Groner v. Davis

Decision Date18 January 1971
Docket Number222,Nos. 221,s. 221
Citation260 Md. 471,272 A.2d 621
PartiesBeverly Anne GRONER v. Jack DAVIS.
CourtMaryland Court of Appeals

Samuel B. Groner, Bethesda (Elizabeth Guhring, Washington, on the brief), for appellant.

Harry W. Lerch, Bethesda (Lerch, Pillote & Lerch, Bethesda, and David Macdonald, Silver Spring, on the brief), for appellee.

Argued before HAMMOND, C. J., and BARNES, McWILLIAMS, FINAN, SMITH and DIGGES, JJ.

BARNES, Judge.

The two appeals in this case were consolidated by us and were briefed and argued together. No. 221 is an appeal from a summary judgment entered on May 21, 1970, by the Circuit Court for Montgomery County (Clapp, J.) in favor of the appellee, Jack Davis, defendant below, for costs in an action at law filed by the appellant, Beverly Anne Groner (the former wife of the defendant, Jack Davis), to recover money advanced by Mrs. Groner for the university education of Lewis Davis, the son of the parties. One of the principal issues in this law action was the alleged misinterpretation by the lower court of a Separation Agreement and Property Settlement between the parties dated November 28, 1962 (Separation Agreement). The second case arises out of an equity suit in which Mrs. Groner filed a bill of complaint on July 25, 1969, for child support and specific performance of the Separation Agreement in connection with the support and maintenance of Andrew Davis, the youngest child of the parties. The parties were divorced a vinculo matrimonii in 1962 and both parties have since remarried. No. 222 is consequently an appeal from the lower court's (Miller, J.) decree of May 25, 1970, which dismissed appellant's prayer for specific performance regarding the maintenance of life insurance policies by the appellee; dismissed appellant's prayer for payment by the appellee of one-half the costs of orthodontia and ordered that the appellee should pay appellant $157.50 per month for the support of Andrew. Timely appeals were taken to this Court by Mrs. Groner from the respective judgment and decree.

The basic facts relevant to the two cases may be considered together. Prior to the divorce a vinculo matrimonii of the parties in December 1962, they entered into a Separation Agreement on November 28, 1962. At that time the parties had three children: Morrilou, then twenty years of age; Lewis, then thirteen years of age; and Andrew, then six years of age. Mrs. Groner-then Beverly Anne Davis and referred to in the Separation Agreement as 'Wife'-was a member of the Bar of Maryland and engaged in the active practice of law. Her then husband, Jack Davis, referred to in the Separation Agreement as 'Husband,' was the sole owner and operator of Brook Farm Restaurant in Chevy Chase, Maryland and had operated that business for a number of years.

The pertinent provisions of the Separation Agreement are as follows 'WHEREAS, the parties hereto, having agreed to live separate and apart, desire to enter into an agreement under which fair and reasonable provision shall be made for the support of their children and under which there will be a complete, final, and effective settlement of their respective rights in and to the property of each other and the property held by them jointly, and a full relinquishment of all the rights, interests, and claims which the one party may otherwise have upon the property of the other:'

'1. As concerns the three minor children of the parties, Husband and Wife agree to the following provisions, to apply until each child shall have reached the age of 21 years or shall otherwise have become emancipated:

'a. Custody of the minor children of the parties; namely, Morrilou, Lewis, and Andrew, shall be in the Wife, with the right, and the privilege, in the Husband to visit and he with his children at reasonable times and places.

'b. Husband agrees to pay to Wife the sum of $175.00 per month on the Eighth day of each month, commencing January 8, 1963, for the support of Lewis and Andrew; such sum being understood to include such support as Wife may require from time to time for Morrilou. Husband shall be entitled to utilize Federal and State tax exemptions for Lewis and Andrew, and Wife agrees to execute such documents as may be necessary from time to time to effect such utilization.

'c. Husband agrees to carry medical insurance, both hospitalization and surgical, for the benefit of the minor children of the parties. Husband and Wife agree that they will equally bear the cost of extraordinary medical and dental expenses for such minor children 'd. Husband agrees to maintain in full force and effect, without further or future encumbrance, the following insurance policies:

'a. Bankers Life Policy No. 1614384, Life, $15,000.00.

'b. Prudential Insurance Policy No. RCPK 22 155 655, Life, $15,000.00.

'c. Sun Life of Canada Policy No. 5158005, Life-Endowment.

'Husband agrees as soon as practicable to cause the named beneficiary in the above policies to be changed to Beverly A. Davis, as trustee for Morrilou, Lewis, and Andrew Davis, equally, or the survivor or survivors thereof. If Wife so requests, Husband shall present receipted bills as evidence of the payment of the premiums on such policies.'

'VII. Wife agrees, commencing with January 1, 1963, to release and discharge Husband from any and all obligations of support, and from all other claims, rights, and duties arising out of the marital relation, other than as herein agreed, and agrees that she will not at any time thereafter contract any debt or charge or liability for which Husband shall or may become personally liable or answerable, and Wife agrees to save Husband harmless therefrom.' 1

In accordance with the terms of the Separation Agreement, Mr. Davis paid $175.00 per month for the support of the two sons, Lewis and Andrews, until Lewis became 21 years of age and emancipated, whereupon he reduced his support payments by one-half, to $87.50 a month. Mrs. Groner between 1966 and 1970 had expended $14,000 for the college education of Lewis, for which, she alleged, Mr. Davis had contributed a total of $237.50.

