, 91 N.H. 492, 23 A.2d 331. See Grimes v. Labreck, 108 N.H. 26, 226 A.2d 787; Bolton-Swanby Co. v. Owens, 201 Minn. 162, 275 N.W. 855. Annot. 18 A.L.R.2d 813, 845. The question remains, whether a new trial......

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