Grinnell v. Wilkinson

• Decision Date: 06 July 1916
• Docket Number: No. 351.,351.
• Parties: GRINNELL v. WILKINSON.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

98 A. 103

GRINNELL

v. WILKINSON.

No. 351.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

July 6, 1916.

Appeal from Superior Court, Providence and Bristol Counties; Willard B. Tanner, Presiding Justice.

Proceeding by William T. Grinnell against Edward Wilkinson for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act. From a judgment dismissing the petition, petitioner appeals. Reversed and remanded.

George A. Breaden and Edward W. Bradford, both of Providence, for appellant. Ernest P. B. Atwood, of Providence, for appellee.

PARKHURST, J. This is a petition for compensation under Pub. Laws, c. 831 (1912), commonly known as the "Workmen's Compensation Act." The petitioner alleges and the answer admits that the parties were subject to the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The petitioner was employed by respondent as a carpenter, and his employment commenced at Providence, in the course whereof he was directed by his employer to go without the state, to New Haven, in the state of Connecticut, to complete work already commenced by him at Providence. While so engaged at New Haven he claimed to have received a splinter in his finger, on the 20th day of May, 1915, and that, as a result of receiving said splinter in the middle finger of his right hand, blood poisoning set in, from which he has never recovered. The petitioner claims that he personally brought the attention of his employer to his injury at the hospital, within a period of 30 days from the occurrence of the accident. The petition was heard before the presiding justice of the superior court at Providence, and denied for the reason, substantially, that the statute does not apply because the injury was received outside the state. The matter is before this court on an appeal duly taken by the petitioner from the decision of the presiding justice.

The question to be decided is whether our statute gives to an employé whose contract of service is within its scope the right to recover compensation for injuries resulting from an accident in the state of Connecticut. The petitioner in his reasons of appeal says that the decree appealed from "is against the evidence and the weight thereof." But the presiding justice, ruling as above against the petitioner, and dismissing the petition solely on the point of law stated, made no findings of fact upon the evidence adduced before him; this court, therefore, has before it upon this appeal only the question of law involved in the decision above referred to; it has no jurisdiction under the act to try and determine the facts of the case. Petitioner's counsel offered no argument upon this point; the argument on this point on behalf of the respondent by his counsel is disregarded for the reasons stated.

Since acts relating to workmen's compensation are of comparatively recent date in this country, the precise question raised in this case has been presented to the courts of this country in comparatively few instances, and quite recently. The presiding justice, in his rescript dismissing this petition, cites only four cases, viz., Gould's Case, 215 Mass. 480, 102 N. E. 693, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 372, Johnson v. Nelson, 128 Minn. 158, 150 N. W. 820, Hotez v. Marine Co., 83 Misc. Rep. 25, 144 N. Y. Supp. 355, and Tomalin v. Pearson, 100 Law Times, 685 (also found in 2 B. W. C. C. 1). Of these cases Johnson v. Nelson is a Minnesota case decided January 8, 1915, and simply holds, substantially, that the plaintiff was an employé whose contract of service related only to work in Wisconsin and was carried out in that state, where he was injured, and that both he and his employer were subject to the terms of the Workmen's Compensation Act of Wisconsin, and that his right of recovery was governed thereby, that the sole remedy of the plaintiff was under the Wisconsin act, and that he could not recover in Minnesota. This case has no bearing upon the question here under consideration.

The case of Hotez v. Marine Co., 83 Misc. Rep. 25, 144 N. Y. Supp. 355 (1913), was for a marine tort, where the complaint charged negligence attempted to be imputed to the owner of a vessel through a subordinate officer. The case was in tort for negligence, and it was held that the Workmen's Compensation Act of New York did not cover the case of torts committed without the state and that the action could not be maintained as a common-law action under the evidence. This case has no application to the case at bar.

