Grimm v. Harper
| Citation | 370 P.2d 197,84 Idaho 220 |
| Decision Date | 30 March 1962 |
| Docket Number | No. 9008,9008 |
| Parties | N. O. GRIMM and Mary Grimm, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. E. M. HARPER and Ann Harper, husband and wife, Defendants-Respondents. |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Rayborn, Rayborn, Rayborn & Webb, Twin Falls, for appellants.
Robert N. W. Balleisen, Twin Falls, for respondents.
After a jury trial judgment was entered for the plaintiffs (appellants herein) in the amount of $2,530.00, which represented the difference between the verdict for plaintiffs in the amount of $3,165.00, and a separate verdict for the defendants in the amount of $635.00. The defendants (respondents herein) moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial on four grounds; i. e., insufficiency of the evidence, the verdict being against law set forth in the instructions; insufficiency and lack of evidence to establish defendants' liability; and that the evidence as a matter of law substantiated the basis of defendants' affirmative defense and counterclaim.
In granting this motion, the trial court held:
'The defendants Motion for a new trial is granted on the grounds that the damages awarded by the jury herein were excessive; and, further, that there was insufficient evidence to justify the verdict, and said verdict was contrary to the law, the plaintiffs are required to remit to the defendants all of the damages except the sum of $440.00, and unless within 20 days after service on plaintiffs' attorney a copy of this order, the plaintiffs file with the clerk, a written consent to reduce the verdict to $440.00 plus costs, the Motion for a New Trial will be granted and trial date set.'
The plaintiffs did not file their written consent reducing the judgment, but instead have appealed from this order granting the new trial. The sum of $440.00 represents the undisputed items in plaintiff's complaint.
The specifications of error and contentions of the plaintiffs are directed to the authority of the trial court to grant a new trial when there is a conflict in the evidence on the factual issues presented to the jury for determination, and when there is substantial evidence to support the verdict reached by the jury. It is contended that the granting of the new trial, when evidence is conflicting, is the substitution of the views of the trial court for the findings of the jury and that it is an abuse of discretion for the trial court to grant a new trial under such circumstances.
Appellants rely principally on the following Idaho decisions to sustain their position: Baldwin v. Ewing, 69 Idaho 176, 204 P.2d 430; the dissenting opinion in Sanchotena v. Tower Co., 74 Idaho 541, 264 P.2d 1021; also upon National Produce Distributors v. Grube, 78 Idaho 33, 297 P.2d 284; and Checketts v. Bowman, 70 Idaho 463, 220 P.2d 682, which is quoted as follows:
Subsequent to the opinions in these cases this court in Coast Transport, Inc. v. Stone, 79 Idaho 257, 261, 313 P.2d 1073, 1075-1076, correctly stated the applicable rule:
'The trial court exercises a wide discretion in ruling on a motion for new trial. In cases where a new trial has been granted the record will be liberally construed in support of the order. [Citing authorities.]
'Appellant recognizes the foregoing rules. He urges that here, there being no conflict in the evidence as to damages, its sufficiency presents a question of law, and, as such, is not addressed to the discretionary power of the trial court. In such case he urges the trial court cannot set aside the verdict if there is any evidence at all sufficient to sustain the verdict. He would apply the rule governing in the case of a motion for a directed verdict. That rule is comparable to the one which governs this court, in cases of appeals taken on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence, to the effect that where there is any competent evidence to sustain the verdict, though conflicting, it will not be set aside. We have held such a rule not applicable to the trial court in passing upon a motion for a new trial. [Citing authorities.]
Sanchotena v. Tower Co., 74 Idaho 541, at page 548, 264 P.2d 1021, at page 1025.
'The trial court did not err in granting a new trial, nor in conditioning the new trial upon defendant's refusal to waive the items of damage as to which the proof was insufficient.'
The distinction between the rules on nonsuit or directed verdict and of motions for new trial, is to be found in Stone v. Matthies, 49 Idaho 277, 287 P. 951.
This court is firmly committed to the proposition that when the trial court is of the opinion that a verdict, based on conflicting evidence, or even when there is no conflict, is not in accord with law or justice, he may grant a new trial, and such order will not be reversed on appeal, except for manifest abuse of discretion in making the order. Poston v. Hollar, 64 Idaho 322, 132 P.2d 142; the basic reason for such rule is well expressed in the decision of Say v. Hodgin, 20 Idaho 64, 68, 116 P. 410, 411 as follows:
'The trial judge sees the witnesses on the witness stand, observes the manner of their testifying, notes their apparent candor or fairness, or the want of it, hears the argument of counsel, and, in short, is in possession of many sources of information valuable in an inquiry as to whether justice has miscarried or not, and which cannot be made to appear in the record of the case which comes to the appellate court; and, appreciating such fact, appellate courts have so frequently held, that it may be announced as settled law, that trial courts possess a discretion to be exercised wisely in the granting or refusal of new trials, and that such discretion will not be by the appellate court disturbed unless it manifestly and clearly appears to have been exercised unwisely and to have been manifestly abused.'
See also cases set out in footnote 1.
In the case of Baldwin v. Ewing, 69 Idaho 176, 204 P.2d 430, jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff but found no damages due, and the trial court granted a motion for new trial. This court in that case recognized the rule that the granting of a new trial is discretionary with the trial court, but held that there was an abuse of discretion in the granting of the new trial.
In National Produce Distributors v. Grube, 78 Idaho 33, 297 P.2d 284, this court stated 'The evidence being...
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Robertson v. Richards
...verdict, the verdict will not be set aside has no application to a trial court in passing upon a motion for a new trial. Grimm v. Harper, 84 Idaho 220, 370 P.2d 197; Coast Transport v. Stone, 79 Idaho 257, 313 P.2d 1073. See also Warren v. Eshelman, 88 Idaho 496, 401 P.2d 539. Rather the di......
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Deshazer v. Tompkins
...of discretion. Blaine v. Byers, 91 Idaho 665, 429 P.2d 397 (1967); Hall v. Johnson, 70 Idaho 190, 214 P.2d 467 (1950); Grimm v. Harper, 84 Idaho 220, 370 P.2d 197 (1962); Warren v. Eshelman, 88 Idaho 496, 401 P.2d 539 (1965). Numerous decisions of this court hold that the trial court may se......
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Blaine v. Byers
...verdict, the verdict will not be set aside has no application to a trial court in passing upon a motion for a new trial. Grimm v. Harper, 81 Idaho 220, 370 P.2d 197; Coast Transport v. Stone, 79 Idaho 257, 313 P.2d 1073. See also Warren v. Eshelman, 88 Idaho 496, 401 P.2d 539. Rather the di......
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Rosenberg v. Toetly
...abused.' 91 Idaho at 671, 429 P.2d at 403. To the same effect are Hall v. Johnson, 70 Idaho 190, 214 P.2d 467 (1950); Grimm v. Harper, 84 Idaho 220, 370 P.2d 197 (1962); Warren v. Eshelman, 88 Idaho, 496, 401 P.2d 539 It is also pointed out in Blaine v. Byers, supra, that 'the general rule ......