Groom v. Colvin

Decision Date28 November 2016
Docket NumberCase No. 1:15–cv–02103–SI
Citation222 F.Supp.3d 915
Parties John Michael GROOM, Plaintiff, v. Carolyn W. COLVIN, Commissioner of Social Security Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Oregon

Tim Wilborn, P.O. Box 370578, Las Vegas, NV 89137. Of Attorneys for Plaintiff.

Billy J. Williams, United States Attorney, and Janice E. Hebert, Assistant United States Attorney, United States Attorney's Office , District of Oregon, 1000 Southwest Third Avenue, Suite 600, Portland, OR 97204; John C. Lamont, Special Assistant United States Attorney, Office of the General Counsel, Social Security Administration , 701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2900 M/S 221A, Seattle, WA 98104. Of Attorneys for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

Michael H. Simon, United States District Judge

John Groom ("Plaintiff") applied for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") and Supplemental Security Income ("SSI"). The final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ("Commissioner") held that Plaintiff's disability began August 1, 2014, which was after Plaintiff's date last insured. Thus, the Commissioner denied Plaintiff's application for DIB and granted his application for SSI beginning on August 1, 2014. Plaintiff seeks review of this final decision by the Commissioner. Plaintiff argues he was disabled before his date last insured, and that he is thus entitled to DIB and SSI. For the following reasons, the Commissioner's decision is reversed and remanded for an award of benefits.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The district court must affirm the Commissioner's decision if it is based on the proper legal standards and the findings are supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) ; see also Hammock v. Bowen , 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). "Substantial evidence" means "more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance." Bray v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin. , 554 F.3d 1219, 1222 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Andrews v. Shalala , 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995) ). It means "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Id. (quoting Andrews , 53 F.3d at 1039 ).

Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the Commissioner's conclusion must be upheld.

Burch v. Barnhart , 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). Variable interpretations of the evidence are insignificant if the Commissioner's interpretation is a rational reading of the record, and this Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. See Batson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin. , 359 F.3d 1190, 1193, 1196 (9th Cir. 2004). "[A] reviewing court must consider the entire record as a whole and may not affirm simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence." Orn v. Astrue , 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin. , 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006) (quotation marks omitted)). A reviewing court, however, may not affirm the Commissioner on a ground upon which the Commissioner did not rely. Id. ; see also Bray , 554 F.3d at 1226.

BACKGROUND
A. Plaintiff's Application

Plaintiff based his disability allegations on a combination of impairments, including asthma

, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease ("COPD"), complex sleep apnea, a history of hydrocephalus1 with shunt placement, an arachnoid cyst of the cerebellum, major depressive disorder, anxiety disorder with dermatillomania,2 a neurocognitive disorder, and migraines AR 40, 45, 254. Plaintiff was diagnosed with a hydrocephaly at the age of one and had a shunt placed in his brain at the age of two. AR 346. Plaintiff had the shunt replaced in 1999. AR 300.

Plaintiff filed an application for both DIB and SSI on September 3, 2012, alleging disability as of March 12, 2012. AR 39. Plaintiff was 42 years old at the alleged disability onset date. AR 476. In February 2015, the ALJ issued a partially favorable decision, finding Plaintiff disabled beginning on August 1, 2014. The ALJ held, however, that Plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proving disability before the date last insured, March 31, 2014. AR 12–13. Plaintiff appealed the ALJ's conclusion that Plaintiff was not disabled before August 1, 2014. The Appeal's Counsel denied Plaintiff's request for review on September 10, 2015, making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner. AR 1. Plaintiff now seeks judicial review of that decision.

B. The Sequential Analysis

A claimant is disabled if he or she is unable to "engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment

which ... has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months[.]" 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). "Social Security Regulations set out a five-step sequential process for determining whether an applicant is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act." Keyser v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin. , 648 F.3d 721, 724 (9th Cir. 2011) ; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 (DIB), 416.920 (SSI) ; Bowen v. Yuckert , 482 U.S. 137, 140, 107 S.Ct. 2287, 96 L.Ed.2d 119 (1987). Each step is potentially dispositive. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). The five-step sequential process asks the following series of questions:

1. Is the claimant performing "substantial gainful activity?"
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). This activity is work involving significant mental or physical duties done or intended to be done for pay or profit. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1510, 416.910. If the claimant is performing such work, she is not disabled within the meaning of the Act. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). If the claimant is not performing substantial gainful activity, the analysis proceeds to step two.
2. Is the claimant's impairment "severe" under the Commissioner's regulations? 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). An impairment or combination of impairments is "severe" if it significantly limits the claimant's physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1521(a), 416.921(a). Unless expected to result in death, this impairment must have lasted or be expected to last for a continuous period of at least 12 months. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1509, 416.909. If the claimant does not have a severe impairment, the analysis ends. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). If the claimant has a severe impairment, the analysis proceeds to step three.
3. Does the claimant's severe impairment "meet or equal" one or more of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 ? If so, then the claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the impairment does not meet or equal one or more of the listed impairments, the analysis continues. At that point, the ALJ must evaluate medical and other relevant evidence to assess and determine the claimant's "residual functional capacity" ("RFC"). This is an assessment of work-related activities that the claimant may still perform on a regular and continuing basis, despite any limitations imposed by his or her impairments. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 404.1545(b)(c), 416.920(e), 416.945(b)(c). After the ALJ determines the claimant's RFC, the analysis proceeds to step four.
4. Can the claimant perform his or her "past relevant work" with this RFC assessment? If so, then the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant cannot perform his or her past relevant work, the analysis proceeds to step five.
5. Considering the claimant's RFC and age, education, and work experience, is the claimant able to make an adjustment to other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy? If so, then the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v), 404.1560(c), 416.960(c). If the claimant cannot perform such work, he or she is disabled. Id.

See also Bustamante v. Massanari , 262 F.3d 949, 954 (9th Cir. 2001).

The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four. Id. at 953 ; see also Tackett v. Apfel , 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) ; Yuckert , 482 U.S. at 140–41, 107 S.Ct. 2287. The Commissioner bears the burden of proof at step five. Tackett , 180 F.3d at 1100. At step five, the Commissioner must show that the claimant can perform other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy, "taking into consideration the claimant's residual functional capacity, age, education, and work experience." Id. ; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1566, 416.966 (describing "work which exists in the national economy"). If the Commissioner fails to meet this burden, the claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). If, however, the Commissioner proves that the claimant is able to perform other work existing in significant numbers in the national economy, the claimant is not disabled. Bustamante , 262 F.3d at 953–54 ; Tackett , 180 F.3d at 1099.

C. The ALJ's Decision

The ALJ applied the sequential process in his decision issued on February 25, 2015. AR 12–30. At step one, the ALJ found Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date. AR 14. At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered from the following severe impairments: "asthma

, COPD (chronic obstructive pulmonary disease ), obstructive and central sleep apnea, history of hydrocephalus, arachnoid cyst, major depressive disorder, anxiety disorder due to dermatillomania, and neurocognitive disorder." Id. The ALJ found that there was insufficient evidence to find that Plaintiff's alleged migraine headaches were a medically determinable impairment. AR 15. At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or equaled the requirements of a listed impairment. AR 15–18.

The ALJ then determined that before August 1, 2014, Plaintiff had the RFC to perform light work, with additional limitations. Specifically, the ALJ...

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