Grimm v. Jackson
| Citation | 849 F. Supp. 1127 |
| Decision Date | 23 February 1994 |
| Docket Number | 93-0388-R,93-0332-R,93-0475-R and 93-0497-R.,93-0395-R,Civ. A. No. 93-0273-R,93-0411-R,93-0316-R |
| Parties | Marvin Leon GRIMM, et als., Plaintiffs, v. Clarence L. JACKSON, et als., Defendants. Douglas WARDLAW, Plaintiff, v. Clarence L. JACKSON, et als., Defendants. June A. GOODWIN, Plaintiff, v. Clarence L. JACKSON, et als., Defendants. Lawrence DANIELS, Plaintiff, v. Clarence L. JACKSON, et als., Defendants. Walter R. COLEMAN, Plaintiff, v. Clarence L. JACKSON, et als., Defendants. Michael Leon HILL, Plaintiff, v. Clarence L. JACKSON, et als., Defendants. Stephen E. REEDY, Plaintiff, v. Clarence L. JACKSON, et als., Defendants. Hibbard KENDRICK, Plaintiff, v. Clarence L. JACKSON, et als., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia |
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Marvin Leon Grimm, Jr., pro se.
Tommy Crute, pro se.
Dennis Witt, pro se.
Robert Dame, pro se.
Jimmy L. McNutt, pro se.
Herbert Haymore, pro se.
Douglas Wardlaw, pro se.
June A. Goodwin, pro se.
Lawrence Daniels, pro se.
Walter R. Coleman, pro se.
Michael Leon Hill, pro se.
Stephen Reedy, pro se.
Hibbard Kendrick, pro se.
Alan Katz, Office of Atty. Gen., Richmond, VA, for defendants.
Virginia inmates proceeding pro se, bring these actions under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, with jurisdiction vested under 28 U.S.C. § 1343. Inasmuch as the plaintiffs in these actions make exactly the same or similar claims against the same defendants, seeking the same relief, the court ordered these actions consolidated for disposition. In each of the actions, defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment and plaintiffs have responded; thus, the actions are ripe for disposition as consolidated.
In all of these actions, plaintiffs challenge a new policy instituted by the Virginia Parole Board under which the Board may defer parole consideration for two or three years for inmates with at least ten years or a life sentence remaining to serve. The policy allows for deferral of parole consideration in cases where the inmate is serving a life sentence, a single sentence of more than 70 years, or multiple sentences totaling more than 70 years, where at least one sentence was for a violent offense. In the past, the practice has been to review every inmate for possible release in the year in which he becomes eligible for discretionary parole and every year thereafter.
Plaintiffs claim that the practice of annual parole review has given rise to an expectation of annual review such that they now have a liberty interest, under state law as previously applied, in receiving annual parole review hearings. They claim that the new policy of deferring parole review deprives them of this liberty interest without due process and that it violates the Equal Protection Clause and the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. They seek injunctive and declaratory relief under § 1983 against the defendants, members of the Virginia Parole Board.
After review of the records in these consolidated actions, it is the opinion of the court that defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on all claims. Plaintiffs have not established that the challenged policy, regarding the deferral of discretionary parole review, is violative of the due process, equal protection or ex post facto clauses of the Constitution. Inasmuch as plaintiffs have failed to state a claim that the policy deprives them of constitutional rights, no material issue of fact remains in dispute, and defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
Upon motion for summary judgment, the court must view the facts, and the inferences to be drawn from those facts, in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Ross v. Communications Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355 (4th Cir.1985). Summary judgment is proper where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). However, "the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
Virginia Code § 53.1-154 grants the Virginia Parole Board the authority to determine the timing of inmates' parole hearings. See Va.Code Ann. § 53.1-154 (1991). The statute reads in relevant part as follows:
§ 53.1-154. Times at which Virginia Parole Board to review cases.... Unless there be reasonable cause for extension of the time within which to review and decide a case, the Board shall review and decide the case of each prisoner no later than that part of the calendar year in which he becomes eligible for parole, and at least annually thereafter, until he is released on parole or discharged, except that upon any such review the Board may schedule the next review as much as three years thereafter, provided there are ten years or more or life imprisonment remaining on the sentence in such cases.
Effective January 1, 1993, the Parole Board implemented the challenged deferral policy, pursuant to the authority of § 53.1-154, under which the Board, at the time of an inmate's parole review, can elect to defer that inmate's next parole reconsideration hearing for up to three years in cases where the inmate falls into one of three categories, as follows:
a. all offenders serving a life sentence for any crime with at least ten years remaining to serve at the time of the hearing where deferment is made;
b. all offenders serving a single sentence of 70 years or more with at least ten years remaining to serve at the time of the hearing where deferment is made; and
c. all offenders convicted of at least one violent offense and serving multiple consecutive sentences totaling at least a seventy (70) years with at least ten years remaining to serve at the time of the hearing where deferment is made.
The defendants offer several reasons for the deferral policy: that a legislative study group recommended the changes for efficiency improvement; that inmates covered by the procedure are more likely to receive multiple denials of parole than are inmates with less time remaining on their sentences; that deferment reduces the number of repeated annual denials of discretionary parole and reduces inmates' false hopes that parole will be granted; and that the deferral procedure responds to community concerns. Inmates may appeal a decision to defer parole reviews beyond one year, based on any of the following grounds:
a. misapplication of the policy;
b. change(s) in the inmate's sentence(s) to the extent that the policy is not applicable;
c. changes in time computation to the extent that the policy is not longer applicable; and/or
(d) post decision diagnosis of an irreversible, incapacitating medical condition.
Defendants, all of whom are members of the Virginia Parole Board, assert that because they are being sued in their official capacities, as representatives of the Commonwealth, they are entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. They also assert that inasmuch as they acted at all times in good faith in compliance with state law, they are entitled to qualified immunity for their actions. The court finds no merit to these arguments. True, the Eleventh Amendment bars suit directly against a state or its agencies, regardless of the nature of relief sought. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984). However, plaintiffs in this action seek injunctive and declaratory relief, not monetary damages, for deprivation of constitutional rights by these defendants. Where plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of a state official's actions and seek only declaratory or injunctive relief, the general rule of Eleventh Amendment immunity does not apply. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908). It is also clearly settled that government officials sued in their official capacities are not entitled to personal immunity defenses such as qualified immunity from suit. See Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 105 S.Ct. 873, 83 L.Ed.2d 878 (1985). Accordingly, it is the opinion of the court that defendants are not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity or qualified immunity.
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from depriving a person of liberty or property without due process of law. U.S. Const., amend. XIV. When a plaintiff claims that the state action has denied him due process, the court must first inquire whether the plaintiff's claimed interest is one which requires due process protection. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7, 99 S.Ct. 2100, 2103-04, 60 L.Ed.2d 668 (1979) (). To have a protectible interest or right, Id., citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2709, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc with only one judge dissenting, has held that the Virginia parole statutes do not create any liberty interest in parole release; the court found that because the decision to grant parole in Virginia was dependent upon "subjective evaluations and predictions of future behavior," no inmate could claim an entitlement to, or liberty interest in, parole release. Gaston v. Taylor, 946 F.2d...
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