Elaborate testimony was taken before the Domestic Relations Master and later before Judge Miller in regard to the cost of maintaining Andrew, the earnings of the parties and other relevant matters. It is not necessary to set forth in detail the many items of proof. Our examination of the record in the case indicates to us that Judge Miller correctly determined from the evidence that the reasonable cost of maintaining Andrew was $246.00 a month. Mrs. Groner believes this amount to be too low in view of her budget for Andrew's maintenance of $425.75; Mr. Davis, on the other hand, believes it to be 'on the high side,' but filed no cross-appeal in the case.

The lower court found from the evidence-properly in our opinion-that Mrs. Groner had earnings of $7,600.00 a year and Mr. Davis had yearly earnings of $13,200. Judge Miller found from the evidence that Mrs. Groner had agreed to contribute to Andrew's support and apportioned the $246.00 a month between the parties in proportion to their annual earnings so that Mr. Davis would pay, on that basis, $157.50 a month for the support and maintenance of Andrew. Other relevant facts will be mentioned when the various points raised are later considered in this opinion.

Appeal No. 221

Mrs. Groner filed an action at law against Mr. Davis on February 24, 1970, in which she sought reimbursement for monies expended by her for the university education of Lewis in the amount of $14,000 from April 1, 1966, to the date of filing the declaration. She alleged that Lewis' university education 'was and is a necessity' to Lewis and is due and owing by the defendant to plaintiff. Mr. Davis filed two general issue pleas and a plea of the three year statute of limitations. He later filed a motion for summary judgment supported by an affidavit to which the Separation Agreement was appended and which was alleged to be the entire agreement between the parties in regard to child support and was a complete defense to the action. Mrs. Groner filed a motion for summary judgment also and an affidavit supporting her motion and in opposition to the motion for summary judgment of Mr. Davis. In her affidavit, Mrs. Groner stated that she had made frequent demands upon her former husband to participate financially in the university education of Lewis and the response of Mr. Davis was 'never an unequivocal refusal, but usually in the form of a statement that he could not do so at this particular time.' On one occasion Mr. Davis made out a check for $237.50 payable to Clark University and handed it to Mrs. Groner. This was the only payment Mr. Davis ever made towards Lewis' college education. Both parties alleged that there was no issue of a material fact and that judgment as a matter of law should be entered in favor of the respective parties.

On May 15, 1970, this matter was heard before Judge Clapp who granted summary judgment in favor of Mr. Davis for costs and denied Mrs. Groner's motion for summary judgment. In Judge Clapp's opinion, filed May 25, 1970, he indicated that in view of the 'Whereas' clause, and Paragraphs I and VII of the Separation Agreement, Mrs. Groner was not entitled to reimbursement for amounts paid by her for the college education of Lewis.

For the purpose of his opinion, Judge Clapp assumed that 'in the status in life of both parties this college education for the child would have been a necessity for which the father in the normal course of events would have (been) liable.' In this assumption, he was correct in view of our decisions in Wooddy v. Wooddy, 258 Md. 224, 231, 265 A.2d 467, 472 (1970); Rhoderick v. Rhoderick, 257 Md. 354, 263 A.2d 512 (1970) and Smith v. Smith, 227 Md. 355, 176 A.2d 862 (1962). Cf. Brown v. Brown, 248 Md. 139, 147-148, 235 A.2d 706, 710, 711 (1967).

Mrs. Groner correctly contends that an action at law may be maintained to obtain reimbursement...

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8 cases
  • Kemp v. Kemp
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • February 22, 1980
    ...for example, demonstrate the relationship of an agreement to the powers of an equity court Wooddy v. Wooddy, supra and Groner v. Davis, 260 Md. 471, 272 A.2d 621 (1971). In Wooddy we held that the equity court lacked jurisdiction to order Dr. Wooddy to designate his children as beneficiarie......
  • Rand v. Rand
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • June 30, 1977
    ...16 Md.App. 17, 293 A.2d 839 (1972). While we indicated that a court may take the mother's earnings into account, see Groner v. Davis, 260 Md. 471, 272 A.2d 621 (1971); Melson v. Melson, supra, we never had occasion to consider whether Art. 72A, § 1 required that it be The Equal Rights Amend......
  • Boucher v. Shomber
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • December 9, 1985
    ...of their son's medical expenses following his psychiatric treatment. The Court, relying on its prior decision in Gromer v. Davis, 260 Md. 471, 272 A.2d 621 (1971), held that an equity court did have jurisdiction to set an award pursuant to its prior decree. 287 Md. 173-74, 411 A.2d Because ......
  • Campolattaro v. Campolattaro
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • September 1, 1985
    ...should be determined in light of the monetary award. See Nisos v. Nisos, 60 Md.App. at 388, 483 A.2d 97. 2. Relying on Groner v. Davis, 260 Md. 471, 272 A.2d 621 (1971), appellant asserts that the trial judge abused his discretion when he failed to order appellee to pay college tuition and ......
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