Grimes v. Liberty Nat. Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 25 September 1987
• Citation: 514 So.2d 965
• Parties: Barbara GRIMES v. LIBERTY NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, et al. 85-1443.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 965

514 So.2d 965

Barbara GRIMES v. LIBERTY NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.

85-1443.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Sept. 25, 1987.

Patrick M. Sigler and Stephen C. Moore, Mobile, for appellant.

Joseph C. Sullivan, Sr., Joseph C. Sullivan, Jr., and David A. Boyett III of Hamilton, Butler, Riddick, Tarlton & Sullivan, Mobile, for appellees Liberty Nat. Life Ins. Co. and Robert E. Henderson.

Leon G. Duke and Frank G. Taylor of Sintz, Campbell, Duke, Taylor & Cunningham, Mobile, for appellee Jack Balsli.

ADAMS, Justice.

This is an appeal by Barbara Grimes from summary judgments in favor of defendants Jack Balsli and Liberty National Life Insurance Company ("Liberty National"), and from a dismissal of the complaint against defendant Robert E. Henderson.

On March 1, 1983, plaintiff's husband, Roy D. Grimes, purchased a $15,000.00 life insurance policy from agent Balsli of Liberty National, which named the appellant as the sole beneficiary. On August 30, 1983, Mr. and Mrs. Grimes were notified by Liberty National that the policy had been cancelled because of non-payment of premiums. Grimes contends that four consecutive payments of $60.23 had been remitted at the time she and her husband received the cancellation notice and that she contacted Balsli for an explanation of the cancellation. Grimes claims that Balsli admitted that he had failed to remit the policy premiums to Liberty National, offered to refund the premiums, and then agreed to have the policy reinstated when appellant refused his offer of a refund.

Grimes alleges that, in conversations with Robert Henderson, manager of Liberty National's Mobile Central District Office, she was assured that the insurance policy covering Mr. Grimes was effective and that she had no cause for worry. Following her husband's death, December 16, 1984, appellant claims that she was told by Henderson that the policy on Mr. Grimes's life was not in effect and that she could not expect payment from Liberty National. Grimes's demand on Henderson and Liberty National to honor the policy was unsuccessful. She then wrote to the attorney retained by Balsli and asked for a payment of $120.46 from Liberty National as a refund of premiums paid and $200.00 from Balsli. Grimes received and negotiated checks in the amounts she requested and, on May 24, 1985, she executed the following release:

For and in consideration of $200.00, I discharge Jack R. Balsli from any and all claims pertaining to the cancellation of our policy with the Liberty National Life Insurance Company.

Henderson argues that he notified the Grimeses in February 1984 that the policy on Mr. Grimes's life had lapsed and that the Grimeses refused his offer to reinstate it. Balsli alleges that the only relevant facts are those pertaining to the signing of the release and that he neither agrees nor disagrees with the facts as stated by Grimes.

Grimes filed suit against Balsli, Henderson, and Liberty National on July 23, 1985, alleging breach of contract, negligence, bad faith failure to pay a claim, outrage, fraud, and deceit. Following argument on defendants' motions to dismiss, Grimes was ordered to amend her complaint. On April 15, 1986, Henderson and Liberty National filed motions to dismiss Grimes's amended complaint and Balsli filed a motion for summary judgment. Grimes filed an affidavit in opposition to the motions, which were argued before Judge Telfair Mashburn on August 1, 1986.

The court held that Grimes could not maintain joint actions for fraud, misrepresentation, and deceit against both Liberty National and Henderson, and dismissed the complaint as it pertained to Henderson. Summary judgment was granted in favor of Balsli on the grounds that Grimes had released him. The court then concluded that because neither agent Balsli nor agent Henderson remained as parties to the suit, Grimes could not proceed against the principal, and entered summary judgment on behalf of Liberty National. Grimes filed this appeal on September 3, 1986.

Grimes argues that she "was under extreme emotional and physical duress due to the recent death of her husband" at the time she executed the release. She also contends that the release was ambiguous, unconscionable, and lacked sufficient consideration. We disagree.

The written release was executed by appellant on May 24, 1985, more than five months after Mr. Grimes's death. Although Grimes may have been under great stress at the time she signed the release, there is no evidence to indicate that Balsli or his attorney subjected her to improper pressure or coerced her cooperation in an effort to secure a release. See Head v. Gadsden Civil Service Board, 389 So.2d 516 (Ala.Civ.App.1980). There is no evidence from which we could conclude that duress was a factor in Grimes's release of Balsli.

In Miles v. Barrett, 223 Ala. 293, 134 So. 661 (1931), this Court held the following language in a release to be unambiguous:

"in full and complete settlement of any and all claims ... on account of such injuries...."

223 Ala. at 293, 134 So. at 661. In Finley v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 456 So.2d 1065 (Ala.1984), we held that language that released the defendants from "any and all claims arising out of or in any way connected with the above-described accident" was not ambiguous. Similarly, the release of agent Balsli from "any and all claims pertaining to the cancellation of our policy" cannot be said to be ambiguous.

Grimes contends that the release of agent Balsli was not supported by sufficient consideration. This argument lacks merit. As we noted in Marcrum v. Embry, 291 Ala. 400, 282 So.2d 49 (1973):

The rule is too well settled, even to admit of argument, that consideration in fact bargained for is not required to be adequate in the sense of equality in value. Corbin on Contracts, § 127. The mere inadequacy, alone, is never sufficient to vitiate a contract or conveyance otherwise valid, and the courts are not disposed to enter upon nice calculations to strike a balance on the one side or the other. Norrell v. Thompson, 252 Ala. 603, 42 So.2d 461, 462. Absolute equality is not to be hoped for, and is seldom attained in men's dealings one with the other. Nor is consideration to be measured in terms of dollars and cents alone; convenience, avoidance of troublesome details and efforts are proper elements. Decker v. Decker, 253 Ala. 345, 44 So.2d 435.

291 Ala. at 406, 282 So.2d at 54; as quoted in Finley, supra, at 1068. We have also held that Ala.Code (1975), § 12-21-109, is to be construed in pari materia with § 8-1-23. Section 8-1-23 provides:

An obligation is extinguished by a release therefrom given to the debtor by the creditor upon a new consideration or in writing with or without new consideration. [Emphasis added.]

See National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Karasek, 240 Ala. 660, 200 So. 873 (1941); Homewood Dairy Products Co. v. Robinson, 254 Ala. 197, 48 So.2d 28 (1950); Mitchell v. Cobb, 270 Ala. 346, 118 So.2d 918 (1960).

Appellant's contention that the release is "unconscionable on its face" because Balsli was released "for fraud involving a $15,000.00 life insurance policy in return for a token payment of $200.00" ignores statute and case law regarding consideration and a written release. Grimes demanded and received $200.00 from Balsli and $120.46 from Liberty National. We find no grounds for appellant's argument that the release is unconscionable.

Henderson and Liberty National argue that the release of Balsli also released them, and, therefore, that summary judgment was...