Grimes v. Texas Dept. of Mental Health and Mental Retardation

• Citation: 102 F.3d 137
• Decision Date: 13 December 1996
• Docket Number: No. 96-20274,96-20274
• Parties: 72 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1141 Willie Bea GRIMES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH AND MENTAL RETARDATION; Richmond State School, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)

Page 137

102 F.3d 137

72 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1141

Willie Bea GRIMES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH AND MENTAL RETARDATION Richmond State School, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 96-20274.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

Dec. 13, 1996.

Patrick J. Gilpin, Houston, TX, for plaintiff-appellant.

Martin Joseph Thompson, Jr., Austin, TX, for defendants-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.

Before REYNALDO G. GARZA, JONES and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.

DeMOSS, Circuit Judge:

In this Title VII race discrimination and retaliation case, Plaintiff/Appellant Willie Bea Grimes brought suit in federal district court alleging that she had been discriminated against by her employers, Texas Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation and Richmond State School ("Defendants"), when she failed to receive a promotion. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. For the following reasons, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Willie Bea Grimes ("Grimes") is an African-American female employee at the Brazos unit of Defendant Richmond State School, a center for mentally retarded people which is run by Defendant Texas Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation (collectively "RSS"). Grimes had worked for RSS in various capacities since 1968. At the time of suit, Grimes was a Qualified Mental Retardation Professional ("QMRP"). As such, she counseled, supervised, and directed the training of patients.

In 1985, Grimes sued RSS for race discrimination when it awarded the position of Assistant Unit Director ("AUD") to Alan Garms ("Garms"), a white male. Grimes prevailed at trial on the issue of liability and the parties subsequently reached a settlement as to damages. This settlement included the retention of Plaintiff as a QMRP, along with an increase in her job responsibilities and pay.

In March 1993, RSS internally posted a job listing for the newly-created supervisory position of Lead QMRP. The Lead QMRP To assist him in his evaluation of the applicants, Garms utilized a "score sheet." The score sheet contained a list of relevant qualifications (e.g., "Ability to supervise Unit QMRP"). For each qualification, Garms attributed a 1 to 10 ranking.

                would have, inter alia, the authority and responsibility to evaluate, promote, and terminate other QMRPs.  Four candidates applied for this position including Grimes, who was the only African-American applicant. 1  Garms was charged with the responsibility of interviewing, ranking, and selecting the four candidates.  To assist him in this process, Garms enlisted Mike Marshall, Coordinator of QMRP Services, and Dan Jones, Director of Education, to do the same.  Garms instructed Jones to focus upon the applicants' respective program development experience and general programming knowledge, while Marshall was instructed to focus upon the applicants' respective supervision knowledge, program coordinator knowledge, QMRP knowledge, and knowledge of standards.  It is unclear whether Garms also expressly told Jones and Marshall that communication skills were to be considered.  Finally, it was required that the applicant possess a bachelor's degree
                

When all was said and done, Marshall selected Grimes as the best qualified applicant for the position of Lead QMRP, while Jones ranked Ranae Hackworth, Program Coordinator at RSS, as the most qualified. Garms--the one with final decision making authority--ranked Hackworth as his first choice and Grimes as his second choice. In May 1993, approximately two months after the initial job posting, Hackworth was offered the position of Lead QMRP.

At some disputed time, Garms subsequently discovered that Hackworth had not, in fact, earned a bachelor's degree. While Hackworth's personnel file contained a document purporting to be a University of Houston transcript (which arguably reflected that she had received such a degree), the transcript was revealed to be bogus. In August 1994, for reasons unclear, Hackworth resigned.

In February 1994, Grimes filed an action in federal district court pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"), alleging that she had been denied the position of Lead QMRP because of her race and in retaliation for her 1985 suit against RSS. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of RSS holding, inter alia, that (1) RSS met its burden of offering summary judgment evidence showing legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for not promoting Grimes, and (2) Grimes failed to meet her burden of offering summary judgment evidence showing that the reasons offered by RSS were merely a pretext for retaliation and race discrimination. Grimes filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the district court on February 15, 1996. On March 11, 1996, Grimes filed this appeal.

DISCUSSION

The only issue before us is whether Appellant Grimes offered summary judgment evidence sufficient to create a genuine fact issue that Defendants' proffered legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for not promoting Grimes were pretextual.

Summary Judgment

We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. LaPierre v. Benson Nissan, Inc., 86 F.3d 444 (5th Cir.1996); Armstrong v. City of Dallas, 997 F.2d 62, 65 (5th Cir.1993). Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In an employment discrimination case, we focus on whether a genuine issue exists as to whether the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff. LaPierre, 86 F.3d at 447; Armstrong, 997 F.2d at 65-66. Needless to say, unsubstantiated assertions are not competent summary judgment evidence. Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1533 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 871, 115 S.Ct. 195, 130 L.Ed.2d 127 (1994); Douglass v. United Services Automobile Association, 79 F.3d 1415, 1429 (5th Cir.1996) (en banc) ("[C]onclusory

allegations, speculation, and unsubstantiated assertions are inadequate to satisfy the nonmovant's burden."); Grizzle v. Travelers Health Network, Inc., 14 F.3d 261, 268 (5th Cir.1994) (An employee's self-serving generalized testimony stating her subjective belief that discrimination occurred "is simply insufficient to support a jury verdict in plaintiff's favor."); Krim v. BancTexas Group, Inc., 989 F.2d 1435, 1449 (5th Cir.1993) ("Summary judgment, to be sure, may be appropriate, even in cases where elusive concepts such as motive or intent are at issue, ... if the nonmoving party rests merely upon conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation.") (citations omitted). In response to motions for summary judgment, it is therefore incumbent upon the non-moving party to present evidence--not just conjecture and speculation--that the defendant retaliated and discriminated against plaintiff on the basis of her race. See Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1079 (5th Cir.1994) (en banc).

Title VII

Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against employees on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). The evidentiary framework for Title VII claims was established by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). A Title VII plaintiff bears the initial burden to prove a prima facie case of discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 801-03, 93 S.Ct. at 1824.

A plaintiff may prove a prima facie case of discrimination by showing (1) that she is a member of a protected class, (2) that she sought and was qualified for an available employment position, (3) that she was rejected for that position, and (4) that the employer continued to seek applicants with the plaintiff's qualifications. Id. A plaintiff establishes a prima facie case for unlawful retaliation by proving (1) that she engaged in activity protected by Title VII, (2) that an adverse employment action occurred, and (3) that a causal link existed between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. Long v. Eastfield College, 88 F.3d 300, 304 (5th Cir.1996). An employee has engaged in activity protected by Title VII if she has either (1) "opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice" by Title VII or (2) "made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing" under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); Long, 88 F.3d at 304.

Once established, the plaintiff's prima facie case raises an inference of intentional discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 792, 93 S.Ct. at 1817. The burden of production then shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged employment action. Id. at 801-03, 93 S.Ct. at 1824. If the defendant comes forward with a reason which, if believed, would support a finding that the challenged action was nondiscriminatory, the inference of discrimination raised by the plaintiff's prima facie case drops from the case. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-57, n. 10, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1094-95, n. 10, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). The focus then shifts to the ultimate question of whether the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510-11, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2749, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993).

A plaintiff alleging employment discrimination is not required to come forward with direct evidence of discriminatory intent. LaPierre, 86 F.3d at 449; Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 75 F.3d 989, 993 (5th Cir.1996) (en banc). Direct evidence of an employer's discriminatory intent is rare; therefore, Title VII plaintiffs must ordinarily prove their claims through circumstantial evidence. A plaintiff may establish circumstantial...