Grkman v. 890 Weatherwood Lane Operating Co.

• Decision Date: 31 May 2016
• Docket Number: 16cv0519
• Citation: 189 F.Supp.3d 513
• Parties: Joseph M. Grkman, JR., Individually and as the Administrator of the Estate of Joseph M. Grkman, Deceased, Plaintiff, v. 890 Weatherwood Lane Operating Company, LLC doing business as the Rehabilitation and Nursing Center at Greater Pittsburg, 890 Weatherwood Lane, LLC doing business as the Rehabilitation and Nursing Center at Greater Pittsburg, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania

189 F.Supp.3d 513

Joseph M. Grkman, JR., Individually and as the Administrator of the Estate of Joseph M. Grkman, Deceased, Plaintiff,

v.890 Weatherwood Lane Operating Company, LLC doing business as the Rehabilitation and Nursing Center at Greater Pittsburg, 890 Weatherwood Lane, LLC doing business as the Rehabilitation and Nursing Center at Greater Pittsburg, Defendants.

16cv0519

United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania.

Filed May 31, 2016

A. Michael Gianantonio, Robert Peirce & Associates, P.C., Robert F. Daley, Peirce Law Offices, Pittsburgh, PA, for Plaintiff.

Eugene A. Giotto, Robert D. Finkel, Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney PC, Pittsburgh, PA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Arthur J. Schwab, United States District Judge

Before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiff's survival and wrongful death case which was originally filed in the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania, but was removed by Defendants who claimed diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). See doc nos. 1 and 6. The gravamen of Defendants' argument in favor of dismissal is that Plaintiff, acting as his father's (the decedent's) personal representative, signed a contract with Defendant which contained a binding arbitration clause. Thus, Defendants contend this case in its entirety must be transferred to arbitration. Doc. no. 7.¹

Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss does not dispute that Plaintiff signed such a contract, and concurs that the contract contained an arbitration clause. However, Plaintiff contends that the arbitration clause does not apply to the specific claims raised by his lawsuit.

Both Plaintiff and Defendants have thoroughly briefed this matter and it is now ripe for adjudication. The Court will deny the Motion to Dismiss for the reasons set forth herein.

I. Standards of Review

A. Rule 12(b)(1) Motion

A Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) challenges this Court's "very power to hear the case." See Judkins v. HT Window Fashions Corp. , 514 F.Supp.2d 753, 759 (W.D.Pa.2007) (Lancaster, J.) (quoting Mortens e n v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n , 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir.1977) ). As the party asserting jurisdiction, Plaintiff "bears the burden of showing that its claims are properly before the district court." Dev. Fin. Corp. v. Alpha Housing & Health Care , 54 F.3d 156, 158 (3d Cir.1995). In reviewing a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), this Court must distinguish between facial attacks and factual attacks. See Petruska v. Gannon Univ. , 462 F.3d 294, 302 (3d Cir.2006).

A facial attack challenges the sufficiency of the pleadings, and the Court must accept the Plaintiff's allegations as true. Id. A defendant who attacks a complaint on its face "[asserts] that considering the allegations of the complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of [plaintiff], the allegations of the complaint are insufficient to establish a federal cause of action." Mullen v. Thompson , 155 F.Supp.2d 448, 451 (W.D.Pa.2001). Dismissal is proper under Rule 12(b)(1) only when "the claim clearly appears to be immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or... is wholly insubstantial and frivolous." Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc. , 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir.1991) (quoting Bell v. Hood , 327 U.S. 678, 682, 66 S.Ct. 773, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946) ).

When, as in this case, a defendant launches a factual attack on subject matter jurisdiction, "no presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff's allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims." Petruska , 462 F.3d at 302 (quoting Mortens e n , 549 F.2d at 891 ). In a factual attack, this Court must weigh the evidence relating to jurisdiction, with discretion to allow affidavits, documents, and even limited evidentiary hearings. See United States ex rel. Atkinson v. P A . Shipbuilding Co. , 473 F.3d 506, 514 (3d Cir.2007).

B. Rule 12(b)(3) Motion

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391, where jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship, a plaintiff may bring a case in:

(1) a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same State, (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated, or (3) a judicial district in which any defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced, if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought.

