Groneman v. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELEC. WKRS.

• Decision Date: 04 November 1949
• Docket Number: No. 3916.,3916.
• Citation: 177 F.2d 995
• Parties: GRONEMAN et al. v. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, LOCAL UNION NO. 354.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

177 F.2d 995 (1949)

GRONEMAN et al. v. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, LOCAL UNION NO. 354.

No. 3916.

United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit.

November 4, 1949.

Allan E. Mecham, Salt Lake City, Utah (Edward W. Clyde and Woodrow D. White, Salt Lake City, Utah, were with him on the brief), for appellants.

A. Wally Sandack, Salt Lake City, Utah, and Louis Sherman, Washington, D. C., (Delbert M. Draper, Salt Lake City, Utah, and Philip R. Collins, Washington, D. C., were with him on the brief), for appellee.

Before BRATTON and HUXMAN, Circuit Judges, and RICE, District Judge.

HUXMAN, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal from the judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Utah dismissing appellants' action for want of jurisdiction. Lynn Groneman and Lavar Groneman, doing business as Groneman and Company, the appellants, instituted this action under Section 303(b) of the Labor Management Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C.A. § 187(b). The action was brought to recover alleged damages resulting from a stoppage of construction work caused by the refusal of appellants' employees to cross a picket line mantained by appellee between July 22 and August 4, 1948, at a project for the construction of a school building in Provo, Utah. In substance, the complaint alleged that appellants were engaged in commerce; that appellee engaged in a secondary boycott against them in violation of 29 U.S.C.A. § 187(a) (1), to enforce a labor dispute it had with Lloyd Engle.

The facts about which there is no dispute are these. Provo City School District of Provo, Utah, undertook the construction of two school buildings. Only the building known as Northeastern Elementary School is involved in the controversy and reference will be made to it alone. The Board entered into a contract with appellants for the carpentry work necessary for the construction of this building. At the same time, the Board entered into a separate and independent contract with Lloyd Engle for the electrical construction and equipment work for the building. As far as the record reveals, there was no relationship or privity of contract or connection between appellants' work and that of Engle. They were both independent contractors, each having a separate contract for their respective part of the construction from the Board. Engle was a small contractor. All his work under the contract was done by himself, his son, and one other person whom he employed. None of them belonged to the Union. The appellee Union therefore considered Engle unfair to organized labor.

While appellants were engaging in preliminary work of constructing forms for pouring cement for the foundation walls, and before Engle had begun any work under his contract, appellee placed one picket on the job. He was placed some distance from the job and carried the following sign:

"This job unfair to Local 354, I. B E. W., A. F. of L."

The picket entered in no controversy or conversations with anyone on the job. Neither appellants nor Engle nor anyone else was denied free, uninterrupted access to the premises. As a result of this picketing, appellants' employees, who were members of the carpenter's union, left the job for a period of nine working days.

The court found that the picketing was directed against Engle and the School Board. Thus, the court stated:

"It is perfectly clear, from all the evidence, that that sign and the inscription pointed to Mr. Engle, because of his relationship as I have expressed it. Now, as I view that situation, this was a challenge of the right of this School District to enter into a contract with Mr. Engle.

"At that time the only people that worked upon this job were these carpenters, constructing these forms for the purpose of pouring cement. Mr. Engle wasn't there, nor did he have any place there and probably would not have for quite a while. So that it is quite apparent to me that this challenge by this sign was a direct challenge against the School Board. The effect it had upon the plaintiffs was incidental to that challenge."

The court's conclusion that commerce was not involved was predicated on its findings that during the nine days the picketing was going on, no material used on the job was moving in interstate commerce because the only material being used was timber for forms, and this was purchased from local merchants from stock piles on hand.

As stated, the trial court, in effect, held that the picketing was directed against the Board and Engle and that the effect upon Groneman was incidental to that dispute. Relying on this, appellee argues that there was therefore no secondary boycott against Groneman. The court, however, did not base its conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction upon such findings. It based its conclusion on its finding that Groneman at the time was not engaged in commerce. Since we agree with the trial court in this, it is not necessary to pass upon appellee's contention that there was no secondary boycott directed against Groneman.

Groneman's operations were essentially local in character. As far as the record reveals, he was engaged...