Grissom v. Modesto Police Dep't
| Docket Number | 1:21-cv-01273-JLT-SAB |
| Decision Date | 11 February 2022 |
| Parties | TONY VALENTINO GRISSOM, Plaintiff, v. MODESTO POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
ORDER SCREENING COMPLAINT (ECF No. 1)
Tony Valentino Grissom, also known as Hawk Silverdragon (“Plaintiff”), [1] proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, initiated this action in the Sacramento Division of the Eastern District of California on August 13, 2021, against Defendants Modesto Police Department, City of Modesto, Officer Tyrell Minnis-Swass, and two Doe Officers. (ECF No. 1.) On August 23, 2021, the case was transferred from the Sacramento Division to this Court. (ECF No. 3.) The complaint is now before this Court for screening. Having considered the complaint, as well as the Court's file, the Court issues the following screening order.
In cases where the plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court is required to screen each case, and shall dismiss the case at any time if the Court determines that the allegation of poverty is untrue, or the action or appeal is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th Cir. 1984). The Court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327; see also Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2005) (). An action is malicious if it was filed with the “intention or desire to harm another.” Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1121 (9th Cir. 2005).
To state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Rather, a plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face,' ” such that the Court may reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. at 663 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555); Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). Thus, the plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). The “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and “facts that are ‘merely consistent with' a defendant's liability” falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.
In reviewing a pro se complaint, the Court is to liberally construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 521 (1969); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010)) (“where the petitioner is pro se, particularly in civil rights cases, [courts should] construe the pleadings liberally and . . . afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt.”); U.S. v. Qazi, 975 F.3d 989, 992-93 (9th Cir. 2020) (“It is an entrenched principle that pro se filings however inartfully pleaded are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”) (citations and internal quotations omitted). Nonetheless, while factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
As a general rule, the Court must limit its review to the operative complaint and may not consider facts presented in extrinsic evidence. See Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001). Materials submitted as part of the complaint, however, are not “outside” the complaint and may be considered. Id.; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n.19 (9th Cir. 1990). Moreover, the Court is not required to accept as true conclusory allegations which are contradicted by exhibits to the complaint. See Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001), opinion amended on denial of reh'g, 275 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2001); Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1295-96 (9th Cir. 1998). Leave to amend may be granted to the extent that the deficiencies of the complaint can be cured by amendment. Cato v. U.S., 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995).
The Court accepts Plaintiff's allegations in the complaint as true only for the purpose of the sua sponte screening requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
Plaintiff alleges he is “one of the people indigenous to this Land of the California Republic.” (Compl. ¶ 4.) On August 22, 2020, around noon, Plaintiff was “traveling from point (a) to point (b) in a private conveyance of his choice, ” also referred to by Plaintiff as “his vehicle, ” in Modesto, California. (Id. at ¶¶ 8, 11.) As he was “on his way to park his vehicle, ” Plaintiff was stopped by Defendant Officer Minnis-Swass “for a suspected traffic violation, ” specifically, an expired vehicle registration. (Id. at ¶¶ 8, 28; see also Ex. D, ECF No. 1 at 25-26 ().) When asked to show his driver's license, Plaintiff told Minnis-Swass he was not “driving” because he was “not actively engaged in commerce.” (Compl. ¶¶ 9, 11.) Minnis-Swass disagreed with this characterization and informed Plaintiff he needed to see Plaintiff's driver's license, or he would have to arrest Plaintiff. (See id. at ¶ 12.) Instead of presenting a driver's license, Plaintiff handed Minnis-Swass a “Fee Schedule, ”[2] a “Notice to Arresting Officer, ”[3] and a “Sovereign Identification.”[4] (Id. at ¶ 13; id. at Exs. A-C, ECF No. 1 at 15-24.) At this time, Minnis-Swass called his “superior officer” to verify whether he should arrest Plaintiff for failure to show a driver's license. (Compl. ¶ 14.)
Thereafter, two Doe officers arrived on scene. (Id. at ¶ 15.) Plaintiff concludes the Doe officers “formed a verbal agreement” with Minnis-Swass to arrest Plaintiff for failure to produce a driver's license but alleges no other facts about the Doe officers. Minnis-Swass then arrested Plaintiff by removing him from his vehicle and placing him in handcuff restraints. (Id. at ¶ 16.)
Minnis-Swass searched Plaintiff's clothes and removed a wallet and a computer thumb drive from Plaintiff's pockets. (Id. at ¶ 17.) Minnis-Swass put Plaintiff in the back of his police vehicle, then he looked through Plaintiff's wallet and found Plaintiff's driver's license. (Id. at ¶ 18.) Minnis-Swass issued Plaintiff a citation and told Plaintiff he would be released if he signed the citation. (Id. at ¶ 19; see also id. at 26.) Plaintiff claims he signed the citation “under duress, coercion and threat of slavery.” (Id. at ¶ 20.) After Plaintiff signed the citation, unspecified Defendants released Plaintiff, returned Plaintiff's wallet but not the thumb drive to him, took pictures of Plaintiff's “Fee Schedule, ” “Notice to Arresting Officer, ” and “Sovereign Identification, ” and departed from the scene. (Id. at ¶¶ 22, 23.) Plaintiff alleges that, during the entire incident, he was never read his Miranda rights or criminally charged. (Id. at ¶¶ 24, 34.)
Based on these allegations, Plaintiff attempts to assert causes of action for: 42 U.S.C. § 1983: false arrest (Count 1); 42 U.S.C. § 1983: due process/Brady violation (Count 2); state law claim: false imprisonment (Count 3); 42 U.S.C. § 1983: conspiracy to commit constitutional violations (Count 4); 42 U.S.C. § 1983: failure to intervene (Count 5); and state law claims of malicious prosecution (Count 6); intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) (Count 7); respondeat superior (Count 8); and indemnification (Count 9). (Id. at 5-12.) Plaintiff does not specify which Defendant he is asserting each claim against and may possibly be asserting every against each Defendant. Liberally construing the complaint, the Court will address Plaintiff's claims as asserted against each Defendant.
As an initial matter, the Court notes Plaintiff names two Doe defendants in his complaint, referring to them as “Officer John Doe 1” and “Officer John Doe 2.” Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10 requires a plaintiff to include the names of the parties in the action. Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(a). Eventually, Plaintiff may be afforded an opportunity for limited, preliminary discovery to identify the names of the Doe defendants “unless it is clear that discovery would not uncover their identities, ” Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980), and only after the Court is satisfied that Plaintiff has exhausted every other possibility of finding their names.[5] See Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Gillespie, 629 F.2d at 642). At this time, however, Plaintiff asserts no factual allegations pertaining to either John Doe 1 or John Doe 2 of the Doe officer defendants, nor does he identify which Doe officer defendant committed what alleged act. This is insufficient to put...
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