Groome v. Davis

• Decision Date: 03 May 1939
• Docket Number: 451.
• Citation: Groome v. Davis, 215 N.C. 510, 2 S.E.2d 771 (N.C. 1939)
• Parties: GROOME v. DAVIS.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

2 S.E.2d 771

215 N.C. 510

GROOME v. DAVIS.

No. 451.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

May 3, 1939

Plaintiff brought this action to recover damages for an injury sustained in an automobile collision through the alleged negligence of the defendant.The evidence tended to show that the plaintiff and his wife, a witness in this case, were guests of the defendant, riding in a car belonging to defendant and operated by him on the Smithfield-Clinton Highway, in the village of Newton Grove, Sampson County.At the point of the collision, State HighwayNo. 23, a main paved highway, is intersected by State HighwayNo. 55 referred to in the evidence as a dirt road.On this latter road there was a stop sign facing the intersection and approach to the main highway.

As the Davis car approached the intersection, the plaintiff Groome and Davis were riding on the front seat and Mrs Groome was on the rear seat.There is evidence that approaching the intersection in the direction in which the defendant was driving, one could see the intersection for a distance of about a quarter of a mile.The road was level and flat, with nothing to obstruct the view.When within 200 yards of the intersection the driver of the car could see down the intersecting highway about 100 yards.When within 100 yards of the approach he could see down the highway to the right approximately 150 yards.While there were weeds on Mr. Davis' right as he approached the intersection, they were 3 1/2 or 4 feet high, and as defendant was seated in his automobile, he was 5 1/2 or 6 feet from the ground, having about two feet clearance of vision over and above the weeds.Mrs. Groome testified that she actually saw the automobile which, it turned out, belonged to a man named Lovie approaching when defendant was within 100 yards of the intersection, at which time Davis was running 70 miles an hour.The approaching car was being driven about the same rate of speed--60 or 65 miles an hour.The defendant made no attempt to slow down until about 100 feet from the intersection, when he slowed down to about 55 miles an hour.When the defendant was within the intersection and near the South East side of the intersecting road, the car driven by Lovie crashed into defendant's car, and as a result of the collision plaintiff was seriously injured.

Mrs. Groome testified: "When the two cars came together, we spun around the road, went to the other side of the highway, went into a ditch and lodged up against a tree 40 feet from the highway, on Mr. Davis' left side of the highway.There was nothing to obstruct Mr. Davis' view of that automobile coming from the side road to his right.I saw it clearly.I saw it at a distance of 100 yards from the intersection."

This witness testified that Davis had been driving at a high rate of speed between Raleigh and the place of the collision, but had no trouble prior to the collision; that she made no protest against any of his driving; that she hesitated to do so because she was an invited guest of Mr. Davis; that she saw the car coming down the dirt road and assumed that Mr. Davis saw it also and naturally thought he was going to stop every second, so did not say anything.

H. B. Sanders, a witness for the plaintiff, testified that in the village of Newton Grove, where the collision occurred, he was standing in front of his store; that the buildings were on the left side of the road as Mr. Davis approached from Smithfield.Some forty-five families normally live in the village, but on this particular afternoon there were approximately fifty people standing in the space around the stores and houses on the left side of the intersection; that Mr. Davis could have seen the car coming over the intersecting highway seventy yards back by observing very much at all, although it would have been a little difficult.If he looked closely he could have seen it for more than seventy-five yards, but for seventy-five yards he had a clear view; that Mr. Davis was driving 65 to 70 miles an hour before applying the brake; he applied his brakes "the length of this court room from the intersection", and his car was traveling 55 to 60 miles an hour when the two cars crashed together.The other car was traveling 60 to 65 miles an hour and did not slow up at all.This was the Lovie car.The Chrysler car driven by defendant was struck on the right side, and the damage was from the right front wheel to the rear of the running board.

There was other testimony as to the rate at which the defendant was driving, as to the result of the collision, as to the effect upon the Chrysler car, and as to the nature and extent of the injury to the plaintiff.

