Grimme v. Grimme

• Decision Date: 25 October 1902
• Citation: 64 N.E. 1088,198 Ill. 265
• Parties: GRIMME v. GRIMME.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

198 Ill. 265

64 N.E. 1088

GRIMME

v.GRIMME.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Oct. 25, 1902.

Appeal from appellate court, First district.

Bill of interpleader by the Supreme Lodge Order of Mutual Protection against Martha and George Grimme, praying the determination of their conflicting claims as beneficiaries under an insurance certificate. From a decree of the appellate court (101 Ill. App. 389) affirming a decree in favor of Martha Grimme, said George Grimme appeals. Affirmed.Charles Lane, for appellant.

James R. Ward, for appellee.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the appellate court for the First district affirming a decree of the superior court of Cook county in favor of appellee. The Supreme Lodge Order of Mutual Protection filed a bill of interpleader in the superior court of Cook county, making appellant and appellee defendants, praying that their conflicting claims to the proceeds of the benefit certificate issued by the order to William F. Grimme, deceased, might be settled, and admitting its liability to the amount of $1,719.20. William F. Grimme applied for membership in the Order of Mutual Protection on October 10, 1890, stating in his application, among other things, that he agreed to be bound by the laws of the order as they then existed or as they might thereafter be amended; and in his statement to the medical examiner he again agreed to comply with the charter, constitution, and by-laws of the order as then in force or as might thereafter be enacted, and that the last benefit certificate issued to him should be the only one in force. On this application the supreme lodge issued a benefit certificate to him on October 14, 1890, in which it promised, upon his death, to pay the amount of one assessment, not to exceed the sum of $2,000, to his wife, Martha Grimme, unless the certificate should be by him revoked. The certificate contained this condition: ‘The express condition upon which this certificate is issued is that the rights of the above-named beneficiary or beneficiaries shall be determined by the charter, constitution, laws, rules, and regulations of the order in force at the time that the sum due hereunder is payable.’ Afterward, on June 6, 1900, he made application to the supreme lodge to have this certificate canceled, and a new one issued in its place, payable one-half to his father, George Grimme, and one-half to his wife, Martha Grimme, and stating that he was unable to return the former certificate, because it was not in his possession. A new certificate was granted to him on June 7, 1900, with the beneficiaries named as requested. One of the conditions of this certificate was ‘that the rights of the above-named beneficiary or beneficiaries shall be determined by the laws of the order in force on the day of the death of the member.’ William F. Grimme died intestate June 22, 1900, leaving no descendants, and his wife claimed the whole amount of the benefit. The court awarded her the entire fund payable under the last certificate, on the ground that appellant, George Grimme, was not eligible as a beneficiary, which decree the appellate court affirmed.

The Supreme Lodge Order of Mutual Protection was incorporated under the laws of Missouri; its articles of association or charter, and the order of court granting it a certificate, having been filed in the office of the secretary of state March 21, 1880. Amendments thereto, made according to law, were filed May 7, 1880, and May 24, 1884. The order was reincorporated and its charter and certificates were filed December 4, 1894. The amended charter of 1880 and the new charter of 1894 are substantially the same, and contain this identical paragraph:

‘Art. 2, § 1. The objects of this order shall be: * * * Second, to provide means, from the proceeds of assessments upon its members, wherewith to assist its sick and disabled members, and for the relief and aid of the families, widows, orphans, or other dependents of its deceased members.’

CARTER, J. (after stating the facts).

The decision of this case involves interpretation and construction of the statutes of Missouri. When the order was incorporated, and down to and including the year 1899, the statutes of that state contained substantially the provision that any number of persons, not less than three, who shall have associated themselves by articles of agreement, in writing, as a society or organization for benevolent, fraternal, beneficial, or educational purposes, may be consolidated into a corporation: provided, always, that the purpose and scope of the association be clearly and fully set forth. Rev. St. Mo. 1879, § 970; Rev. St. Mo. 1889, § 2821; Rev. St. Mo. 1899, § 1394. It was also provided that such associations and societies should be permitted to include in their corporate powers the privilege of providing for the relief and aid of the families, widows, orphans, or other dependents of their deceased members. Rev. St. Mo. 1879, § 972. Section 2823 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri of 1889 is substantially the same, except that it reads, ‘other kindred dependents.’ To render operative this permission to include in their corporate powers the privilege of providing for such benefits as just stated, it was provided in the Revised Statutes of Missouri of 1879, by section 973, and in the Revised Statutes of Missouri of 1889, by section 2824, that any society theretofore or thereafter incorporated under the provisions of the act might avail itself of the benefits of the ‘foregoing section’ (that is, section 972 in the revision of 1879, and section 2823 in that of 1889) by amendments to its constitution or articles of association. In 1897 the legislature of Missouri passed a fraternal benefit act, which, in section 1, defined fraternal beneficiary associations under the act, and contained this provision: ‘Payment of death benefits shall be to the families, heirs, blood relatives, affianced husband or affianced wife of or to persons dependent upon the member.’ This section took the place of section 972 of the Revised Statutes of 1879 and section 2823 of the Revised Statutes of 1889. It was retained in the Revised Statutes of Missouri of 1899, but there numbered 1408; the sections in the last revision having been arranged in a different order from preceding revisions.

It will be observed that this act of 1897 materially changed and enlarged the class of persons who might take as beneficiaries, and is broad enough to include the appellant, the father of the member, while the class as named in the beneficiary certificate here in question, and in the statute when the certificate was issued, did not include those standing in that relationship to the member by virtue of such relationship, only; and the first and principal question in the case is whether the disposition of the fund in question is governed by said act of 1897, or by the more restricted language of the previous acts mentioned.

Section 2 of the act of 1897 provided that all such associations as came within the definition given of fraternal beneficiary associations in section 1, whether organized under the laws of Missouri or any other state, ‘and now doing business in Missouri, may continue such business, provided they hereafter comply with the provisions regulating annual reports,’ etc. This section is retained in the Revised Statutes of Missouri of 1899 as section 1409. Section 15a of the act of 1897 repealed sections 2823 and 2824 of the Revised Statutes of 1889, and substituted therefor a new section (2823), which was substantially the same as the repealed section 2824, allowing such associations to avail themselves of the benefits of the ‘foregoing section’ by amendments to their constitutions or articles of association, or by reincorporation. By thus repealing section 2823 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri of 1889, which contained the permission for associations to include death benefits in their corporate objects, the reference in the new section 2823 to the ‘foregoing section’ lost its directive force, and the term ‘foregoing section’ must be construed to mean that section in the act of 1897 which...