Groff v. State
| Citation | 488 N.E.2d 711 |
| Decision Date | 13 February 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 17-S03-8602-CR-159,17-S03-8602-CR-159 |
| Parties | Daniel L. GROFF, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below). |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Paul B. Kusbach, South Bend, for appellant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Richard Albert Alford, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
Following conviction of robbery while armed with a deadly weapon, Groff was sentenced to ten (10) years imprisonment to run consecutively to a previous sentence of six (6) years imprisonment imposed for dealing in a controlled substance. At the time of the robbery, the Defendant had already been convicted for the earlier offense, but was free on appeal bond. The prior conviction has since been affirmed on appeal, Groff v. State (1981) Ind.App., 415 N.E.2d 721.
This case is before us upon a motion for emergency transfer pursuant to Appellate Rule 4(A)(10) filed on behalf of the State of Indiana, following commencement of Defendant's appeal in the Court of Appeals. The sole issue is whether consecutive sentences were mandatory under the provisions of Ind.Code Sec. 35-50-1-2(b).
When Groff was sentenced for the armed robbery, the trial court expressly found neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, but imposed a consecutive sentence solely by reason of its conclusion that Sec. 35-50-1-2(b) required mandatory sentences. The statute provides:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the court shall determine whether terms of imprisonment shall be served concurrently or consecutively.
(b) If a person commits a crime:
(1) After having been arrested for another crime; and
(2) Before the date he is discharged from probation, parole, or a term of imprisonment imposed for that other crime; the terms of imprisonment for the crimes shall be served consecutively, regardless of the order in which the crimes are tried and sentences are imposed.
Appellant contends that the statutory language has been restricted and limited by the decisions of the Court in Hutchinson v. State (1985), Ind., 477 N.E.2d 850, and Haggard v. State (1983), Ind., 445 N.E.2d 969, which contain language that the "mandatory section of the statute, section (b), only applies if a defendant is on probation, parole, or serving a term of imprisonment at the time the other offenses were committed." Hutchinson, 477 N.E.2d at 857, Haggard, 445 N.E.2d at 973. Appellant contends that because he was free on an appeal bond at the time of the second offense, rather than on probation, parole, or serving a term of imprisonment, the trial court erred in imposing a mandatory consecutive sentence.
In Hutchinson, the Defendant was convicted of attempted murder committed while he was awaiting trial upon a previous charge of armed robbery. He was convicted and sentenced for armed robbery before the sentencing for attempted murder. The statutory provision for imposing mandatory consecutive sentences was held not applicable. Since the record there showed that the court did consider appropriate aggravating circumstances, the case was remanded for a specific statement of facts to support the...
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White v. State
...does not apply to him. Though White's argument misses the mark a bit, the issue itself was decided favorably to him in Groff v. State (1986), Ind., 488 N.E.2d 711. Because White committed the instant offense before he was sentenced for the earlier ones, the sentence for this crime must be A......
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Arnold v. State
...(I.C. 35-50-1-2(b) not applicable to defendant who committed second offense while on bond awaiting trial on first offense); Groff v. State (1986) Ind., 488 N.E.2d 711 (I.C. 35-50-1-2(b) was applicable where defendant committed second offense while free on bond while awaiting appeal of his f......
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St. John v. State
...statute as requiring mandatory consecutive sentences where a subsequent crime occurs after sentencing for a prior crime. Groff v. State (1986), Ind., 488 N.E.2d 711, 712. Further, the statute does not require consecutive sentences where the subsequent crime is committed during the time peri......
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Dragon v. State
...Sides v. State, 490 N.E.2d 318, 320 (Ind.1986), rev'd on other grounds on reh'g, 507 N.E.2d 560 (Ind.1986); see also Groff v. State, 488 N.E.2d 711, 712 (Ind.1986) (stating where subsequent offense occurs after sentencing for a prior crime, I.C. § 35-50-1-2 applies to require mandatory cons......