Griner Drilling Service, Inc. v. Jenkins

• Decision Date: 22 October 1986
• Citation: 497 So.2d 187
• Parties: GRINER DRILLING SERVICE, INC. v. J.W. JENKINS. Civ. 5127.
• Court: Alabama Court of Civil Appeals

Page 187

497 So.2d 187

GRINER DRILLING SERVICE, INC. v. J.W. JENKINS.

Civ. 5127.

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

Oct. 22, 1986.

Edward P. Turner, Jr., Gordon K. Howell and David Michael Huggins of Turner, Onderdonk & Kimbrough, Chatom, for appellant.

William L. Utsey of Utsey & Christopher, Butler, for appellee.

HOLMES, Judge.

This is a trespass case.

Jenkins filed suit against Griner Drilling Service, Inc. (Griner) for trespass to his property, which allegedly occurred when Griner's employees entered upon Jenkins's land to recover pipe that Griner had installed. Griner counterclaimed to recover the pipe or, alternatively, the value of the pipe.

Griner filed a motion for summary judgment, which was denied. The case was then tried before a jury, which returned a verdict for Jenkins on his trespass claim in the amount of $4,000 and a verdict for Griner on its counterclaim in the amount of $1,575, i.e., the value of the pipe. The trial court entered a judgment on these verdicts.

Griner, through able and distinguished counsel, appeals, contending that the trial court erred, first, in denying its motion for summary judgment and, second, in entering a judgment on what Griner argues are inconsistent verdicts. We disagree with both contentions and affirm.

In 1976 Jenkins leased the oil, gas, and mineral rights on the subject property. The lessee subsequently assigned those rights to Midroc Oil Company (Midroc), which apparently began to explore for oil or gas on the property. Midroc contracted with Griner for the latter to dig a water well on Jenkins's land, which would presumably aid in Midroc's search for oil and gas.

Apparently, Midroc stopped its operations on Jenkins's land in search of oil or gas in early 1979, after drilling an oil well that was a "dry hole." In January 1979 Jenkins and Midroc entered into a settlement agreement for damage to Jenkins's land. Jenkins was paid $1,500, and in return he executed a written "Release and Agreement" for damage to the land.

In March 1983 Griner's employees entered upon Jenkins's land and unsuccessfully attempted to remove the pipe that had been placed on the land as part of the water well used in Midroc's oil or gas exploration. They were stopped by one of Jenkins's relatives.

In support of its summary judgment motion, Griner submitted to the trial court copies of Jenkins's 1976 lease of his mineral rights, Griner's contract with Midroc to drill the water well, and Jenkins's 1979 Release and Agreement. Jenkins submitted nothing in opposition to Griner's summary judgment motion.

Griner contends that the documentary evidence it presented in support of its motion for summary judgment established its entitlement to summary judgment and that, since Jenkins failed to present any evidence in opposition, the evidence in support of its motion was uncontroverted and the motion was due to be granted.

We agree that, because no evidence was presented to contradict that offered by Griner, the trial court had no choice but to consider Griner's evidence uncontradicted. Bishop v. Leavell Banking Co., 464 So.2d 106 (Ala.Civ.App.1985). Under such circumstances, however, summary judgment would still not be appropriate unless such evidence, though uncontradicted, established that the granting of the motion was warranted. Bishop, 464 So.2d at 108. We find that summary judgment was not warranted in this case.

Summary judgment is proper only when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Sadie v. Martin, 468 So.2d 162 (Ala.1985); Bishop, 464 So.2d at 107; Rule 56, Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure. All reasonable doubts concerning the existence of a genuine issue of fact must be resolved against the moving party. Sadie, 468 So.2d at 165.

The evidence that Griner submitted in support of its summary judgment motion, though not contradicted by Jenkins, does not resolve all material questions of fact regarding its right to enter upon Jenkins's land in March 1983 and remove the pipe.

Griner's price list/contract with Midroc provided that Griner reserved the right to recover the pipe casing. It further provided, however, that Griner "normally pull[s] the wells when the drilling operation is completed." One might conclude that Griner did not follow its normal procedure in this case because it did not enter upon Jenkins's land to "pull the well" until March 1983, approximately four years after Midroc's drilling operation on the land was completed, thus leaving some doubt as to whether Griner had relinquished its right to remove the pipe.

Jenkins's mineral lease provided that the lessee (Midroc) "shall have the right at any time to remove all machinery and fixtures placed on said land, including the right to draw and...