Gronvold v. Suryan

• Decision Date: 09 October 1935
• Docket Number: No. 13466.,13466.
• Citation: 12 F. Supp. 429,1936 AMC 105
• Parties: GRONVOLD et al. v. SURYAN.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Washington

12 F. Supp. 429

1936 AMC 105

GRONVOLD et al. v. SURYAN.

No. 13466.

District Court, W. D. Washington, N. D.

October 9, 1935.

Wright, Jones & Bronson, of Seattle, Wash., for libelants.

Bogle, Bogle & Gates, of Seattle, Wash., for respondent.

NETERER, District Judge.

Libelants seek to recover damages on breach of warranty not expressed in the charter agreement which is sought to be introduced by alleged statements ante charter party agreement as matter of inducement.

It is further alleged in the third amended libel that after the execution of the charter party and upon delivery of the vessel to the libelants, for installing of oil tanks, etc., that libelants, preliminary to reconstruction and installation of the tanks and equipment referred to in the charter party, stated to the respondent that they proposed to enter into the transportation of oils and gasoline, and required a vessel that would carry not less than 103 tons of oil and gasoline, and that the added weight of the tanks and other equipment would approximate 17 or 18 tons, and that before proceeding with such construction and installation they wanted to be assured of the vessel's suitability and capability of meeting the requirements, and that the respondent assured the libelants that he knew of his own knowledge that said vessel was able and capable of carrying a cargo of at least 125 tons of gasoline, and that the vessel was safe, seaworthy, and staunch in all respects, and that blueprints and specifications for the tanks and equipment were submitted to the respondent, all of which were approved; and then alleges that the vessel was unseaworthy and not able to carry the 103 tons of gasoline and oil, but that it was condemned by the Steamboat Inspection Service of the United States, and not permitted to be used until made seaworthy, and that all tanks in excess of 71.3 tons' capacity be removed.

As a second cause of action libelants seek to recover damages for destruction of cargo, and loss of trade, etc., by burning of the vessel by negligence and malicious conduct of the engineer causing fire on the boat, alleging that the engineer was selected by the owner in harmony with charter party agreement, and that the engineer selected was the owner's agent, and, as such, caused the ignition of a fire on the vessel, which caused the destruction of the vessel and cargo. The value of the loss of cargo is sought to be recovered, as well as loss of trade prospects and business. It alleges that the conduct of the engineer was contrary to the orders of the master of the vessel and was an act of the owner-principal.

Exceptions are filed as to the matters of inducement and statements not included in the charter party, and also as to the fullness and distinctness thereof and sufficiency of the statements as to the several causes of action; that the two causes of action are distinct issues, not connected, one being a breach of contract, and the other for alleged tort.

Admiralty issues are submitted on equitable principles in harmony with the rules of justice in consonance with the principles of maritime law which pervade the practice of the admiralty in this country. The supreme purpose of doing justice is paramount to technical forms and rules, and an arbitrary rule of proceeding does not predominate as it does in the stricter common-law or civil-law practice. Admiralty, rather, submits to discretion of the court much of the procedure necessary to administer justice in the most expeditious and economical manner without economic loss of time or expense to the litigants. With this thought in mind I think the exception as to the joining of the two causes of action — breach of contract and alleged tort — the bases of which are the contract and the functions thereunder, under Admiralty Rules 14, 15, and 18 (28 USCA following section 723), should be denied. While the issue in this case is, as stated by Mr. Justice Brown in The Corsair, 145 U. S. 335, 12 S. Ct. 949, 36 L. Ed. 727, not directly within the rules — and that question is not decided— I think that substantial justice in this case can be more speedily and fully and justly and equitably done by permitting the claims to be set up in one action.

Without specifically enumerating the other exceptions and disposing of them separately, I think the matter can be disposed of upon the sufficiency of the several counts as to containing causes of action.

The charter of a vessel is a maritime service, and such contract is cognizable in admiralty. Benedict on Admiralty (5th Ed.) vol. 1, § 62, p. 82; § 65, p. 88; Torices v. The Winged Racer, Fed. Cas. No. 14,102, 39 Hunt, Mer. Mag. 458; Osaka Shosen Kaisha v. Pacific Export Lumber Co., 260 U. S. 490, 43 S. Ct. 172, 67 L. Ed. 364; The Arlyn Nelson (D. C.) 243 F. 415.

It is also fundamental that a contract maritime in itself carries involved incidentals with it, and unless separable, nonmaritime claims will be heard with the maritime. Benedict on Admiralty (5th Ed.) vol. 1, § 62, p. 83; Rosenthal v. The Louisiana (C. C.) 37 F. 264; The Pulaski (D. C.) 33 F. 383; Evans v. New York & P. S. S. Co. (D. C.) 145 F. 841; Id. (D. C.) 163 F. 405; Keyser v. Blue Star S. S. Co. (C. C. A.) 91 F. 267; Nash v. Bohlen (D. C.) 167 F. 427; Union Fish Co. v. Erickson (C. C. A.) 235 F. 385, affirmed 248 U. S. 308, 39 S. Ct. 112, 63 L. Ed. 261; The Thomas P. Beal (D. C.) 295 F. 877; The Ada (C. C. A.) 250 F. 194.

Torts aboard a vessel on the high seas or navigable waters are of admiralty cognizance. Benedict on Admiralty (5th Ed.) vol. 1, § 127, p. 196; The Plymouth, 70 U. S. (3 Wall.) 20, 18 L. Ed. 125; Hamburg, etc. v. Gye (C. C....