Groff v. City of Frederick

• Citation: 44 Md. 67
• Parties: JOSEPH GROFF v. THE MAYOR, ALDERMEN AND COMMON COUNCIL of FREDERICK CITY, AND GEORGE W. DELAPLAINE, Tax Collector.
• Decision Date: 01 March 1876
• Court: Court of Appeals of Maryland

44 Md. 67

JOSEPH GROFF v. THE MAYOR, ALDERMEN AND COMMON COUNCIL of FREDERICK CITY, AND GEORGE W. DELAPLAINE, Tax Collector.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

March 1, 1876

APPEAL from the Circuit Court for Frederick County, in Equity.

The bill of complaint in this case, alleged in substance, that the General Assembly of Maryland had passed the Act of 1870 ch. 314, extending the taxable limits of Frederick City, so as to include and bring within the taxable boundary a large amount of arable and pasture land for the sole purpose of subjecting the same to the burthens of city taxation, and thereby to increase the revenues of the corporation of Frederick; that there was no necessity for such extension that there were no streets, lanes or alleys, or town lots included within the territory annexed, and that the old taxable limits as existing before the passage of said Act of 1870, were large enough; that said enlargement of the taxable limits was not made on account of, or with reference to, the increase or expansion of the city, as manifested by the built up part thereof, but was arbitrarily and unreasonably made that no part of the land included in said extended limits was necessary for streets, lanes or alleys, or town lots, or other uses and purposes of a town, and that said land did not, nor did any of it, abut upon any street, lane or alley of Frederick, and that all of it, except that of the Agricultural Society, was used for farming and pasturing purposes; that some few houses had been built beyond the old limits, which could have been embraced within the taxable limits, without including the said arable and farm land; that said Act of Assembly was unconstitutional and void, and that the exercise by the city of the power attempted to be conferred under it, would injure the complainant and others similarly situated. The bill prayed that the Act might be declared unconstitutional and void, and that the appellees might be restrained from further proceedings to collect taxes levied under said Act. The bill was filed by the complainant in behalf of himself and all others similarly interested. The injunction issued as prayed.

The defendants answered admitting sundry of the allegations of the bill, denying others specifically, and all generally which were not specifically admitted, and requiring proof of the allegations denied.

Exceptions were filed to the answer, but at the hearing they were withdrawn, and a replication entered. Testimony was taken under an order of the Court, and the motion filed by the appellees to dissolve the injunction was heard on bill answer, exhibits and evidence. The Court (BOWIE, J.) dissolved the injunction, and from the order of dissolution the complainant appealed.

The cause was argued before BARTOL, C.J., STEWART, GRASON and MILLER, J.

James McSherry, for the appellant.

The Act of 1870, ch. 314, in so far as it extends the limits of Frederick, is, under the facts disclosed in evidence, unconstitutional and void, and whilst in a proper case the Legislature may extend the taxable limits of a municipality, the Act in question is, not by reason of any defect apparent on its face, but from the circumstances exhibited in the record, an invasion of that provision of the Constitution of the State, which protects private property from seizure for public use, without compensating the owner.

It is conceded, that municipal corporations are subject to the control of the Legislature, and that the latter has the undoubted power to prescribe their outlines, and even when necessary, to enlarge them. But this power is not an arbitrary one; it has a limit within which the Courts may confine it, and the Legislature cannot confer upon a municipality the power to absorb the property of the citizen, under the color of taxation, when that property is removed from the local government, and receives neither advantage nor protection therefrom.

"A municipal corporation proper, is created mainly for the interest, advantage and convenience of the locality and its people." 1 Dillon on Mun. Corp., sec. 10, note. The city of Frederick is a municipal corporation. Act of 1816, ch. 74.

The extension of the taxable limits of a corporation is, so far as the added territory is concerned, the creation of a new corporation, and the powers conferred, should be consistent with the purposes for which a municipality is organized, to wit: the "interest, advantage and convenience of the locality and its people."

The Act of 1870, confers upon the appellees not only a power adverse to the interest of the people residing or owning property beyond the old taxable limits, but one in direct antagonism to the provisions of the organic law of the State.

