Gros v. Port Washington Police Dist.
| Decision Date | 26 October 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. CV 95-0168 (ADS).,CV 95-0168 (ADS). |
| Citation | 944 F.Supp. 1072 |
| Parties | Paul GROS, Plaintiff, v. The PORT WASHINGTON POLICE DISTRICT, Commissioners Stephen Zaccherio, Frank Scobbo, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
Leeds & Morelli by Lenard Leeds, Eileen Campbell, Carle Place, NY, for Plaintiff.
Jaspan, Schlessinger, Silverman & Hoffman L.L.P. by Stanley Camhi, James Burke, Garden City, NY, for Defendants.
Presently before the Court is the renewed motion of the defendants, the Port Washington Police District and two of its commissioners, Stephen Zaccherio ("Zaccherio") and Frank Scobbo ("Scobbo") ("Scobbo" collectively the "defendants" or "Police District"), for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b) and/or a new trial including remittitur pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59. According to the defendants, after a jury trial, the plaintiff, Paul Gros ("Gros" or the "plaintiff"), has failed to establish that his First Amendment rights to free speech and free association have been violated. As a result, the defendants contend that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In the alternative, the defendants seek a new trial or a remittitur of the damages awarded. Gros opposes the motion, arguing that the verdict should be upheld and that he entitled to the full amount of the damage award.
In addition, the plaintiff cross moves for attorneys' fees as a prevailing party. The defendants also move for attorneys' fees related to the time expended at the trial in the event that their motions for judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial are granted.
The plaintiff, Paul Gros, is a police sergeant in the Port Washington Police District. From the 1980's until the present, Gros has consistently remained active in the affairs of the Policemen's Benevolent Association ("PBA"). In 1985 he was appointed PBA vice president and served in that capacity until 1986 when he was elected president. The plaintiff served as president until 1990 when he was appointed a PBA trustee. In 1994, Gros was reelected president, which is the office he held at the time of the trial. According to the plaintiff, because of his participation in PBA affairs, he was subject to "a continual barrage of harassing and discriminatory treatment by the defendants." For example, Gros contends that as the result of his union activities, his promotion to the rank of sergeant was delayed for several years, that he was denied assignments he would have otherwise been given, and that he was denied job-related training, all in violation of his First Amendment rights.
A jury trial was held on June 19, 20, 24, 25, 26, 27, and July 1 and 2, 1996. Prior to the jury charge, the Court, ruling in part on the defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law, recognized that in order for Gros to maintain his First Amendment claims, he must establish that the speech or association at issue touched upon matters of public concern. See Gros v. Port Washington Police Dist., 932 F.Supp. 63, 66 (E.D.N.Y.1996) (). Familiarity with this opinion, as well as prior proceedings before this Court is presumed. Assessing the evidence based on the representations of counsel, this Court's informal trial notes, and without the aid of the trial transcript, the Court instructed that the jury could find that Gros had spoken out on the following matters of public concern if the plaintiff could prove such events by a preponderance of the evidence:
1. That the plaintiff spoke at meetings with the police commissioners in 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993 and 1994 to the effect that there was a shortage of supervisory personnel, including sergeants, in the Port Washington Police District;
2. That in November 1993, Gros spoke out publicly about alleged criminal activities on the part of Commissioner Zaccherio; and
3. Also in November 1993, the plaintiff spoke to the District Attorney of Nassau County concerning alleged criminal activities on the part of Commissioner Zaccherio.
See Trial Transcript ("Tr.") at 1417-18 ().
The Court further instructed the jury that if Gros had established the foregoing speech of public concern, the jury could determine that the plaintiff was harassed in violation of his constitutional rights if he was able to prove the following facts by a preponderance of the evidence:
1. In 1990, he was not paid overtime for a trip he took to Washington, D.C.;
2. In 1992, after he successfully investigated a serious bank crime, his award was downgraded;
3. In 1993, he received radar training instead of a narcotics assignment;
4. As a result of the Flower Hill Hose Co. meeting on February 2, 1993, he was investigated;
5. In May 1993, he was not paid overtime when he testified at a Human Rights Hearing for another officer;
6. He was not paid overtime when he testified at a PERB hearing in November 1993;
7. Also in November 1993, Gros was directed to see a police surgeon when there was nothing wrong with him 8. In December 1993, charges were served on Gros at home in the presence of his family because he spoke out against Commissioner Zaccherio alleging possible criminal activity.
Based on this evidence, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff finding that the defendants violated his constitutional rights. As a result, the plaintiff was awarded $25,000 in back pay, $500,000 for emotional distress and $80,000 in punitive damages each, against Commissioners Scobbo and Zaccherio.
The defendants challenge the jury verdict and damages award on several grounds. Initially, the defendants contend that although the Court instructed the jury that Gros had engaged in protected speech between 1989 and 1994 regarding a shortage of supervisory personnel, a review of the trial transcript reveals that no such evidence was ever presented. According to the defendants, Gros spoke to the Commissioners only about his own promotion during these periods, which does not constitute a matter of public concern, and therefore is not shielded by the First Amendment. With respect to the second and third instances of speech regarding Commissioner Zaccherio's alleged illegal conduct, the defendants argue that the resulting harassment is "de minimis," and therefore does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Finally, with respect to the alleged harassment, the Police District contends that Gros failed to establish that speech was a "substantial" or "motivating" factor for the retaliation, as required in order to state a constitutional claim.
In addition to their substantive attacks on the plaintiff's free speech claims, the defendants challenge the verdict on a number of other grounds. First, the Police District contends that the back pay award cannot be sustained because the plaintiff's promotion claim is barred by the three-year statute of limitations. In the alternative, the defendant posits that even if the back pay award is not time barred, it must nevertheless be reduced because it is not supported by the evidence.
Second, the individual defendants, Commissioners Zaccherio and Scobbo, contend that even if the plaintiff may have otherwise established his First Amendment claims, they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law under the doctrine of qualified immunity. According to Zaccherio and Scobbo, any action they were found to have taken against Gros was not in violation of a clearly established constitutional right. As a result, they contend that they should be insulated against civil suit.
Third, the Police District contends that the $500,000 award for emotional damages should be reduced. According to the defendants, such a large award should shock the conscience of the Court and constitutes a denial of justice.
Fourth, the defendants argue that the award of punitive damages was inappropriate in this case as such an award is not support by the evidence. In the alternative, the Police District contends that even if punitive damages are appropriate, they should be reduced.
Finally, the defendants maintain that they were denied a fair jury trial because of the composition of the panel. Based on the fact that a number of the jurors were from New York City rather than the counties of Nassau and Suffolk, closer to where the events involved took place, the Police district contends that its Seventh Amendment right to a jury of its peers was violated.
Needless to say, the plaintiff opposes the defendants' motion and disputes all of the arguments advanced. Gros argues that the jury verdict is proper and is entitled to deference by the Court. Accordingly, the plaintiff contends that the verdict and the award of damages should stand.
Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b), a renewed judgment for a matter of law may be made "at the close of all the evidence" and after the verdict. A motion for judgment of a matter of law may be granted where "there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find [in favor of the non-moving] party." Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a).
When ruling on a motion for judgment as a matter of law, the court must "`consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the [non moving party] and ... give that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences that the jury might have drawn in [its] favor from the evidence.'" Concerned Residents for the Environment v. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d 114, 117 (2d Cir.1994), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 1793, 131 L.Ed.2d 721 (1995), quoting, Smith v. Lightning Bolt Prods., Inc., 861 F.2d 363, 367 (2d Cir.1988). Accordingly,...
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