Grose v. Holland

• Decision Date: 12 April 1948
• Docket Number: 40507
• Citation: Grose v. Holland, 211 S.W.2d 464, 357 Mo. 874 (Mo. 1948)
• Parties: Andrew N. Grose et al., Appellants, v. William Edgar Holland and Myrtle Watts, Trustee of the Estate of William Edgar Holland
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

211 S.W.2d 464

357 Mo. 874

Andrew N. Grose et al., Appellants, v. William Edgar Holland and Myrtle Watts, Trustee of the Estate of William Edgar Holland

No. 40507

Supreme Court of Missouri

April 12, 1948

Motion for Rehearing or to Transfer to Banc Overruled May 27, 1948.

Appeal from Pettis Circuit Court; Hon. Dimmitt Hoffman Judge.

Reversed and remanded (with directions).

Leo J. Harned and George H. Miller for appellants.

(1) The trial court erred in dismissing plaintiffs' cause of action because "the ordinary rules of construction and operation regarding survivorship in entirety estates do not extend to, or have within their contemplation, a survivorship which arises by a wrongful, illegal, and felonious homicide committed by such survivor who, and those claiming under him may claim all the entirety estate." Barnett v Couey, 27 S.W.2d 757; Perry v. Strawbridge, 209 Mo. 621, 108 S.W. 641; Sherman v. Webber, 167 A. 517; Bryant v. Bryant, 137 S.E. 188. (2) The trial court erred in dismissing the plaintiffs' cause of action because the legal fiction of complete ownership of the whole estate by each party in estates by the entirety must give way when equitable principles intervene. Barnett v. Couey, 27 S.W.2d 757; State ex rel. v. Ellison, 290 Mo. 28, 233 S.W. 1065; Rezabek v. Rezabek, 196 Mo.App. 673, 192 S.W. 107; Holmes v. Kansas City, 209 Mo. 513, 108 S.W. 9; Sherman v. Webber, 167 A. 517; Bryant v. Bryant, 137 S.E. 188, 51 A.L.R. 1100; Van Alstyne v. Tuffy, 169 N.Y.S. 173; Whitney v. Lott, 36 A.2d 890. (3) Upon the dissolution of the legal fiction of an estate by the entirety, by the felonious act of one of the parties thereto, a court of equity should treat the estate as one being held as tenants in common. Barnett v. Couey, 27 S.W.2d 757; State ex rel. v. Ellison, 233 S.W. 1065; Sherman v. Webber, 167 A. 517; Bryant v. Bryant, 137 S.E. 188; Zanzonico v. Zanzonico, 2 A.2d 597; Capizzi v. Khoury, 5 N.Y.S. (2d) 201; Whitelock v. Whitelock, 143 A. 712. (4) The trial court erred in dismissing plaintiffs' cause of action because for a court of equity to grant the relief prayed for in plaintiffs' petition would not operate as a bill of attainder or forfeiture of survivor's estate. Perry v. Strawbridge, 108 S.W. 641; Barnett v. Couey, 27 S.W.2d 757; Sherman v. Webber, 167 A. 517; Bryant v. Bryant, 137 S.E. 188.

John T. Martin and Montgomery, Martin & Salveter for respondents.

(1) The deed to William Edgar Holland and his wife, creating an estate by the entirety, vested in each, at the time of its execution and delivery, the whole estate in the lands in controversy. Upon the death of his wife, although through his felonious act, no new or additional estate was acquired by Holland by way of survivorship or inheritance. Otto F. Stifel's Union Brewing Co. v. Saxy, 273 Mo. 159, 201 S.W. 67; Schwind v. O'Halloran, 346 Mo. 486, 142 S.W.2d 55; Wilson v. Frost, 186 Mo. 311, 85 S.W. 375; Garner v. Jones, 52 Mo. 68; Ashbaugh v. Ashbaugh, 273 Mo. 353, 201 S.W. 72; Ahmann v. Kemper, 342 Mo. 944, 119 S.W.2d 256. (2) The provisions of the constitution and statutes of this state prohibit the enforcement of a forfeiture of any estate for conviction of a crime. Sec. 13, Art. II, Constitution of Missouri of 1875; Sec. 30, Art. I, Constitution of Missouri of 1945; Sec. 4858, R.S. 1939. (3) Courts of equity, equally with courts of law, are bound by, and obliged to give effect to, the positive provisions of the constitution and statutes and are no more privileged to disregard the provisions of the basic laws than are courts of law. 19 Am. Jur. 55; Hedges v. Dixon County, 150 U.S. 182, 37 L.Ed. 1044, 14 S.Ct. 71; Stevens v. De La Vaulx, 166 Mo. 20, 65 S.W. 1003. (4) The criminal act of one spouse in murdering the other, in the light of the foregoing provisions of the constitution and statutes, affords the court no ground for declaring and enforcing a forfeiture of any part of the vested estate of the guilty party in lands held by the entirety. Beddingfield v. Estil and Newman, 100 S.W. 108; Wenker v. Landon, 88 P.2d 971; Hammer v. Kinnen, 16 Dist. and County Rep. 395; In re Eckardt's Estate, 54 N.Y.S. (2d) 484; Oleff v. Hodapp, 195 N.E. 838; Weeks v. New York Life Ins. Co., 128 S.C. 223, 122 S.E. 586. (5) Constitutional and statutory provisions against attainder are not infringed by legislative enactments and court decisions which deprive a murderer of the right to inherit from his victim, or take as a devisee under the latter's will or recover proceeds of policies upon the murdered person's life, because the guilty party is not deprived thereby of any vested estate; he is only denied the right to acquire property through his criminal act. Perry v. Strawbridge, 209 Mo. 621, 108 S.W. 641; Box v. Lanier, 112 Tenn. 393, 79 S.W. 1042; Hamblin v. Merchant, 103 Kan. 508, 175 P. 678.

