Grindstaff v. State
| Decision Date | 30 October 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. E2007-02377-SC-R11-PC.,E2007-02377-SC-R11-PC. |
| Citation | 297 S.W.3d 208 |
| Parties | Earl Marion GRINDSTAFF v. STATE of Tennessee. |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Brad Lewis Davidson, Newport, Tennessee, for the appellant, Earl Marion Grindstaff.
Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General & Reporter; Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General; Rachel West Harmon, Assistant Attorney General; James Bruce Dunn, District Attorney General; and Amanda H. Inman, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
GARY R. WADE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JANICE M. HOLDER, C.J., CORNELIA A. CLARK, WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., and SHARON G. LEE, JJ., joined.
The petitioner, who entered pleas of guilt to five counts of aggravated sexual battery and received an effective sentence of thirty years, filed a petition for post-conviction relief on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied relief. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, finding that the petitioner's trial counsel had performed deficiently but concluding that no prejudice resulted. Because the performance of trial counsel did not meet the objective standard of reasonableness and because the petitioner was prejudiced as a result, we grant post-conviction relief, set aside the guilty pleas, and remand for trial.
On February 15, 2005, Earl Marion Grindstaff (the "Petitioner"), then fifty-five years of age, entered pleas of guilt to five counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony.1 By the terms of the plea agreement, the trial court was to determine both the length and the manner of service of the sentence for each offense.2 As a Range I offender, the Petitioner was subject to a sentence of not less than eight nor more than twelve years on each of the five offenses. Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-112(a)(2) (2003). The Petitioner's inappropriate contact with the twelve-year-old victim, who was a friend of his granddaughter, served as the factual basis for the guilty pleas. In a statement made to a detective with the Cocke County Sheriff's Department, the Petitioner confessed to touching either the breasts of the victim, her genital area, or her buttocks on at least five separate occasions. Each of the offenses occurred at the Petitioner's residence during times the victim spent the night with his granddaughter.
At the sentencing hearing on May 2, 2005, trial counsel argued that the Petitioner qualified as "a candidate for alternative sentencing" and proposed "community correction or probation" "for the rest of his life."3 He also contended that the Petitioner met the criteria of an especially mitigated offender and was entitled to consideration for a reduced sentence.4 At the conclusion of the proceedings, the trial court, which made no explicit reference to whether the Petitioner qualified for either a reduced or an alternative sentence, imposed terms of ten years on each of the five counts of aggravated sexual battery, ordered confinement in the Department of Correction, and directed that two of the counts be served consecutively to the other three counts, an effective sentence of thirty years at one hundred percent service.
On direct appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, rejecting arguments that the trial court had erred by the imposition of the term or by the denial of an alternative sentence. State v. Grindstaff, No. E2005-02059-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 1540257, at *1 (Tenn.Crim.App. June 6, 2006). The Court of Criminal Appeals further observed that the Petitioner "was not eligible for probation because he was convicted of aggravated sexual battery, a specifically excluded offense." Id. at *6. This Court denied the application for permission to appeal on October 30, 2006.
On March 15, 2007, the Petitioner filed a petition for relief under Tennessee's Post-Conviction Procedure Act, Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-30-101, et seq., alleging that he had been denied the effective assistance of counsel. He contended that Assistant Public Defender Keith Haas ("trial counsel") had failed to adequately communicate his exposure to a sentence of confinement and also had failed to lodge an objection to the sentencing hearing, which was not held within forty-five days after the entry of the Petitioner's guilty pleas, as required by statute. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-209(a) (2003).
At the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, the Petitioner's son, John Wiley Grindstaff, testified that trial counsel had assured the Petitioner that he would receive a probationary sentence if he pled guilty to the charges. The Petitioner's wife, Gay Grindstaff, who was present during several of the meetings between the Petitioner and his trial counsel, also testified. She claimed that trial counsel had never provided any indication that the Petitioner might be incarcerated after his guilty pleas. As proof of his expectation of an alternative sentence, she explained that the Petitioner, a commercial truck driver, had arranged to make a delivery on the day following his sentencing hearing.
The Petitioner, who served in the United States Navy for twenty-two years, received decorations for his service in the Vietnam War and Operation Desert Storm, and had worked steadily as a truck driver for the thirteen years since his honorable discharge, had no prior criminal record. During the evidentiary hearing, the Petitioner testified that his primary objective in pleading guilty to the charges was to persuade the trial court to grant an alternative sentence. He contended that his trial counsel had made a promise "to fight for a lifetime of probation." While acknowledging that he was aware the Assistant District Attorney, Tracy Stone, would argue for a sentence of confinement, the Petitioner nevertheless maintained that he anticipated a probationary sentence based upon his conversations with trial counsel. As support for that contention, the Petitioner testified that he had rejected an initial offer for concurrent sentences of eight years, the minimum possible, because the State had insisted upon a term of confinement. He claimed that he had not considered subsequent proposals, which also included a period of imprisonment, for the same reason. The Petitioner conceded, however, that he had known the State would not pursue additional criminal charges of the same nature if he pled guilty to each of the five counts.
Trial counsel testified for the State. When asked about the specific advice he had provided to the Petitioner regarding the possibility of serving time in prison, trial counsel stated as follows:
I explained ... that at that time the law ... stated that if you have a sentence of one day over eight years, that you had to serve that in the Department of Correction[ ]. I explained ... that this was one of those Class B felonies that if he were sent to prison, that ... would be 100 percent to serve with no more than 15 percent taken off for good time credit. If he received a sentence of eight years, then he would be eligible for alternative sentencing[ ]. And I explained those options to him."
(Emphasis added.)
Trial counsel confirmed that the Petitioner rejected the State's initial offer of an eight-year sentence at one hundred percent confinement in the Department of Correction. He admitted that when the State subsequently proposed concurrent, eight-to-twelve-year sentences on each count with the trial court to determine the actual length of each term and the manner of service, he advised the Petitioner that although "[t]here was no guarantee of probation," the applicable law did permit an alternative sentence. Trial counsel reiterated his understanding of the law as follows: According to trial counsel, the Petitioner also rejected this second offer and the matter was scheduled for trial. When the State learned of allegations made against the Petitioner by another female victim, apparently his granddaughter, it withdrew the offer of concurrent sentencing, but proposed the minimum eight-year terms on each of the five counts; this third proposal would have permitted the trial court to determine not only the manner of service but also whether the sentences would be served concurrently or consecutively. Upon receiving this final offer, trial counsel sent a letter to the Petitioner that included the following language:
Please be advised that ... ADA T. Stone ... has made the following offer on your case. Upon a plea ... to the five (5) counts ... the state would recommend eight (8) years on each count. A sentencing hearing would be held to determine how that sentence would be served. The State would be free to argue for jail time and even consecutive sentencing on each count due to different dates. We can argue for probation or community corrections (CC). As I told you before, any sentence eight (8) years or less can be placed on alternative sentencing (i.e. probation). Anything over eight (8) years must be served in the department of correction[ ]. Please note that because the offer is eight (8) years on each count, the Court could sentence you to some consecutive sentencing; but because it is only 8 years on each, they can give you probation or community corrections for that (i.e. 16 years or even the maximum of 40 years on probation or CC). Also, if the Court ordered you to serve your sentence in the DOC, then it must be at 100% (no more than 15% taken off for good time credit) due to the nature of the offense (as we discussed previously).5
(Emphasis added.)
In the letter, trial counsel also informed the Petitioner that the State had agreed not to pursue additional charges relating to the Petitioner's granddaughter if the Petitioner accepted the...
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