Grogan v. All My Sons Bus. Dev. LLC
| Citation | 552 F.Supp.3d 142 |
| Decision Date | 04 August 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 19-11531-PBS |
| Parties | Jacob GROGAN, Paul Jones, Terrance Lee, and Treavon Whitaker, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. ALL MY SONS BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT LLC ; All My Sons Moving and Storage of Rhode Island LLC; and Chris Generale, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
Harold L. Lichten, Matthew W. Thomson, Lichten & Liss-Riordan, P.C., Boston, MA, Matthew Patton, Smith & Brink, P.C., Braintree, MA, for Plaintiffs.
Douglas J. Hoffman, Jackson Lewis PC, Boston, MA, for Defendants.
Saris, D.J.
Plaintiffs bring this class action against All My Sons,1 alleging violations of the Massachusetts Wage Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148 (Count I), and the Massachusetts Minimum Wage Law, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151, § 1 (Count II). The Court has certified the following two classes:
The core claim for both classes is that All My Sons required them to work significant hours "off the clock" under uniform company-wide timekeeping and compensation policies.
Before the Court now are cross-motions for partial summary judgment. All My Sons moves for summary judgment on the Wage Act claim (Count I). Plaintiffs move for partial summary judgment related to the Minimum Wage Law claim (Count II). For the following reasons, the court ALLOWS IN PART and DENIES IN PART All My Sons’ motion (Dkt. 46) and ALLOWS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Plaintiffs’ motion (Dkt. 50).
Except where stated otherwise, the following facts are undisputed.
All My Sons operates a moving and storage company with dozens of locations throughout the United States. Plaintiffs are individuals employed as Drivers and/or Helpers out of the Massachusetts locations of All My Sons.2 Drivers are, as expected, the employees who drive the moving trucks during assignments. Helpers are Drivers’ " ‘right-hand m[e]n’ helping on the job" and assist Drivers in performing tasks related to the move itself. Dkt. 62 ¶ 2. A typical work assignment includes one Driver and one to two Helpers.
The parties disagree as to whether All My Sons pays Helpers the Massachusetts minimum wage or at a rate slightly above minimum wage. They agree, however, that All My Sons pays Drivers at a rate above minimum wage (although they dispute how far above minimum wage that rate is).
Employees are not compensated for all hours worked between the time they arrive at All My Sons in the morning and the time they leave the warehouse at end of the day. The company's "Payroll Policy" expressly states that the "pay plan for Drivers and Helpers is ... not based strictly on hours worked." Dkt. 51-1 at 1. It notes: "Instead of setting an hourly rate at minimum wage and paying from the time you arrive at All My Sons facility in the morning until the time you leave at the end of the day, your total pay is set above minimum wage." Id. The Payroll Policy also instructs each employee to "record the time you arrive at the All My Sons facility to begin your shift as well as the time you leave the facility at the end of your shift" so the company may "compare your total pay for the workweek to the total hours worked to make sure it meets required minimums." Id. at 2. All My Sons did not keep records documenting its employees’ arrival or departure times.
Per company policy, All My Sons requires Drivers and Helpers working out of its Massachusetts locations to arrive at the warehouse by 7:00 a.m. to receive their assignments and load any required materials onto the moving trucks. The parties dispute, however, whether Drivers and Helpers actually showed up at 7:00 a.m. Dkt. 51-7 at 15 ( ); see also Dkt. 62 ¶ 7. They also dispute how long the assignment and loading process typically takes, with All My Sons indicating it lasts five or ten minutes and Plaintiffs indicating it can last up to an hour and a half.
All My Sons does not compensate employees for any time spent in the warehouse in the morning. Instead, the workday clock for Drivers and Helpers only "starts" when they "arrive at the customer location and obtain the customer's initials next to the start time." Dkt. 51-1 at 1. The clock then "stops" when they "finish the move at the customer's new location and obtain the customer's initials next to stop time, certifying that the job is complete." Id.
In addition to the "labor hours" captured by the workday clock, see id., All My Sons compensates employees for time spent traveling to customer sites at the start of the day and returning to the warehouse after a job ends. It does not, however, directly record how long employees spend in transit. Instead, it estimates "travel time." Id. For local moves, All My Sons awards Drivers an extra hour per assignment and Helpers an extra half an hour per assignment. For short-haul and long-distance moves, it awards Drivers 100% of the calculation of total mileage traveled (assuming an average speed of 50 miles per hour) and Helpers 75% of that calculation. Helpers and Drivers return to the warehouse at the end of the day to return the truck and equipment.
The Payroll Policy further provides for employees to be compensated for "Warehouse Time labor," measured as "[s]imple start and stop time from the time work begins and ends." Id. at 2. All My Sons does not contend that it used "Warehouse Time labor" to pay any of its employees for time spent in the warehouse loading trucks in the morning or unloading them in the afternoon. It instead used this calculation for time spent sweeping the lot or taking out the trash.
Summary judgment is appropriate when, based upon the pleadings, affidavits, and depositions, "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is "material" if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A dispute is "genuine" if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id.
Generally, "a party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). "To succeed, the moving party must show that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's position." Rogers v. Fair, 902 F.2d 140, 143 (1st Cir. 1990). Once it has made the requisite showing, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to "present definite, competent evidence to rebut the motion" and demonstrate that a "trialworthy issue persists." Vineberg v. Bissonnette, 548 F.3d 50, 56 (1st Cir. 2008) (internal citations and quotations omitted). " ‘[T]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence’ is insufficient to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment." Torres v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 219 F.3d 13, 18 (1st Cir. 2000) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ).
All My Sons seeks entry of judgment in its favor on Count I (the Wage Act claim).3 It contends that, because the Wage Act only exists to "ensure[ ] that employers fulfill the promises they make to employees," Dkt. 47 at 5, and because it has fulfilled its promises to employees by complying with the wage structure set forth in the Payroll Policy, it is entitled to a finding as a matter of law that it did not violate the Wage Act.
The "purpose" of the Wage Act is "to prevent the unreasonable detention of wages," Weiss v. DHL Express, Inc., 718 F.3d 39, 47 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Bos. Police Patrolmen's Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Bos., 435 Mass. 718, 761 N.E.2d 479, 481 (Mass. 2002) ), not to "prescribe any particular method by which employees must be paid their earned wages," Salerno v. Baystate Ford, Inc., No. 14-8609-D, 2016 WL 513747, at *2 (Mass. Super. Feb. 5, 2016) ; cf. Bos. Police Patrolmen's Ass'n, 761 N.E.2d at 481 (). DeSaint v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. 13-cv-11856-GAO, 2015 WL 1888242, at *10 (D. Mass. Apr. 15, 2015) (internal citations omitted).
The Court agrees with All My Sons that the Payroll Policy does not facially violate the Wage Act simply because it fails to separately pay employees for each hour worked. The implementing regulations for the Wage Act implicitly recognize that compensation structures other than straight hourly wages may be...
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