The case of Tomalin v. Pearson, 100 L. T. 685, 2 B. W. C. C. 1, in the Court of Appeal for England relates to the English Workmen's Compensation Act, and holds that an employé injured in work done at Malta under contract with a British employer has no right of recovery, under the English act, which by its terms as interpreted by the English court covers only injuries received within the territorial limits of the United Kingdom. This construction is based principally upon the fact that there is no express language in the act to cover injuries suffered outside the United Kingdom, except in case of a limited class of seamen; and it appears to be held that this express extension to a limited class of seamen is evidence of an intention on the part of Parliament to limit the effect of the act otherwise as above stated. See also Hicks v. Maxton, 1 B. W. C. C. 150; Schwartz v. India Rubber Co., 2 K. B. 299, where the English act is held not to apply to foreign injuries.

The leading case in this country up to 1913, was Gould's Case, 215 Mass. 480, 102 N. E. C93, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 372, decided September 12, 1913, and it was doubtless upon this authority that the presiding justice relied in his decision, and he is, at first sight, apparently supported thereby. Since that time, however, certain other cases have been decided which in the opinion of this court more closely apply to our act and which we shall later discuss. Gould's Case, supra, was a petition under the Massachusetts act. The petitioner was a citizen resident of Massachusetts, and made a contract of service with a Massachusetts corporation, and accepted the benefits of the act. "In the course of his employment he received the injury out of which this claim arises, in the state of New York. He was principally employed in Massachusetts, but at times incidentally worked in New York and other states." After discussing certain incidental questions of practice which are not here material, the court proceeds to discuss the construction of the act, and while conceding that the Legislature has power, if it sees fit, to give the act such scope as to cover injuries received outside the state, finds no express words giving it such scope, which is deemed to be significant, and then proceeds to examine its provisions in detail to see whether there is any intent to be gathered therefrom to make the act apply to such injuries. At page 484 of 215 Mass., at page 695 of 102 N. E., Ann. Cas. 1914D, 372, the court says:

"A consideration of the act in detail fails to disclose any plain intent to that end. On the contrary, several provisions indicate solely intrastate operation. Part 2, § 19, provides that the employé who has received an injury shall submit himself on request to an examination 'by a physician or surgeon authorized to practice medicine under the laws of the commonwealth.' It hardly can be inferred from this language that the Legislature intended that physicians or surgeons from Massachusetts should journey to the place of injury, or that those authorized to practice under the laws of other states should make the examination, Part 3 of the act, which relates to procedure, and which as has been pointed out creates a wholly new method of procedure, deals only with boards and courts within this commonwealth. No provision is made for enforcing rights as to injuries occurring outside the state. Part 3, § 7, as amended by St. 1912, c. 571, § 12, requires that the hearings of the committee on arbitration 'be held in the city or town where the injury occurred.' Obviously, this cannot relate to injuries received outside this commonwealth. Section 11 as amended by St. 1912, c. 571, § 14, provides that in the event of resort to the courts copies of the papers shall be presented 'to the superior court for the county in which the injury occurred or for the county of Suffolk.' The words 'for the county of Suffolk' may be presumed to be inserted for convenience, as the offices of the Industrial Accident Board are in Suffolk and courts are continually in session in that county, and not in order to make provision for injuries occurring outside the state. Part 3, § 18, requires the employer, within 48 hours, not counting Sundays and legal holidays, after the accident resulting in personal injury, to make a report 'in writing to the Industrial Accident Board.' Part 4, § 18, authorizes the directors of the Massachusetts Employés' Insurance Association created by the act, to make and enforce reasonable rules and regulations for the prevention of injuries on the premises of the subscribers, 'and for this purpose the inspectors of the association shall have free access to all such premises during regular working hours.' This section is in furtherance of that part of the purpose of the act as set forth in its title for the prevention of industrial injuries. But it cannot be operative outside of Massachusetts."

From these various provisions of the Massachusetts act the court finds an intent to confine the operation of the act to accidental injuries happening in the state, and that it is not applicable to injuries arising out of the state. On page 488 of 215 Mass., on page 696 of 102 N. E., Ann. Cas. 1914D, 372, the court says:

"If employés and employers from different states carry their domiciliary personal injury law with them into other jurisdictions, confusion would ensue in the administration of the law, and at least the appearance of inequality among those working under similar conditions. If such a result had been...