Grohs v. Grohs
| Decision Date | 17 October 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:17-cv-01605 (SRU),3:17-cv-01605 (SRU) |
| Parties | WILLIAM GROHS, Plaintiff, v. KELLY SMITH GROHS, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
Kelly Smith Grohs removed her family court case to this court after the Connecticut Superior Court awarded sole custody of her children to her former husband, William Grohs. See Pet. Removal, Doc. No. 1. After examining the petition for removal, I conclude that the case was improperly removed, and that any claims stated in Ms. Grohs' petition would be barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and the domestic relations exception to subject-matter jurisdiction. Therefore, I order Ms. Grohs' case remanded to Connecticut Superior Court.
Pursuant to the federal removal statute, "any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant . . . to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Thus, whether a civil action may be removed from state court turns on whether "the district court has original jurisdiction," Aetna Health v. Kirshner, 415 F. Supp. 2d 109, 112 (D. Conn. 2006), as determined "by looking to the complaint as it existed at the time the petition for removal was filed." Moscovitch v. Danbury Hosp., 25 F. Supp. 2d 74, 79 (D. Conn. 1998).
"The burden of establishing the existence of federal subject matter jurisdiction rests on the removing party," Kirshner, 415 F. Supp. at 112, and "courts may raise jurisdictional defects in removal cases sua sponte." Stark v. Tyron, 171 F. Supp. 3d 35, 39 (D. Conn. 2016) (citing Barbara v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 99 F.3d 49, 53 (2d Cir. 1996)). "If it appears before final judgment that a case was not properly removed, because it was not within the original jurisdiction of the United States district courts, the district court must remand it to the state court from which it was removed." Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr., 463 U.S. 1, 8 (1983).
Kelly Smith Grohs and William J. Grohs were divorced on July 26, 2011. See Judgment of Dissolution, Grohs v. Grohs, No. UWY-FA10-4022991-S, Doc. No. 169.00 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 26, 2011). In connection with their divorce, they entered into a Parenting Agreement that was "attached []to and made a part []of" the Dissolution of Marriage Settlement Agreement.1 See Ex. L to Pet. Removal, Doc. No. 1-11, at 3. Ms. Grohs alleges that Mr. Grohs subsequently violated the terms of the Parenting Agreement and conspired with judges of the Connecticut Superior Court to obtain sole custody of the children. See Pet. Removal, Doc. No. 1, at 5-6.
On September 25, 2017, after the Superior Court awarded sole custody of the children to Mr. Grohs, Ms. Grohs removed the family court action to this court under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(a) & 1443. She asserts a slew of bases for federal jurisdiction, including 18 U.S.C. §§ 228 (the Child Support and Recovery Act) and 1346 (the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 (Federal question jurisdiction), 1361 (Action to compel an officer of the United States to perform his duty), 1391 (Venue), 1491 (the Tucker Act), 1651 (the All Writs Act),1738A (Full faith and credit given to child custody determinations), & 2283 (the Anti-Injunction Act); 29 U.S.C. § 701 (the Rehabilitation Act); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 (the Civil Rights Act of 1866), 12133, & 12188 (the Americans with Disabilities Act); Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 5.1, 15, & 65; the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Fourteenth, and Nineteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; and Article I, Section 10, Clause 1, Article IV, Section 2, Clause 1, and Article VI of the United States Constitution. In addition, Ms. Grohs has moved to proceed in forma pauperis and to appoint counsel. See Docs. 2 & 3.
On October 6, 2017, Mr. Grohs appeared through counsel and moved to remand the case to state court on grounds of untimely removal and lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under the domestic relations exception or the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Mot. Remand, Doc. No. 10; Mem. Supp. Mot. Remand, Doc. No. 11. He also seeks attorneys' fees and costs incurred as a result of the removal. Ms. Grohs filed several motions in response, see Docs. Nos. 13-20, including, on October 13, 2017, an objection to Mr. Grohs' motion to remand. See Doc. No. 18.
