Groover v. State, 73756

• Decision Date: 03 January 1991
• Docket Number: No. 73756,73756
• Citation: 16 Fla. L. Weekly 49,574 So.2d 97
• Parties: 16 Fla. L. Weekly 49 Tommy Sands GROOVER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 97

574 So.2d 97

16 Fla. L. Weekly 49

Tommy Sands GROOVER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 73756.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Jan. 3, 1991.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 25, 1991.

Larry Helm Spalding, Capital Collateral Representative, Billy H. Nolas, Chief Asst. CCR and Thomas H. Dunn, Staff Atty., Office of the Capital Collateral Representative, Tallahassee, for appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen. and Mark C. Menser, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee.

EHRLICH, Justice.

In Groover v. State, 489 So.2d 15 (Fla.1986), this Court considered Tommy Sands Groover's appeal of the trial court's denial of his Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 motion to vacate judgment and sentence and of his application for a stay of execution. The motion was denied by the trial court without an evidentiary hearing. Upon review, this Court could not say that it had been conclusively shown that Groover was entitled to no relief in connection with his contention, contained in claims I and III, that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to inquire into his competency to stand trial and for failing to request a psychiatric evaluation. Our conclusion that an evidentiary hearing was required was based primarily on the fact that large doses of Mellaril, a powerful antipsychotic drug, were administered to Groover throughout his pretrial and trial incarceration. 489 So.2d at 17. In his order, the trial judge recognized that these claims are "entwined" and "both involve the same factors of competency enumerated in [Florida] Rule [of Criminal Procedure] 3.211."

After a two-day evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that "[t]here has been no sufficient evidence of mental incompetency or any deficient performance of counsel, and there has been no requisite showing of any prejudice of the defendant, [under the standards set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) ]." In rejecting the testimony of the defense's expert witnesses, the court concluded that:

None of the expert witnesses presented by the defense, except Shore, participated in the 1983 trial or observed the defendant at the time of pretrial or trial. The defense experts read none or only selected parts of the voluminous transcripts of the pretrial and trial proceedings that are crucially relevant to this cause. They jump to conclusions regarding a distant trial and conclude that Nichols and Shore were ineffective counsel without any significant and believable observations at the time of pretrial and trial. In essence, the views of the defense's seven experts are from a perspective far removed from the realities of the 1983 trial and without benefit of Nichols' and Shore's meticulous preparation and extensive knowledge of all the facts of the case, and without the benefit of hundreds of pages of testimony generated from the defendant himself.

The court concluded that attorneys Nichols and Shore, ¹

each made conscious tactical choices when dealing with the defendant and during the formulation of his defense. Both attorneys testified that in their opinions there was no genuine issue of sanity. In sharp contrast to defense experts, both Nichols and Shore felt compelled to follow the dictates of Rule 3.210, Fla.R.Crim.P., which requires that a motion for competency examination be made in good faith and on reasonable grounds to believe the defendant is incompetent to stand trial, which requires a recital of the specific observations of and conversations with the defendant which have formed the basis of such motion, and which in the committee note indicates that such a motion should not be "boiler plate." There was clearly no indication to either Nichols or Shore that the defendant was insane or suffering from diminished capacity due to the administration of Mellaril.

We agree with the trial judge that attorneys Shore and Nichols were not deficient for failing to seek an examination to determine Groover's competency to stand trial. Where there is no evidence calling a defendant's competency into question counsel is not bound to seek an evaluation under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.210. See Blanco v. Wainwright, 507 So.2d 1377 (Fla.1987). The trial court found that Groover "exhibited no behavior whatsoever in the pretrial or trial phases of this case that would indicate that he was mentally deficient or under the influence of any drug to the extent his normal faculties were imparied [sic]." The state's witnesses support this conclusion. As noted by the trial judge,

[t]here is abundant and overwhelming evidence from many witnesses who observed and conversed with Defendant throughout the pretrial and trial stages:

1. that the defendant did not appear retarded or unable to communicate;

2. that the defendant could relate concepts of time;

3. that the defendant never exhibited inappropriate courtroom behavior, and, in fact, was oriented to the events in the courtroom.

This abundant and overwhelming evidence...