Grint v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.
| Decision Date | 20 April 2018 |
| Docket Number | 15-CV-6592 (KAM) |
| Parties | ALEXEI GRINT, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c), plaintiff, Alexei Grint ("plaintiff"), appeals the final decisions of defendant Commissioner of Social Security ("defendant" or the "Commissioner"). The Commissioner denied plaintiff's application for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") under Title II of the Social Security Act (the "Act") on the grounds that the plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Act at any time through September 30, 2011, the last date insured. The Commissioner also denied, in part, plaintiff's application for Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") benefits under Title XVI of the Act, finding that plaintiff was not disabled prior to March 1, 2012, but became disabled and consequently eligible for SSI benefits on that date. Plaintiff disputes these findings and alleges that he became disabled under the Act as of April 1, 2010 and is thus entitled to receive both DIB and SSI benefits due to physical impairments that have prevented him from working since that time.
Presently before the court are defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings and plaintiff's cross-motion for judgment on the pleadings. For the reasons set forth below, the Commissioner's motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted, the plaintiff's cross-motion for judgment on the pleadings is denied, and the decision of the Commissioner is affirmed.
The court adopts the factual and procedural background set forth in the Administrative Transcript, the Administrative Law Judge's September 27, 2013 decision, and the parties' respective motions for judgment on the pleadings. This opinion discusses only those facts relevant to the court's determination as set forth herein.
Plaintiff filed an application for DIB under Title II of the Act on March 9, 2011 and an application for SSI benefits under Title XVI of the Act on May 4, 2011. (Tr. 53.)1 Each application alleged that the onset date of plaintiff's disability was January 1, 2008, though the plaintiff subsequently amended this date, as discussed below. (Id.) Plaintiff claimed disability due to "neck problems" and providedmedical evidence that he suffered from "dizziness, some vertigo, [and] neck pain." (Tr. 121.) The Social Security Administration ("SSA") determined that plaintiff's condition was not sufficient to keep him from working and consequently denied his applications on August 23, 2011. (Tr. 53, 116-121.)
On September 1, 2011, plaintiff filed a written request for a hearing. (Tr. 53.) Plaintiff appeared and testified at the hearing, which took place before Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Valorie Stefanelli on January 3, 2013. (Tr. 53; see also Tr. 70-110 ().) A non-attorney, Asia A. Simmons, represented plaintiff at the hearing. (Tr. 53.) In addition, an impartial vocational expert, Miriam Greene, appeared and testified at the hearing. (Tr. 53, 103-109.) Following the hearing, plaintiff amended the alleged date of onset of disability to April 1, 2010. (Tr. 53, 302.)
On September 27, 2013, the ALJ issued a decision (the "ALJ Decision") denying plaintiff's claim for DIB and SSI benefits for the period from April 1, 2010 through February 28, 2012, and granting his claim for SSI benefits from March 1, 2012 through the date of the decision. (Tr. 53-63.) This outcome was the result of the ALJ's determination that the plaintiff became disabled as of March 1, 2012 but was not disabled prior to that date. (Tr. 53.)
More specifically, the ALJ concluded that the medical record demonstrated that the plaintiff could perform sedentary work, as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a) and 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(a), prior to March 1, 2012. (Tr. 56.) The ALJ found that prior to March 1, 2012, the plaintiff's residual functional capacity ("RFC") was such that he was capable of performing his past relevant work, specifically that of an analyst and programmer. (Tr. 61.) The ALJ further concluded that as of March 1, 2012 plaintiff's RFC prevented him from performing his past relevant work and that, based on the vocational expert's testimony, there were no other jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that the plaintiff could perform. (Id.)
Accordingly, the plaintiff was found to be disabled under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f) and 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(f) as of March 1, 2012 through September 27, 2013, the date of the ALJ decision, and was entitled to SSI benefits beginning on March 1, 2012. (Tr. 62.) The ALJ also reviewed the plaintiff's earnings record and determined that his disability insurance had lapsed after September 30, 2011, and accordingly denied his DIB claim because he was uninsured as of the date on which he became disabled.2 (Tr. 53, 62.)
Plaintiff appealed the ALJ Decision to the Appeals Council and on December 2, 2013, made a submission identifying three reasons the ALJ Decision should be vacated and remanded. (Tr. 314-17.) The plaintiff argued that the ALJ erred when she: (1) "[f]ailed to properly find the lumbar spine and left knee impairments 'severe' at step 2 of the sequential evaluation," (2) "[f]ailed to properly evaluate the [plaintiff's] residual functional capacity," and (3) "[f]ailed to properly evaluate the opinions" of two treating physicians, Dr. Nina Kushner and Dr. Michael Riskevich. (Tr. 314.) The plaintiff made an additional submission to the Appeals Council on February 25, 2014, arguing that the ALJ also erred by "failing to properly assess the credibility of the claimant's subjective complaints." (Tr. 318.) The Appeals Council denied plaintiff's request for review of the ALJ's decision, making the ALJ Decision the final decision of the Commissioner. (Tr. 5.)
Plaintiff commenced the instant action on December 1, 2015. (Complaint, ECF No. 1.) The Commissioner served her motion for judgment on the pleadings on June 1, 2016, (Letter Enclosing Motion, ECF No. 11), and plaintiff filed his cross-motion for judgment on the pleadings and memorandum in support thereof on October 24, 2016. (Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, ECF No. 16; Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law ("Pl. Mem."), ECF No. 17). The Commissioner filed her paperswith the court on November 14, 2016. (See Notice of Motion, ECF No. 18; Defendant's Memorandum of Law, ECF No. 19; Defendant's Reply Memorandum of Law, ECF No. 20.)
"Any individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security made after a hearing to which he was a party . . . may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action" in a district court. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) When a district court conducts such a review, it may "enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing." Id.
"A district court may set aside the Commissioner's determination that a claimant is not disabled only if the factual findings are not supported by 'substantial evidence' or if the decision is based on legal error." Burgess v. Astrue, 537 F.3d 117, 127 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Shaw v. Chater, 221 F.3d 126, 131 (2d Cir. 2000)); accord 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence "means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion," and must be "more than a mere scintilla." Burgess,537 F.3d at 127-28 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 31 (2d Cir. 2004)). The district court must "consider[] the whole record . . . because an analysis of the substantiality of evidence must also include that which detracts from its weight." Williams ex rel. Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1988) (citations omitted).
If there is substantial evidence in the record to support the Commissioner's factual findings, those findings are conclusive and must be upheld, see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and "the [reviewing] court may not substitute its own judgment for that of the [ALJ], even if it might justifiably have reached a different result upon a de novo review." Jones v. Sullivan, 949 F.2d 57, 59 (2d Cir. 1991) (quoting Valente v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 733 F.2d 1037, 1041 (2d Cir. 1984)).
To qualify for DIB and/or SSI, an individual must be disabled. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(a)(1)(E), 1382(a)(1). An individual is disabled under the Act when he or she is not able "to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last" for at least twelve continuous months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The impairment, or impairments, must be "of such severity that [the claimant] is not only unableto do his [or her] previous work but cannot, considering his [or her] age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy." 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B). To be eligible for DIB an individual must also have been insured within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 414 at the time he or she became disabled. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(A); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(c)(1) and 414(a)-(b) (defining insured status).
To determine whether a claimant is disabled, the SSA follows a five-step sequential analysis, as detailed below. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4).
At step one, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful employment. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). If the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity, then his...
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