Because allegations by pro se parties are "h[e]ld to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers," Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam), I am "required to read [Ms. Grohs'] pro se submissions liberally." See Newman & Cahn, LLP v. Sharp, 288 F. Supp. 2d 115, 116 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980)). Even affording Ms. Grohs' "pro se petition for removal the close and sympathetic reading to which it is entitled," however, I conclude that "it reveals no basis for the exercise of subject matter jurisdiction over the underlying suit." See Vill. of Milbrook v. Forrest, 903 F. Supp. 599, 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). For the reasons set forth below, I grand Mr. Grohs' motion to remand, and order that the case be remanded to Connecticut Superior Court.
Ms. Grohs asserts two statutory bases for removal of the case from state court: (1) section 1441(a), removal on the basis of federal question jurisdiction; and (2) section 1443, removal on the basis of civil rights violations. Neither statute entitles her to remove the case to this court.
Section 1441(a) permits removal of "civil action[s] . . . of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Thus, "[o]nly state-court actions that originally could have been filed in federal court may be removed to federal court by the defendant." Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). Because there is no diversity of citizenship,2 the only basis for original jurisdiction over the parties is if Ms. Grohs' claims "aris[e] under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
"In determining whether a petition establishes the existence of a federal question, removal based on federal question jurisdiction is improper unless a federal claim appears on the face of a well-pleaded complaint." Four Keys Leasing & Maintenance Corp. v. Simithis, 849 F.2d 770, 773 (2d Cir. 1988). "Allegations made for the first time in a removal petition . . . cannot support the removal of a case on federal question grounds." Id. Rather, "a right or immunity created by the Constitution or laws of the United States must be an element, and an essential one, of the plaintiff's cause of action." Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr., 463 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1983). A defendant such as Ms. Grohs "cannot, merely by injecting a federal question into an action that asserts what is plainly a state-law claim, transform the action into one arising under federal law." See Williams, 482 U.S. at 399.
The instant case plainly does not "fall[] within the original 'federal question' jurisdiction of the United States district courts." See Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 8. First, the "face of the complaint" does not reveal a substantial federal question. See Williams, 482 U.S. at 399. Insofar as can be discerned from Ms. Grohs' attachments and the public docket, Mr. Grohs' lawsuit "appears to be no more than an ordinary matrimonial controversy" that does not involve any federal claims. See Dillard v. Family Court, 404 F.2d 404, 405 (2d Cir. 1968) (per curiam). Indeed, Ms. Grohs' petition for removal does not contend that Mr. Grohs' "'statement of his own cause of action shows that it is based' on federal law." See Romano v. Kazacos, 609 F.3d 512, 518 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 60 (2009)). Instead, she argues that the conduct of Mr. Grohs, his attorneys, and the state judges violated her rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and other federal statutory and constitutional provisions. See Pet. Removal, Doc. No. 1, at 4-10.
Whether construed as a defense to Mr. Grohs' lawsuit, a counterclaim against Mr. Grohs, or a third-party complaint against Mr. Grohs' attorneys and the state judges, Ms. Grohs' allegations "cannot serve as the basis for 'arising under' jurisdiction." See Holmes Grp. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., 535 U.S. 826, 831 (2002) (counterclaims); see also, e.g., Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 14 (defenses); Palisades Collections v. Shorts, 552 F.3d 327, 332 (4th Cir. 2008) (third-party complaints). Hence, removal was improper under section 1441.
Section 1443 provides in pertinent part:
28 U.S.C. § 1443(1). In short, the statute "permits removal by a defendant whose petition recites facts that would be sufficient, if true, to permit the federal court to infer that in the state proceeding the defendant will be denied specific equal civil rights." Simithis, 849 F.2d at 773.
A case may not be removed under section 1443 when a petitioner "simply [alleges] that in practice [she] would be denied or be unable to enforce [her] rights" in state court. Emigrant Sav. Bank v. Elan Mgmt. Corp., 668 F.2d 671, 674 (2d Cir. 1982). Rather, "removal w[ill] lie" only "when enforcement of the petitioner's rights in a state court was barred...
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