Groenings v. City of St. Charles

• Decision Date: 28 June 1991
• Docket Number: No. 2-90-1052,2-90-1052
• Citation: 574 N.E.2d 1316,158 Ill.Dec. 923,215 Ill.App.3d 295
• Parties: , 158 Ill.Dec. 923 Charles J. GROENINGS, et al., as Cotrustees, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The CITY OF ST. CHARLES et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 1316

574 N.E.2d 1316

215 Ill.App.3d 295, 158 Ill.Dec. 923

Charles J. GROENINGS, et al., as Cotrustees, et al Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The CITY OF ST. CHARLES et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 2-90-1052.

Appellate Court of Illinois Second District.

June 28, 1991.

Robert S. Minetz, Cowan & Minetz, Chicago, Roy A. Safanda, Safanda & Brannen, Robert F. Casey, St. Charles, for Charles J. Groenings and John E. Groenings, Jr., Frank Fernholz, Thomas Groenings Trust, LaSalle Nat. Bank and Old Kent Bank-St. Charles NA.

Kenneth C. Shepro (argued), Clara Rubinstein, Altheimer & Gray, Chicago, Allen L. Landmeier (argued), James D. Skaar, Smith, Landmeier & Skaar, P.C., Geneva, for City of St. Charles and Village of Wayne.

Justice BOWMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiffs appeal from orders dismissing their complaint for failure to state a cause of action and denying their subsequent motion to amend the complaint. The facts of this case, as alleged in the complaint, proposed amended complaint, and exhibits, disclose the following. The plaintiffs (Groenings) own approximately 80 acres of real estate located between, and contiguous to, the two defendants, City of St. Charles (St. Charles) and Village of Wayne (Wayne), in unincorporated Kane County. Both municipalities are non-home-rule units of government.

The Groenings petitioned to St. Charles for annexation of their property but were denied on February 20, 1989. On that same date St. Charles adopted an ordinance authorizing execution of a boundary agreement between itself and Wayne relative to the unincorporated territory, including plaintiffs' property, which lay between the two municipalities. Through the boundary accord the defendants essentially agreed to neither annex nor exercise zoning or subdivision control authority beyond the territory located on their respective sides of the boundary line established by the accord. The Groenings' property is situated on the Wayne side of the line. The resolution denying the Groenings' petition for annexation took into consideration the boundary agreement with Wayne and noted that, under the agreement, St. Charles was prohibited from annexing the Groenings' property. These facts provide an adequate background for understanding the procedural history which follows. However, other pertinent facts will be presented in our discussion of the issues.

After the annexation petition was denied, the Groenings filed a five-count complaint against St. Charles and Wayne. Counts I, II, and III alleged various constitutional violations, sought to invalidate the Illinois statute which authorized the boundary agreement, and requested damages pursuant to section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982)). In count IV plaintiffs asserted that defendants had tortiously interfered with their prospective economic advantage. Count V sought to void the boundary agreement or, alternatively, the enabling statute, as a matter of Illinois law.

Subsequently, the plaintiffs successfully moved to voluntarily strike their claims for money damages against Wayne. Both defendants filed motions to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 110, par. 2-615). Following the parties' submission of memoranda and oral argument on the motions, the trial court dismissed all counts of the complaint and terminated the litigation.

The Groenings filed motions for leave to vacate, to allow an interlocutory appeal, and to file an amended complaint instanter. A proposed first amended complaint accompanied the motion for leave to amend. At the hearing on the motions, the trial judge inquired regarding the differences between the original complaint and the proposed amended complaint, heard the arguments of counsel, and reviewed the differences between the two complaints himself. After indicating that the amendment would not change his original conclusion that dismissal was appropriate, the judge denied all of plaintiffs' motions. The judge also stated that the proposed amendment should be part of the record for appellate review. The Groenings appeal from both the order dismissing their complaint and the order denying their motion for leave to amend the complaint.

A complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action only when it clearly appears that no set of facts could be proved under the pleadings which would entitle plaintiff to relief. (Ogle v. Fuiten (1984), 102 Ill.2d 356, 360-61, 80 Ill.Dec. 772, 466 N.E.2d 224; Midwest Bank & Trust Co. v. Village of Lakewood (1983), 113 Ill.App.3d 962, 970, 69 Ill.Dec. 671, 447 N.E.2d 1358.) While a motion to dismiss admits all well-pleaded facts as true (Teter v. Clemens (1986), 112 Ill.2d 252, 256, 97 Ill.Dec. 467, 492 N.E.2d 1340), it does not admit conclusions of law or fact which are unsupported by allegations of specific facts which warrant those conclusions. (Payne v. Mill Race Inn (1987), 152 Ill.App.3d 269, 273, 105 Ill.Dec. 324, 504 N.E.2d 193.) If, after any conclusions found in the complaint have been excluded, there are not sufficient facts to state a cause of action, the motion must be granted even though it may generally inform the defendant of the claim against him. (Knox College v. Celotex Corp. (1981), 88 Ill.2d 407, 426, 58 Ill.Dec. 725, 430 N.E.2d 976; Towne v. Town of Libertyville (1989), 190 Ill.App.3d 563, 567, 137 Ill.Dec. 865, 546 N.E.2d 810.) In ruling on a motion to dismiss, allegations of the complaint are to be interpreted in the light most favorable to the plaintiff (Payne, 152 Ill.App.3d at 273, 105 Ill.Dec. 324, 504 N.E.2d 193), but factual deficiencies may not be cured by liberal construction (Knox, 88 Ill.2d at 427, 58 Ill.Dec. 725, 430 N.E.2d 976). The granting of a motion to dismiss for insufficiency of a complaint is within the sound discretion of the trial court. (Town of Libertyville, 190 Ill.App.3d at 567, 137 Ill.Dec. 865, 546 N.E.2d 810.) The sufficiency of the Groenings' complaint will be judged by these standards.

Count V of plaintiffs' complaint turns on the issue of the validity of the annexation provision in the boundary agreement between Wayne and St. Charles. The Groenings' initial contention is that the provision is void because the two non-home-rule municipalities did not have the power to execute such an agreement.

Plaintiffs rely primarily on Village of Long Grove v. Village of Kildeer (1986), 146 Ill.App.3d 979, 100 Ill.Dec. 341, 497 N.E.2d 319, in which Long Grove sought to enforce an annexation clause very similar to the one in dispute here. The parties had executed a boundary agreement, including a provision prohibiting either village from annexing beyond the jurisdictional boundary line, pursuant to section 11-12-9 of the Municipal Code (Code) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 24, par. 11-12-9), which provided:

"If unincorporated territory is within one and one-half miles of the boundaries of two or more corporate authorities that have adopted official plans, the corporate authorities involved may agree upon a line which shall mark the boundaries of the jurisdiction of each of the corporate authorities who have adopted such agreement."

This court noted that non-home-rule units possess only those powers granted to them by law or necessarily implied from or incident to powers expressly granted (Long Grove, 146 Ill.App.3d at 980, 100 Ill.Dec. 341, 497 N.E.2d 319) and interpreted section 11-12-9 as not providing authority for that part of the parties' agreement which prohibited annexation. We held that the annexation provision was invalid.

Defendants correctly point out that Long Grove was decided in July 1986 and that in 1987 section 11-12-9 was amended by the addition of the following sentence:

"On and after September 24, 1987, such agreement may provide that one or more of the municipalities shall not annex territory which lies within the jurisdiction of any other municipality, as established by such line." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch.24, par. 11-12-9.)

The Groenings acknowledge the language of the amendment but maintain that it does not apply to non-home-rule communities such as St. Charles and Wayne because it does not explicitly say that it so applies. In plaintiffs' words, if the legislature had meant to grant the power in question to non-home-rule units "it would have passed a law which stated that 'non-home rule units are authorized to enter into boundary agreements which prohibit annexation.' " As we read it, the crux of plaintiffs' argument is that the amendment of section 11-12-9 did not affect the holding of Long Grove and, therefore, the interpretation of section 11-12-9 as found in Long Grove is applicable to the boundary agreement executed by St. Charles and Wayne. This position is meritless.

First of all, we find the sequence of events involving the statute to be persuasive that the legislature amended section 11-12-9 in direct response to our Long Grove opinion. In Long Grove we concluded the municipalities lacked power to execute an annexation agreement because non-home-rule units have only the powers delegated to them by the legislature, and we could find nothing in the language of the statute which even referred to annexation, much less purported to regulate it. Too, section 11-12-9 appeared in a portion of the Code which is concerned with the planning function, as distinct from the annexation activity, of a municipality, and the statute reflected no intent to have an effect on the annexation statutes. Subsequently, the legislature added clear and specific language, not only referring to annexation but also empowering municipalities to agree to restrictions on their annexation activity. This language did not change the planning focus of section 11-12-9. Rather it seems to have been added as another planning tool which the legislature saw fit to provide to municipalities. In our view, it is reasonable to conclude...