Groninger v. Davison
Decision Date | 26 August 1966 |
Docket Number | No. 18227.,18227. |
Citation | 364 F.2d 638 |
Parties | Mabel GRONINGER, Appellant, v. Merrill E. DAVISON, Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Harold G. DeKay, Atlantic, Iowa, for appellant.
Herschel G. Langdon, of Herrick, Langdon, Sandblom & Belin, Des Moines, Iowa, for appellee; David W. Belin and Richard G. Langdon, of Herrick, Langdon, Sandblom & Belin, Des Moines, Iowa, on the brief.
Before VOGEL, Chief Judge, and MATTHES and MEHAFFY, Circuit Judges.
This case is a suit for money damages by reason of personal injuries sustained in an automobile accident occurring in Clarinda, Page County, Iowa. We are concerned with whether or not the Iowa statute of limitations had expired, thus barring the action. A chronology of the events which caused the District Court to grant summary judgment for the defendant-appellee is necessary:
March 2, 1963. The accident which resulted in injuries to the plaintiff-appellant occurred within the State of Iowa.
March 1, 1965. Plaintiff-appellant filed her complaint with the clerk of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, therein alleging, inter alia, diversity of citizenship and involvement of more than the statutory requirement for federal court jurisdiction.
March 3, 1965. Summons in the action was delivered to the United States Marshal for service.
March 4, 1965. Service of summons on the defendant-appellee was made by the United States Marshal.
March 17, 1965. Defendant-appellee Davison filed his appearance and asked for an additional 15 days to file a responsive pleading.
March 28, 1965. Plaintiff-appellant filed an amended and substituted complaint.
March 31, 1965. Defendant-appellee filed his answer to the amended and substituted complaint.
June 21, 1965. Following a pre-trial conference, the District Court entered an order granting defendant-appellee leave to amend his answer and to plead the Iowa statute of limitations as a defense.
June 30, 1965. Defendant-appellee moved for summary judgment on the ground and for the reason that the action in United States District Court had not been commenced prior to the expiration of the Iowa statute of limitations.
September 13, 1965. The District Court sustained the motion for judgment in favor of the defendant-appellee.
§ 614.1, Iowa Code Annotated, provides in pertinent part:
Rule 48 of the Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
"A civil action is commenced by serving the defendant with an original notice."
Rule 49 of the Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
The District Court held that the Iowa two-year statute of limitations which began to run on March 3, 1963, and ended March 2, 1965, had expired at the commencement of this action. The court based its holding upon the compelling authority of Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 1949, 337 U.S. 530, 69 S.Ct. 1233, 93 L.Ed. 1520; Burkhardt v. Bates, D.C.N.D.Iowa, 1961, 191 F. Supp. 149, aff'd., 296 F.2d 315; and 2 Moore's Federal Practice, § 3.07, p. 769.1
In appealing, plaintiff-appellant asks reversal on two grounds:
1. That there was a waiver by the defendant-appellee through failure to set out the affirmative defense of the statute of limitations in his first answer;
2. That the commencement of an action in federal court based upon diversity of citizenship is a matter of procedure and is governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A., Rule 3 of which provides:
We affirm the action of the District Court in granting summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee.
As to plaintiff-appellant's first point, leave to amend the answer was expressly granted by the order of the District Court dated June 21, 1965. No objection was ever made thereto, although the amendment including the defense of the statute of limitations was filed on June 23, 1965. Plaintiff-appellant did not raise this point in the District Court and here has made no separate argument thereon. She has cited a number of cases allegedly in support of the position that defendant-appellee waived the defense, none of which, however, support her argument. In Roe v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 7 Cir., 1943, 132 F.2d 829, the only case cited which alludes to concurrent functioning of both Rule 8(c) and Rule 12 (h)2 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A., upon which the plaintiff-appellant's waiver argument is dependent, the court said at page 832:
(Emphasis supplied.)
The clear inference to be drawn from this language is that a defendant could be relieved from a default and revive his defense. See, also, Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 7 Cir., 1956, 229 F.2d 714, 717. The other authority relied upon by plaintiff-appellant, Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Darby, D.C.W.D.Mo., 1945, 59 F.Supp. 175, and Kraushaar v. Leschin, D.C.E.D.Pa., 1944, 4 F.R.D. 143, offer the plaintiff-appellant yet less support for in neither of these cases was there any attempt to amend the pleading to raise the statute of limitations as a defense, nor was Rule 12(h) specifically relied upon as the basis for waiver.
It appears to be settled that there is no waiver of the statute of limitations defense if the answer is properly amended to include it. See, Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., supra, 229 F.2d at pp. 716-718 and cases cited; George McArthur & Sons, Inc. v. Safe-Play Mfg. Co., D.C.E.D.Pa., 1962, 32 F.R. D. 229, 230; Schwartz v. American Stores Co., D.C.E.D.Pa., 1958, 22 F.R.D. 38. Emich Motors dealt with the precise statute of limitations waiver problem herein presented. The court there concluded at page 717 of 229 F.2d:
It is clearly within the trial court's sound discretion to grant leave to amend pleadings. See, e. g., Foman v. Davis, 1962, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222; Standard Title Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 8 Cir., 1965, 349 F.2d 613, 622; Gallon v. Lloyd-Thomas Co., 8 Cir., 1959, 264 F.2d 821, 823. Here there was no showing of abuse of that discretion. Plaintiff-appellant's claim that the statute of limitations defense was waived after there had been proper amendment is wholly without merit.
Plaintiff-appellant's second point is more troublesome, but we believe was correctly decided by Judge Hanson. The case is, we think, controlled by Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 1949, 337 U.S. 530, 69 S.Ct. 1233, 93 L. Ed. 1520. There, a diversity suit for damages because of injuries sustained in an automobile accident which occurred less than two years before the filing of the complaint but where the summons was not served until more than two years after the date of the accident, it was held that summary judgment in behalf of the defendant was proper. Therein, Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the court, with one dissent, stated, beginning at page 532 of 337 U.S., at page 1234 of 69 S.Ct.:
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