OPINION

Tipton, P.J.

The appellants filed their amended petition in the circuit court of Pettis County, Missouri. In count one they seek to be declared the equitable owners of an interest in certain real estate situated in Pettis and Johnson Counties, and in count two of the petition they seek to partition this real estate. The trial court sustained respondents' motion to dismiss appellants' petition, and from a judgment of dismissal the appellants have duly appealed.

The appellants allege that they are the heirs of Mattie Mollie Holland, deceased; that she and William Edgar Holland were lawfully married; that at the time of the death of Mattie Mollie Holland, she and William Edgar Holland owned certain described real estate in Pettis and Johnson Counties as tenants by the entirety; that on or about April 14, 1944, William Edgar Holland murdered his wife; that he was convicted of this murder and is now serving a life sentence in the state penitentiary; that Myrtle Watts was duly appointed trustee of his estate; that after murdering his wife, he took exclusive possession of the real estate and has collected the profits therefrom and now claims sole and complete ownership of this property; that there were no children born of the aforesaid marriage; that the appellants are the only heirs of Mattie Mollie Holland; that William Edgar Holland, by reason of his murdering his wife, has enriched himself and come into possession and control of the real estate, and in equity and good conscience should not be permitted to profit by his crime; that the appellants are entitled to one-half interest in the real estate; that the marital union by which William Edgar Holland and Mattie Mollie Holland were tenants by the entirety of the real estate was severed by the iniquitous and wrongful act of William Edgar Holland and that he ought not to be allowed to profit by the wrongful act. The prayer of this count is that appellants be declared the equitable owners of one-half interest in the real estate and one-half interest in the profits since April, 1944. The second count of the petition is for partition.

Respondents filed a motion to dismiss for the reason that the petition failed to state a claim upon which any relief can be granted. The grounds of the motion were that if Mattie Mollie Holland came to her death as alleged, then William Edgar Holland became the sole owner and the holder of the full fee simple title thereto. Respondents further stated that to deprive William Edgar Holland of any part of fee simple title to the real estate would be in violation of the provisions of Section 4858, R.S. Mo., 1939, and Section 13 of Article II of our 1875 Constitution.

As previously stated, the trial court sustained respondents' motion for dismissal and dismissed the petition.

The question presented for our determination under the facts in this record is whether a husband who murders his wife may become, as survivor, the sole and unconditional owner of an estate by the entirety so that he may have and enjoy the full benefit thereof.

The respondents to sustain their contention rely upon the following cases: Otto F. Stifel's Union Brewing Co. v. Saxy, 273 Mo. 159, 201 S.W. 67; Schwind v. O'Halloran, 346 Mo. 486, 142 S.W. 2d 55; Wilson v. Frost, 186 Mo. 311, 85 S.W. 375; Frost v. Frost, 200 Mo. 474, 98 S.W. 527; Garner v. Jones, 52 Mo. 68; Ashbaugh v. Ashbaugh, 273 Mo. 353, 201 S.W. 72; Ahmann v. Kemper, 342 Mo. 944, 119 S.W. 2d 256. The principle of law announced in those cases is well expressed in our early case of Garner v. Jones, supra.

"At common law a conveyance in fee to husband and wife, of real estate, created a tenancy by the entirety. Being but one person in law, they took the estate as one person. Each being the owner of the entire estate; neither of whom had any separate or joint interest but a unity or entirety of the whole. So if either died the estate continued in the survivor, as it had existed before; an undivided unity or entirety. There was no survivorship as in joint tenancies, but a continuance of the estate in the survivor as it originally stood. The only change by death was in the person, not in the estate. Before death they both constituted one person holding the entire estate, and after the death of either the survivor remainded as the only holder of the estate." Loc. cit. 71.

We agree with the law announced by those cases, but they do not decide the exact question before us. In the above cited cases, death of one party to the marriage was the result of natural causes and not the result of willful murder by the surviving spouse as in the case at bar.

Appellants' petition is an equitable action, and the exact question before us is discussed by Bogert in his work, Trusts and Trustees, section 478, page 56, which reads as follows:

"Some difficulty may be experienced in applying equitable doctrines to the joint tenancy and tenancy by the entirety cases, due...