Grivnow v. Bowser
| Decision Date | 12 September 2022 |
| Docket Number | 20-cv-2000 (CRC) |
| Parties | STEPHEN K. GRIVNOW, Plaintiff, v. MURIEL BOWSER, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Former District of Columbia Public Schools (“DCPS”) teacher Stephen K. Grivnow brings this pro se lawsuit against D.C. Mayor Muriel Bowser and various DCPS officials. In July 2019, Grivnow was discharged from his position at Dunbar High School following a poor performance evaluation. He alleges that the evaluation and resulting termination violated the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause and a host of D.C. and federal laws. The defendants move to dismiss Grivnow's complaint. As explained below the Court finds that virtually all of Grivnow's claims either are time barred, fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the D.C. Public Employee Relations Board, or fail to state a claim. There is one exception, however Grivnow has (just barely) pled a valid claim for retaliation under the D.C. Whistleblower Protection Act. The Court will therefore deny the motion to dismiss as to a portion of that claim, and grant it in all other respects.
Before his termination, Grivnow taught math at Dunbar High School. Second Am. Compl. ¶ 1, ECF No. 36-1 (hereinafter “Compl.”).[1] Grivnow characterizes himself as an outspoken member of the Washington Teacher's Union (“WTU”) who regularly reported “fraud, abuse, [and] contract violations” at the school. Id. ¶ 2. In particular, Grivnow alleges that in 2018 he exposed record keeping violations regarding student attendance at Dunbar to an independent auditor, Alvarez & Marsal, that had been engaged by the District's Office of the State Superintendent of Education to examine policy adherence and graduation rates in DCPS high schools. Compl., Ex. A-1 (Alvarez & Marsal Report), ECF No. 36-2. Grivnow claims that Dunbar Principal Nadine Smith gave him an artificially low “IMPACT” teacher evaluation score and then terminated him in retaliation for this whistleblowing. Compl. ¶¶ 3, 6. He further alleges that Principal Smith fabricated her assessment of his classroom teaching-which is part of the IMPACT process-despite not having observed him in the classroom. Id. ¶ 10. And, he claims that the various other DCPS administrators named in his complaint “conspired” with Principal Smith to “support” her supposed fabrication of his IMPACT score. Id. ¶ 16.
Grivnow also generally complains of widespread abuse of DCPS's IMPACT evaluation system and its negative effect on teachers and students more broadly. See Id. ¶ 4 (“IMPACT has been criticized as creating a culture of fear amongst staff and has been criticized as creating an impetus to make statistics look good for school administrators at the expense of the students' educational needs.”); id. ¶ 35 (); id. ¶ 61 (). Grivnow filed numerous union grievances concerning IMPACT policy violations he claimed to have observed, as well as grievances about his own IMPACT evaluation. Id. ¶ 59; see also id., Ex. C-1. Grivnow names eight separate defendants: (1) Mayor Muriel Bowser, (2) DCPS Chancellor Dr. Lewis Ferebee, (3) DCPS Chief of Labor Management Kaitlyn Girard, (4) DCPS Labor Management and Employee Relations Manager Jade Fuller, (5) DCPS General Counsel D. Scott Barash, (6) David Pinder, Superintendent for one of DCPS's geographic subdivisions; (7) Dunbar Principal Nadine Smith, and (8) Dunbar Assistant Principal Errol Johnson. Compl. at 4.
The complaint asserts seven causes of action against all defendants. They include a constitutional claim under the Due Process Clause (claim 1); statutory claims under the D.C. and Federal Whistleblower Protection Acts (claim 4), the D.C. Administrative Procedure Act (claim 6), and the National Labor Relations Act (claim 7); and common law claims for breach of the WTU's collective bargaining agreement (claim 2), defamation (claim 3), and conspiracy to commit fraud (claim 5). Compl. ¶¶ 47-79 (Claims for Relief). The defendants move to dismiss the complaint in its entirety for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss at 1, ECF No. 39. The motion is ripe for the Court's consideration.
