Grimm v. State
| Decision Date | 20 April 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 37, Sept. Term, 2017,37, Sept. Term, 2017 |
| Citation | 183 A.3d 167,458 Md. 602 |
| Parties | Brian GRIMM v. STATE of Maryland |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Argued by Jeffrey M. Ross, Assistant Public Defender (Paul B. DeWolfe, Public Defender of Maryland of Baltimore, MD) on brief, for Petitioner/Cross–Respondent
Argued by Daniel J. Jawor, Assistant Attorney General (Brian E. Frosh, Attorney General of Maryland of Baltimore, MD) on brief, for Respondent/Cross–Petitioner
Argued before: Barbera, C.J., Greene, Adkins, McDonald, Watts, Hotten, Getty, JJ.
It is undisputed that the ultimate question of probable cause to conduct a warrantless search is reviewed by an appellate court de novo ; i.e. , the standard of review for the issue of probable cause is de novo , or without deference. "In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, an appellate court reviews for clear error the trial court's findings of fact, and reviews without deference the trial court's application of the law to its findings of fact." Varriale v. State, 444 Md. 400, 410, 119 A.3d 824, 830 (2015) (citation omitted). It may be less clear, however, whether a particular determination by a trial court is a finding of fact, and thus subject to deference, or a conclusion of law, and thus subject to no deference. See Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113, 106 S.Ct. 445, 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985) .
This case requires us to determine whether, in the context of a probable cause determination, the issue of a drug detection dog's reliability is a factual question to be reviewed for clear error, or a legal one to be reviewed de novo. This is a matter of first impression, and our resolution of the issue will govern the standard of review of a trial court's determination as to whether a drug detection dog is, or is not, reliable.
We set the stage. In this case, Sergeant Christopher Lamb of the Maryland Transportation Authority Police initiated a traffic stop of a vehicle that Brian Grimm, Petitioner, had been driving. Officer Carl Keightley of the Maryland Transportation Authority Police, a K–9 handler, and Ace, his Belgian Malinois K–9 partner, arrived at the scene of the traffic stop.1 Ace scanned the vehicle and alerted to it. Sergeant Lamb searched the vehicle and found drugs inside.
In the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, the State, Respondent, charged Grimm with various drug-related crimes. Grimm moved to suppress the drugs, alleging that Sergeant Lamb lacked probable cause to search his vehicle. At a hearing on the motion to suppress, the circuit court admitted into evidence several documents, including Ace's training records, Ace's field reports,2 and Officer Keightley's and Ace's certifications. The State called two expert witnesses: Officer Keightley and Sergeant Mary Davis, the Montgomery County Police Department's K–9 Unit's head trainer. Grimm also called two expert witnesses: Ted Cox, the former head trainer of the Baltimore Police Department's K–9 Unit and the Maryland Transportation Authority Police's K–9 Unit,3 and Officer Michael McNerney, a trainer of the Maryland Transportation Authority Police's K–9 Unit. Sergeant Davis essentially testified that Ace was reliable, while Cox and Officer McNerney opined that Ace was unreliable. The circuit court denied the motion to suppress, concluding that Sergeant Lamb had probable cause to search the vehicle. The circuit court found that Sergeant Davis was "the most credible witness[,]" and "accept[ed]" her opinion as to Ace's reliability.
Before us, as to the standard of review, Grimm contends that we must review without deference, as opposed to for clear error, the circuit court's determination that Ace was reliable. As to the merits, Grimm argues that, no matter which standard of review applies, the circuit court erred in determining that probable cause existed.
The State responds that the standard of review is for clear error, and asserts that the circuit court did not clearly err in determining that Ace was reliable. Alternatively, the State maintains that, even if probable cause did not exist, the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule applies.
In Part I below, we conclude that the ultimate question of probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle based on a drug detection dog's alert is reviewed de novo ; i.e. , the standard of review as to the issue of probable cause to search based on a drug detection dog's alert is de novo. A determination of probable cause involves a two-step process. First, a court must identify all of the relevant historical facts that were known to the officer at the time of the search and, if necessary, any relevant or disputed background facts. Second, the court must determine whether those facts give rise to probable cause to search. We conclude that the issue of a drug detection dog's reliability is a factual question. Accordingly, an appellate court reviews for clear error a trial court's determination as to whether a drug detection dog is, or is not, reliable. In Miller, 474 U.S. at 114, 106 S.Ct. 445, the Supreme Court concluded that, where an issue falls somewhere between a clear legal issue and a simple historical fact, the determination of the nature of the issue turns on an analysis of which judicial actor is better positioned to decide the question. As explained below, the issue of a drug detection dog's reliability is, in our view, a background fact that falls somewhere between a clear legal issue and a simple fact. A trial court is better positioned than an appellate court to determine the issue. An issue as to a drug detection dog's reliability requires a trial court to assess the credibility of lay and expert witnesses; to watch, when available, a recording of a drug detection dog's scan; to weigh and determine the weight to be given documentary evidence, such as the drug detection dog's training records, field reports, and certifications; to consider the qualifications of any experts, and their opinions about the evidence; and to determine whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the drug detection dog is reliable; and whether the drug detection dog's alert indicated that drugs were present. As such, a trial court is better positioned than an appellate court to determine a drug detection dog's reliability.
