Griswold v. State
Decision Date | 21 December 2021 |
Docket Number | No. 05-19-01561-CR,05-19-01561-CR |
Citation | 637 S.W.3d 888 |
Parties | Thomas George GRISWOLD III, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Niles S. Illich, Scott H. Palmer, P.C., Addison, for Appellant.
Jeffrey William Shell, Kenda L. Culpepper, Rockwall County District Attorney's Office, Rockwall, for Appellee.
Before Justices Molberg, Goldstein, and Smith
On the Court's own motion, we withdraw our October 26, 2021 opinion and judgment. This is now the opinion of the Court.
Thomas George Griswold III appeals his conviction for the third-degree felony offense of stalking. In three issues, Griswold asserts (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, (2) the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion for new trial without conducting an evidentiary hearing, and (3) the trial court erred by denying his motion to quash the indictment because the stalking statute is unconstitutionally overbroad and vague on its face. Because we agree with Griswold that the stalking statute is unconstitutionally overbroad and vague on its face, we reverse and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Griswold was indicted for stalking under section 42.072 of the penal code for conduct beginning on or about January 1, 2007 and ending on April 24, 2018. Specifically, the indictment alleged that Griswold:
did then and there on more than one occasion and pursuant to the same scheme or course of conduct directed specifically toward [the complainant] that [Griswold] knowingly engaged in conduct that constituted an offence under section 42.07 and/or conduct that [Griswold] knew or reasonably should have known [the complainant] would regard as threatening bodily injury for [the complainant] and or bodily injury or death, and did cause [the complainant] to be placed in fear of bodily injury or death, to-wit: [listing five specific allegations of repeated communications, public declarations on Facebook, public statements, and public threats].
The indictment continued by alleging Griswold's conduct caused the complainant "to feel harassed, annoyed, alarmed, abused, tormented, embarrassed, or offended" and "would cause a reasonable person to feel harassed, annoyed, alarmed, abused, tormented, embarrassed, or offended."
At the time Griswold was indicted, section 42.072 of the penal code, entitled "Stalking," provided:
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.072(a). Section 42.07, the "electronic-communications-harassment statute," provided:
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.07(a)(7). The definition of electronic communication encompasses current forms of communication and means:
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.07(b)(1).
Prior to trial, Griswold filed a motion to quash the indictment alleging the stalking statute was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, citing Ex parte Barton , 586 S.W.3d 573, 583–85 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2019, pet. granted) (op. on reh'g). After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion and proceeded to trial. Griswold was convicted of stalking as charged in the indictment and sentenced to ten years in prison. He filed a motion for new trial, which the trial court denied. This appeal followed.
In his third issue, Griswold challenges the constitutionality of the stalking statute. In particular, he contends the harassment statute, which is incorporated by direct reference into the stalking statute, is unconstitutionally vague because the words "harass, annoy, alarm, abuse, torment, or embarrass" "leaves the electronic-communications subsection open to various ‘uncertainties of meaning.’ "
There is a split of authority regarding this issue. Compare State v. Chen , 615 S.W.3d 376, 384–85 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, pet. filed) ( ); Ex parte Barton , 586 S.W.3d at 583–85 ( ); with Ex parte Johnston , No. 09-19-00445-CR, 2021 WL 1395564, at *3–5 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Apr. 14, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) ( section 42.072 does not implicate First Amendment protection and therefore not unconstitutionally overbroad or vague); Ex parte McDonald , 606 S.W.3d 856, 863–64 (Tex. App.—Austin 2020, pet. filed) (same); Ex parte Sanders , No. 07-18-00335-CR, 2019 WL 1576076, at *4–5 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Apr. 8, 2019, pet. granted) ( )(same); Ex parte Hinojos , No. 08-17-00077-CR, 2018 WL 6629678, at *6 (Tex. App.—El Paso Dec. 19, 2018, pet. ref'd) ( )(same); Ex parte Reece , No. 11-16-00196-CR, 2016 WL 6998930, at *3 (Tex. App.—Eastland Nov. 30, 2016, pet. ref'd) ( )(same); Lebo v. State , 474 S.W.3d 402, 408 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2015, pet. ref'd) (same); Duran v. State , No. 13-11-00205-CR, 2012 WL 3612507, at *3–4 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Aug. 23, 2012, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (same).
We review de novo a constitutional challenge to a criminal statute. Lawrence v. State , 240 S.W.3d 912, 915 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) ( ). Whether a statute is facially constitutional is a question of law and the challenging party generally carries the burden to establish a statute's unconstitutionality. Vandyke v. State , 538 S.W.3d 561, 570 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) ; Ex parte Lo , 424 S.W.3d 10, 14–15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
After a thorough review of the cases, we find persuasive and agree with the analyses and reasoning in both Barton and Chen , which held that the electronic-communications-harassment statute ( section 42.07(a)(7) "sends repeated electronic communications in a manner reasonably likely to harass, annoy, alarm, abuse, torment, embarrass, or offend another") is unconstitutional. Barton , 586 S.W.3d at 575 (vague and overbroad); Chen , 615 S.W.3d at 385 (overbroad).
In Barton , the Fort Worth Court of Appeals first addressed whether the statute implicated the free-speech guarantee of the First Amendment. Barton , 586 S.W.3d at 576. Although the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals previously held the telephone-harassment statute, section 42.07(a)(4), was not "susceptible of application to communicative conduct that is protected by the First Amendment" in Scott v. State , 322 S.W.3d 662, 669 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010), the Fort Worth court noted that portion of Scott had been abrogated by Wilson v. State , 448 S.W.3d 418, 424–25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). Reading Wilson to concede that conduct punishable by the statute could have a dual intent—one protected by the First Amendment and one not—the court "departed from Scott ’s ‘sole intent’ limiting construction and held the electronic-communications-harassment statute implicated speech protected by the First Amendment." Chen , 615 S.W.3d at 381 (discussing Barton , 586 S.W.3d at 579 ). The Barton court then held section 42.07(a)(7) unconstitutional, noting that it "suffers from a fatal flaw of vagueness because the disjunctive series of the terms ‘harass, annoy, alarm, abuse, torment, embarrass, or offend’ leaves the electronic-communications subsection open to various ‘uncertainties of meaning,’ " and "the term ‘reasonably likely’ does not create a ‘reasonable person’ standard sufficient to cure the failure of the subsection to specify whose sensitivities were offended." Barton , 586 S.W.3d at 583 (citing Long v. State , 931 S.W.2d 285, 288–90 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) ).
In Chen , the Fourteenth Court agreed with the logic of Barton , elaborating further on the First Amendment implications. While Scott addressed "the uniquely invasive nature of telephone calls," the court noted that " ‘electronic communications’ encompasses a far broader array of activities ... Crucially, many of the activities do not fall within the ‘captive-audience’ context, but instead require affirmative actions by the user to access the content at issue." Chen , 615 S.W.3d at 382 (citation omitted). The Fourteenth Court agreed with Barton ’s conclusion that Scott was no longer controlling, noting the breadth of the electronic-communications-harassment statute is "breathtaking" and has "the potential to sweep up large swaths of protected speech." Id. at 384. It concluded that "by its plain text[,] the scope of the statute prohibits or chills a substantial amount of protected speech, rendering it unconstitutionally overbroad." Id. at 385.
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