28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(1)–(3). See also Bockman v. First American Marketing Corp. , 459 Fed.Appx. 157, 160 (3d Cir.2012).

A Motion to Dismiss predicated upon Rule 12(b)(3) requires that the "defendant ... bear the burden of showing improper venue." Myers v. Am. Dental Ass'n , 695 F.2d 716, 724–25 (3d Cir.1982).

C. Rule 12(b)(6) Motion

In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, federal courts require notice pleading, as opposed to the heightened standard of fact pleading. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) requires only " ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds on which it rests.’ " Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson , 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957) ).

Building upon the landmark United States Supreme Court decisions in Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit explained that a District Court must undertake the following three steps to determine the sufficiency of a complaint:

First, the court must take note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim. Second, the court should identify allegations that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Finally, where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.

Connelly v. Steel Valley Sch. Dist. , 706 F.3d 209, 212 (3d Cir.2013) (citation omitted).

The third step requires this Court to consider the specific nature of the claims presented and to determine whether the facts pled to substantiate the claims are sufficient to show a "plausible claim for relief." Covington v. Int'l Ass'n of Approved Basketball Officials , 710 F.3d 114, 118 (3d Cir.2013). "While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a Complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 664, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

This Court may not dismiss a Complaint merely because it appears unlikely or improbable that Plaintiff can prove the facts alleged or will ultimately prevail on the merits. Twombly , 550 U.S. at 563 n. 8, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Instead, this Court must ask whether the facts alleged raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary elements. Id. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Generally speaking, a Complaint that provides adequate facts to establish "how, when, and where" will survive a Motion to Dismiss. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside , 578 F.3d 203, 212 (3d Cir.2009).

In short, a Motion to Dismiss should not be granted if a party alleges facts, which could, if established at trial, entitle him/her to relief. Twombly , 550 U.S. at 563 n. 8, 127 S.Ct. 1955.

II. Factual Background

The following facts are accepted as true solely for the purposes of deciding the instant Motion to Dismiss.

Plaintiff's Complaint indicates that Plaintiff's father, Joseph Grkman, Sr. ("Mr. Grkman"), was admitted to Defendants' skilled nursing facility on February 17, 2014. Doc. no. 1-2, ¶ 24. On February 17, 2014, Mr. Grkman possessed a Stage II, 0.5 centimeter ulcer on his coccyx. Id., ¶ 28-29. The Complaint further alleges that Mr. Grkman's ulcer became a Stage III, 2.0 centimeter pressure ulcer within eight days of his admission. Id., ¶ 34-35. Throughout the months of March and April 2014, Mr. Grkman's ulcer worsened, and on May 6, 2014, he was discharged from Defendants' facility. Id., ¶ 36-57. Mr. Grkman died on May 23, 2014. Id., ¶ 58.

Plaintiff's Complaint advances two claims: one is a survival claim and the other is a wrongful death claim. The survival claim alleges that Defendants were negligent in their care for Mr. Grkman—specifically with respect to his ulcer—which led to additional health complications during the months of March, April, and May of 2014, which caused Mr. Grkman to suffer and die. Id., ¶ 59-67. Plaintiff brings the survival cause of action as the administrator of the estate of Mr. Grkman seeking damages for Mr. Grkman's "pain, suffering, embarrassment ... and other losses and damages permitted by law." Id. ¶ 68. The wrongful death claim asserts that due to Defendants' alleged negligent care of Mr. Grkman, Plaintiff (and others) sustained the following injuries and damages:

a. They have expended money for funeral and Estate expenses as a result of the death of Mr. Grkman;

b. They have expended money for hospital, nursing, and medical expenses necessitated by reason of the injuries causing Mr. Grkman's death;

c. They have been denied, and have forever lost, the services, assistance, guidance, counseling, companionship and society of Mr. Grkman; and,

d. They have been, and will forever be, deprived of the financial support and all pecuniary benefits which they would have received from Mr. Grkman.

Id., ¶ 70.

Defendants' Motion asks the Court to dismiss this case in its entirety primarily due to the fact that Plaintiff, while acting as his father's (Mr. Grkman's) personal representative, signed an Admission Agreement so that Mr. Grkman could become a resident at Defendant's skilled nursing facility. See doc. no....