At the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence the defendant moved for judgment as of nonsuit, which motion was allowed, and plaintiff appealed.

Thomas W. Ruffin and Douglass & Douglass, all of Raleigh, for appellant.

Smith, Leach & Anderson, of Raleigh, for appellee.

SEAWELL Justice.

In this casewe find two automobilists approaching a common intersection on different highways simultaneously, each traveling at a speed prima facie negligent and colliding within the intersection.The issue is not between them, but between the defendant Davis and the plaintiff Groome, a guest in his car.Lovie, the other driver, is not sued.Questions of right of way, however, are raised as affecting the exercise of due care on the part of the defendant, and as bearing on the question of proximate cause of plaintiff's injury, sustained in the collision.

Defendant was traveling a through highway at a speed of about 65 miles an hour, which he reduced to about 55 miles an hour before going into the intersection.The Lovie car approached from the right over a road on which had been posted a stop sign which, under the law, required him to stop before entering the main highway.He approached the intersection at a speed of about 65 miles per hour, which he did not diminish up to the time of the collision.

There are two arguments made by defendant's counsel in support of the judgment sustaining the demurrer to the evidence:

They contend that the speed of defendant's automobile had no causal connection with the collision, since his car was stricken on the side, and if the speed had been slightly greater or slightly less the collision would not have occurred.But there is more involved in speed than the mere chance of being at a particular spot at a given instant.The event may not be left in the lap of the gods, when it should have been kept in the hands of the driver.

It is also contended that the defendant, having the right of way, had the right to assume that Lovie would observe the stop sign, since the law required him to stop before entering the intersection of the through highway; and that the negligence producing the injury, if any, was, as a matter of law, solely that of Lovie, since, as contended, his was the intervening act of an intelligent agent, unforeseeable by defendant, which, as efficient cause of the injury, insulated his negligence, if any, from such result.As to this, involving, as we think it does, the defendant's manner of approach to the intersection, we think counsel have overestimated the degree of reliance defendant was legally authorized to place on the observance of the stop sign, and have overlooked the conditions under which the assumption may be made.

Presumably the stop sign was erected under authority of Chapter 148, Public Laws of 1927, Section 21--see Michie's North Carolina Code of 1935, Section 2621 (63) --which reads as follows: "Vehicles must stop at certain through highways.--The State Highway Commission with reference to State highways and local authorities with reference to highways under their jurisdictions are hereby authorized to designate main traveled or through highways by erecting at the entrances thereto from intersecting highways signs notifying drivers of vehicles to come to a full stop before entering or crossing such designated highway, and whenever any such signs have been so erected it shall be unlawful for the driver of any vehicle to fail to stop in obedience thereto.That no failure so to stop, however, shall be considered contributory negligence per se in any action at law for injury to person or property; but the facts relating to such failure to stop may be considered with the other facts in the case in determining whether the plaintiff in such action was guilty of contributory negligence."

Under the same chapter of the Public Laws of 1927, and Chapter 311, Public Laws of 1935--see Michie's North Carolina Code, 1935, Section 2621 (46)--we find the following speed regulations: "(a) No person shall drive a vehicle on a highway at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions then existing.(b) Where no special hazard exists the following speeds shall be lawful, but any speed in excess of said limits shall be prima facie evidence that the speed is not reasonable or prudent and that it is unlawful: 1.Twenty miles per hour in any business district; 2.Twenty-five miles per hour in any residence district; 3.Thirty-five miles per hour for motor vehicle designed, equipped for, or engaged in transporting property; and thirty miles per hour for such motor vehicle to which a trailer is attached; 4.Forty-five miles per hour under other conditions."No suggestion was made in the court below that paragraphs 1, 2, or 3 might apply in this case.

The law further provides, Michie's North Carolina Code of 1935 Section 2621 (46)(c): "The fact that the speed of a vehicle is lower than the foregoing prima facie limits shall not relieve the driver from the duty to decrease speed when approaching and crossing an intersection *** and speed shall be decreased as may be necessary to...