Groninger v. Fletcher Trust Co.
| Decision Date | 23 April 1942 |
| Docket Number | 27629. |
| Citation | 41 N.E.2d 140,220 Ind. 202 |
| Parties | GRONINGER et al. v. FLETCHER TRUST CO. |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Appeal from Marion Circuit Court; Arthur C. Van Duyn, Special judge.
Henry M. Dowling, of Indianapolis, for appellants.
Dailey O'Neal, Dailey & Efroymson, of Indianapolis (Donald S. Morris, of Indianapolis, of counsel), for appellee.
Edwin Steers, of Indianapolis, Indiana State Bar Ass'n.
Thompson & Smith, of Indianapolis, amicus curiae.
This is an action by the appellants, practicing lawyers, brought as a class suit for themselves and all practicing lawyers, seeking to enjoin the appellee from performing certain acts which the appellants claim constitute practicing law. An amicus curiae brief, supporting appellants' position has been filed by the Indiana State Bar Association. The case was tried upon an agreed statement of facts, and there was judgment for the defendant.
Error assigned questions the correctness of the judgment upon the undisputed facts. No question is raised concerning the capacity of the plaintiffs to maintain the action.
It was stipulated that the defendant is a corporation, organized under the laws of this state relating to trust companies that it has in its regular employ three lawyers, who are admitted to practice and who are members of the bar of the courts of this state; and that it solicits and advertises its desire for appointment as executor and trustee.
The appellee is authorized by statute to act as executor, administrator, guardian, and trustee, and to execute all such trusts, and the controversy arises out of its activity in connection with the establishment and execution of such trusts. It is stipulated that the appellee does not, through its regularly employed attorneys or otherwise, engage in any activities which are charged to constitute practicing law, except in connection with trusts in which it is the executor, administrator, guardian, or trustee. In the preparation of wills and other trust instruments in which it is named as trustee, it participates only to the extent of collaborating and advising with an attorney not in its regular employ, and selected by the testator or trustor, with the exception that it sometimes makes minor changes in wills or trust instruments already prepared, at the request of the testator or trustor; and that where it contracts to become the trustee in revocable trusts involving the collection, investment, or distribution of funds, where the transaction is routine and not involved, contracts are prepared by the defendant without the cooperation of attorneys not in its regular employ. In all litigation and all matters of importance involving complicated legal questions it retains counsel not in its regular employ. No charge is made or fees collected or received by the appellee for the preparation of any instrument or for legal services furnished through its regularly employed staff of attorneys, and the fees for its services as a fiduciary are in no case different or higher than if the services had been rendered by other attorneys not in the appellee's employ.
The appellee is a corporation, and, of course, in all of its transactions, it acts through some natural person or persons. As we understand appellants' contention, it is not that the appellee procures laymen who are not practicing attorneys to perform services which constitute practicing law, nor is it contended that the appellee charges, collects, or receives any fees or emoluments for services rendered by practicing attorneys who are in its regular employ. It is the contention that the use of appellee's regularly employed attorneys, rather than outside attorneys employed at the expense of the trust, constitutes the illegal practice of law.
The appellee does not contend that it has the right...
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