The town of Frederick was laid out in 1746. The original survey and plat were lost. See Act of 1786, ch. 36, sec. 1. In 1816, a new Act of incorporation superseding that of 1786, was passed, and by sec. 2nd, the taxable limits of the town were prescribed. See Act of 1816, ch. 74, sec. 2. In 1832, the taxable limits were extended. See Act of 1832, ch. 187.

These taxable limits remained as thus fixed until again extended by the Act of 1870, ch. 314. The property within this belt has been assessed by the acre, and taxes levied thereon for the use of the appellees.

There was no necessity to extend the taxable limits of Frederick, for the simple reason that there was ample room within the old limits for double the present population.

No new streets, lanes or alleys were or are needed, and if they were, there was ample room within the old limits for them. No new streets have been laid out since the survey, made under the Act of 1816--some alleys have been widened. If new streets, lanes or alleys have been or are needed, they could have been laid out and opened beyond the old taxable limits, without extending those limits. See Act of 1870, ch. 314.

The lands annexed are, and have always been used for agricultural purposes, and not as town property.

No part of this agricultural land abuts on or adjoins any street, lane or alley of Frederick.

No part of this property has ever been laid out into town lots, and no portion of it is necessary for such use, because there is ample room within the old limits; very few houses having been built beyond them since 1832.

The people living within the annexed territory have derived no advantages from such annexation. They have received no benefit from being compelled to pay city taxes, but on the contrary, the value of their property has been depreciated thereby.

It is held in Pennsylvania, that under the terms of the Act of the Legislature authorizing the incorporation of villages, the boundaries cannot be extended so as to include a large body of farm lands, but the district to be incorporated, should be restricted by the Courts in which proceeding is had so as to include no more than the village itself, and its proper territory. Borough of Little Meadows, 35 Pa. State, 335; Devore's Appeal, 56 Pa. St., 163; see also 2 Dillon on Mun. Corp., 226, 633, 634; Buell vs. Ball, 20 Iowa, 282; Morford vs. Unger, 8 Iowa, 82; Langworthy vs. The City of Dubuque, 13 Iowa, 86; City of Covington vs. Southgate, 15 B. Mon., 491; Cheaney vs. Hooser, 9 B. Mon., 330; Sharp's Ex'r vs. Dunavan, 17 B. Mon., 223; Mitchell vs. Kauffman, &c., 34 Iowa, 194; Deeds vs. Sanborn, 26 Iowa, 419; Bradshaw vs. The City of Omaha, 1 Neb., 16.

Sec. 40 of Art. 3, of the Constitution of Maryland, prohibits the Legislature from passing any law taking private property for public use without compensation. And this provision is applicable to the case at bar.

It is not denied that there is a difference between the exercise of the right of eminent domain, and of the right of taxation. These two powers although somewhat alike, are not the same. The evil effects, and the practical results to the citizen, arising from the unwarrantable exercise of either, are identically the same. To strip a man of his property, by imposing onerous taxes upon him for the uses of a municipality, which affords him no protection, and renders him no benefit in return, is no less an infraction of the constitutional guaranty, than the taking of his land without compensation, for the road-bed of a railway.

It is the taking of private property without compensation, which the Constitution prohibits, no matter what may be the form under which it is attempted. The provision is a restriction on the Legislature, inhibiting it from authorizing the taking of private property for public use, without compensation, and the spirit of it alike protects the citizen from an unwarrantable exercise of power under any color or pretext whatever; substantial protection is guaranteed.

But to narrow this provision by applying it alone to the power of eminent domain, would make that protection depend upon form and not substance. "There is a fundamental principle of right and justice inherent in the nature and spirit of the social compact, that rises above and restrains the power of legislation, which the Legislature cannot pass without exceeding its rightful authority." This principle is "designed to protect the life, liberty and property of the citizen, from violation in the unjust exercise of legislative power." Mayor &c., of Balt. vs. State, &c., 15 Md., 469.

The facts in this case show that the imposition of corporation taxes upon the owners of the agricultural land embraced within the new limits, is an actual taking of private property for public use without compensation, and to that extent the Act of 1870, is repugnant to the Constitution of the State.

Again the proviso to the Act of 1832, chap. 187, qualifies the Act of 1870, and restricts its application. The property of the appellant consists not only of a...