Rule 12(b)(6) requires dismissal of a complaint that fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” When evaluating a 12(b)(6) motion, the court must determine whether the complaint “contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
Under the standard set forth in Twombly, a “court deciding a motion to dismiss” must “assume all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)” and “must give the plaintiff ‘the benefit of all reasonable inferences derived from the facts alleged.'” Aktieselskabet AF 21. November 2001 v. Fame Jeans Inc., 525 F.3d 8, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (first quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; and then quoting Stewart v. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n, 471 F.3d 169, 173 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). Although a complaint need not provide “detailed factual allegations” to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, it must offer “more than labels and conclusions.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “In determining whether a complaint states a claim, the court may consider the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached thereto or incorporated therein, and matters of which it may take judicial notice.” Stewart, 471 F.3d at 173.
“A document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally construed,'” and “a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Yet, pro se complaints must still “plead factual matter that permits the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct,” Abdelfattah v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 787 F.3d 524, 533 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Jones v. Horne, 634 F.3d 588, 596 (D.C. Cir. 2011)), and “present a claim on which the Court can grant relief,” Smith v. Scalia, 44 F.Supp.3d 28, 36 (D.D.C. 2014) (quoting Budik v. Dartmouth-Hitchcock Med. Ctr., 937 F.Supp.2d 5, 11 (D.D.C. 2013)).
The District offers three arguments for dismissal. First, it contends that Grivnow's allegations against the individual DCPS administrators are overly conclusory and lack factual support. Second, it argues that the D.C. Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act vests exclusive jurisdiction over Grivnow's state and common law claims with the District's Public Employee Relations Board. Finally, the District maintains that Grivnow has failed to state a constitutional claim. The Court takes each in turn.
Grivnow has sued the individual D.C. and DCPS officials in both their official and personal capacities. Compl. at 3 (Parties). To the extent that Grivnow sues defendants in their official capacities, the Court will construe these claims as brought against the District of Columbia. “It is well-established that ‘[w]hen sued in their official capacities, government officials are not personally liable for damages.'” Younger v. D.C. Pub. Sch., 60 F.Supp.3d 130, 142 (D.D.C. 2014) (alteration in original) (quoting Atchinson v. District of Columbia, 73 F.3d 418, 424 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). “A suit for damages against municipal officials in their official capacities ‘is thus equivalent to a suit against the municipality itself.'” Id. (quoting Atchinson, 73 F.3d at 424); see Price v. D.C., 545 F.Supp.2d 89, 94 (D.D.C. 2008) (“[T]he complaint names the mayor as a defendant in his official capacity only, which is equivalent of suing the city.” (quoting Jungels v. Pierce, 825 F.2d 1127, 1129 (7th Cir. 1987)); see also D.C. Code § 1615.54 (). Accordingly, the Court will construe Grivnow's claims against the defendants in their official capacities as claims brought against the District of Columbia and direct the Clerk's Office to add the District of Columbia to the caption of this case. See, e.g., Proctor v. District of Columbia, 74 F.Supp.3d 436, 445 n.3 (D.D.C. 2014) (); Miller v. Gray, 52 F.Supp.3d 62, 66-67 (D.D.C. 2014) (); Henneghan v. D.C. Pub. Schools, 597 F.Supp.2d 34, 37 (D.D.C. 2009).
Turning to Grivnow's claims against the individual defendants based on their personal involvement in the relevant personnel actions, aside from those concerning Principal Smith Grivnow's allegations fall short of the pleading standard set forth in Twombly and Iqbal. As discussed more below, Grivnow alleges that Principal Smith gave him an artificially deflated IMPACT score and eventually terminated him in retaliation for his whistleblowing activities. See Compl. ¶¶ 3, 6, 58-60. But with respect to the other individual defendants, Grivnow has failed to allege any facts that would give rise to personal liability. Rather, h...
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