In Part II below, we hold that the circuit court did not clearly err in determining that Ace was reliable, as an abundance of evidence supports the circuit court's finding that Ace was reliable. We conclude that, under the totality of the circumstances, Sergeant Lamb had probable cause for the search, and we do not address the State's argument as to good faith.
On April 19, 2014, in the circuit court, the State charged Grimm with possession of heroin with intent to distribute and other drug-related crimes. On May 23, 2014, Grimm filed a motion to suppress drugs that had been found in a vehicle that he had been driving. On multiple days, December 17, 2014, January 5 and 13, 2015, and March 17, 2015, the circuit court conducted a hearing on the motion to suppress.
At the hearing, as a witness for the State, Sergeant Lamb testified that, on April 18, 2014, a detective with the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area team provided him with a description of a man who was suspected to be driving north on Interstate 95 from Atlanta, Georgia to the Baltimore area with a large quantity of controlled dangerous substances. On April 19, 2014, Sergeant Lamb was informed that the man was driving a maroon Honda that was registered in Georgia, that there were multiple occupants in the Honda, and that the man was expected to drive from Maryland Route 100 onto the northbound side of Maryland Route 295. That same day, Sergeant Lamb saw the Honda travel from Maryland Route 100 onto Maryland Route 295, and saw that, including the driver, the Honda had three occupants who were not wearing seat belts. Sergeant Lamb initiated a traffic stop.
Sergeant Lamb testified that Grimm was in the Honda's driver's seat. According to Sergeant Lamb, Grimm's "clothing looked disheveled," and "[h]is hair looked unkempt[,]" which indicated to Sergeant Lamb that "he had been driving for a long time ... and had[ not] been staying anywhere." Sergeant Lamb spoke with Grimm, who "was kind of mumbling" and "rambling a little bit." Grimm did not make eye contact when he was addressing Sergeant Lamb. Grimm, however, appeared to be "very calm."
Grimm provided Sergeant Lamb with his Maryland driver's license and the Honda's registration. Two days earlier, the Honda had been registered in Georgia to a man named Johnny Lee Oglesbee, Jr. Grimm told Sergeant Lamb that he had bought the Honda, but could not afford to register the Honda in his name. Grimm did not say who Oglesbee was. Grimm told Sergeant Lamb that he and three other people had traveled from Baltimore to Atlanta for approximately one week to visit friends and buy the Honda. Grimm said that he had paid for plane tickets from Baltimore to Atlanta for all four of them.
A woman named Davita Henry was in the front passenger seat. A man named Aaron Chase was in the backseat,4 directly behind Grimm. During the traffic stop, Henry stared straight ahead, and never turned to look at Sergeant Lamb, who was standing on the Honda's passenger side while speaking to Grimm. Meanwhile, Chase, who "was leaning forward to engage [Sergeant Lamb] in conversation" while he was speaking to Grimm, "was very open with the fact that he was[ ]" not wearing a seat belt, and was "overly polite[.]" Sergeant Lamb explained that people who are "overly polite" may be trying to distract law enforcement officers from "what[ is] going on[.]" Grimm told Sergeant Lamb that there had been a fourth occupant in the Honda, who had been...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Reed
...car" is a tactic used by drug traffickers to distract police canines from detecting the scent of narcotics. See Grimm v. State , 458 Md. 602, 618, 183 A.3d 167, 176 (2018) (noting that dog food can be used as a distraction for police canines searching for narcotics).Sixth, the presence of a......
-
State v. Robertson
...apply here." The State points to this Court's decisions in Kusi v. State , 438 Md. 362, 91 A.3d 1192 (2014), and Grimm v. State , 458 Md. 602, 183 A.3d 167 (2018), to support its contention that the bifurcated standard of review used in those cases is appropriate in the case at bar. However......
-
Britton v. State
...probability -- all that is required for probable cause -- that either drugs or evidence of a drug crime . . . will be found"), aff'd, 458 Md. 602 (2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 263 (2018). Thus, the motions court correctly held that the stop was lawful under Terry v. Ohio. Alternatively, ......
-
Glanden v. State
...to evaluate [the] credibility and weigh the evidence." Grimm v. State , 232 Md. App. 382, 403–04, 158 A.3d 1037 (2017), aff'd , 458 Md. 602, 183 A.3d 167 (2018). We, thus, accept the court's finding was not clearly erroneous as the testimony's implausibility was for the court to decide. See......