Grosjean v. Saul
| Decision Date | 09 September 2019 |
| Docket Number | 18-CV-435F |
| Parties | CHANCE M. GROSJEAN, Plaintiff, v. ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of New York |
DECISION and ORDER
(consent)
APPEARANCES:
LAW OFFICES OF KENNETH R. HILLER, PLLC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
KENNETH R. HILLER, and
TIMOTHY HILLER, of Counsel
Amherst, New York 14226
JAMES P. KENNEDY, JR.
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
Attorney for Defendant
Federal Centre
138 Delaware Avenue
Buffalo, New York 14202
and
VERNON NORWOOD
Special Assistant United States Attorney, of Counsel
Social Security Administration
Office of General Counsel
26 Federal Plaza - Room 3904
New York, New York 10278
and
RICHARD W. PRUETT, and
LAURA RIDGELL BOLTZ
Special Assistant United States Attorneys, of Counsel
Social Security Administration
Office of General Counsel
1961 Stout Street, Suite 4169
Denver, Colorado 80249
On July 9, 2019, this matter was reassigned to the undersigned before whom the parties to this action consented pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) to proceed in accordance with this court's June 29, 2018 Standing Order (Dkt. 20). The matter is presently before the court on motions for judgment on the pleadings filed by Plaintiff on February 15, 2019 (Dkt. 15), and by Defendant on April 12, 2019 (Dkt. 18).
Plaintiff Chance M. Grosjean ("Plaintiff"), brings this action under Title II of the Social Security Act ("the Act"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), seeking judicial review of the Commissioner of Social Security's final decision denying Plaintiff's application filed with the Social Security Administration ("SSA"), on April 16, 2014, for Social Security Child Disability Insurance ("disability benefits"). Plaintiff alleges he became disabled on April 19, 2011, based on anxiety and visual hallucinations. AR2 at 171-79, 198. Plaintiff's applications initially were denied on July 14, 2014, AR at 90-96, and at Plaintiff's timely request, on September 7, 2016, a hearing was held in Buffalo, New York, before administrative law judge Bryce Baird ("the ALJ). AR at 35-77. Appearing and testifying at the hearing were Plaintiff, his attorney, Jeanne Murray, Esq. ("Murray"), and vocational expert ("VE") Michele Erbacher.
On April 4, 2017, the ALJ issued a decision denying Plaintiff's claim, AR at 12-34 ("the ALJ's decision"), which Plaintiff appealed to the Appeals Council. AR at 170. On February 14, 2018, the Appeals Council issued a decision denying Plaintiff's request forreview, rendering the ALJ's decision the Commissioner's final decision. AR at 1-6. On April 13, 2018, Plaintiff commenced the instant action seeking judicial review of the ALJ's decision.
On February 15, 2019, Plaintiff moved for judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. 15) ("Plaintiffs' Motion"), attaching the Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Dkt. 15-1) ("Plaintiff's Memorandum"). On April 12, 2019, Defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. 18) ("Defendant's Motion"), attaching the Commissioner's Brief in Support of the Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings Pursuant to Local Standing Order on Social Security Cases (Dkt. 18-1) ("Defendant's Memorandum"). Filed on May 3, 2019, was Plaintiff's Reply Brief (Dkt. 19) ("Plaintiff's Reply"). Oral argument was deemed unnecessary.
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff's Motion is DENIED; Defendant's Motion is GRANTED.
Plaintiff Chance M. Grosjean ("Plaintiff" or "Grosjean"), born March 16, 1996, was 15 years old as of April 19, 2011, his alleged disability onset date ("DOD"), and 21 years old as of April 4, 2017, the date of the ALJ's decision. AR at 16, 18. Plaintiff lived with his mother in an apartment, socialized with friends with whom he played sports twice a week, attended school and church, and had a driver's license. AR at 214, 758. Plaintiff is a high school graduate and has attended college, including for three semesters away from home, but transferred to a local college after developing cyclical vomitingsyndrome for which, despite diagnostic testing, no physical cause has been found. AR at 46, 455. It is undisputed Plaintiff suffers from an anxiety disorder, and has no history of substantial gainful activity. AR at 17-18. Plaintiff attributes his anxiety disorder to the August 2011 death of his father with whom he was very close. AR at 485.
A claimant is "disabled" within the meaning of the Act and entitled to disability benefits when she is unable "to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which . . . has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i)(1); 1382c(a)(3)(A). A district court may set aside the Commissioner's determination that a claimant is not disabled if the factual findings are not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision is based on legal error. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3); Green-Younger v. Barnhart, 335 F.3d 99, 105-06 (2d Cir. 2003). In reviewing a final decision of the SSA, a district court "is limited to determining whether the SSA's conclusions were supported by substantial evidence in the record and were based on a correct legal standard." Talavera v. Astrue, 697 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Id. It is not, however, the district court's function to make a de novo determination as to whether the claimant is disabled; rather, "the reviewing court is required to examine the entire record, including contradictoryevidence and evidence from which conflicting inferences can be drawn" to determine whether the SSA's findings are supported by substantial evidence. Id. "Congress has instructed . . . that the factual findings of the Secretary,4 if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive." Rutherford v. Schweiker, 685 F.2d60, 62 (2d Cir. 1982).
The definition of "disabled" is the same for purposes of receiving SSDI and SSI benefits. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 423(d) with 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a). Because in the instant case, Plaintiff seeks child disability benefits, Plaintiff must establish disability prior to age 22. 20 C.F.R. § 404.350. The applicable regulations set forth a five-step analysis the Commissioner must follow in determining eligibility for disability benefits. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 and 416.920. See Bapp v. Bowen, 802 F.2d 601, 604 (2d Cir. 1986); Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1982). If the claimant meets the criteria at any of the five steps, the inquiry ceases and the claimant is not eligible for disability benefits. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 and 416.920. The first step is to determine whether the applicant is engaged in substantial gainful activity during the period for which the benefits are claimed. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b) and 416.920(b). The second step is whether the applicant has a severe impairment which significantly limits the physical or mental ability to do basic work activities, as defined in the relevant regulations. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c). Third, if there is an impairment and the impairment, or its equivalent, is listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 of the regulations ("Appendix 1" or "the Listings"), and meets the durationrequirement of at least 12 continuous months, there is a presumption of inability to perform substantial gainful activity, and the claimant is deemed disabled, regardless of age, education, or work experience. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A) and 1382a(c)(3)(A); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d) and 416.920(d). As a fourth step, however, if the impairment or its equivalent is not listed in Appendix 1, the Commissioner must then consider the applicant's "residual functional capacity" or "RFC" which is the ability to perform physical or mental work activities on a sustained basis, notwithstanding the limitations posed by the applicant's collective impairments, see 20 C.F.R. 404.1520(e)-(f), and 416.920(e)-(f), and the demands of any past relevant work ("PRW"). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e) and 416.920(e). If the applicant remains capable of performing PRW, disability benefits will be denied, id., but if the applicant is unable to perform PRW relevant work, the Commissioner, at the fifth step, must consider whether, given the applicant's age, education, and past work experience, the applicant "retains a residual functional capacity to perform alternative substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy." Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir. 1999) (quotation marks and citation omitted); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1560(c) and 416.960(c). The burden of proof is on the applicant for the first four steps, with the Commissioner bearing the burden of proof on the final step. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4) and 416.920(a)(4); Burgess v. Astrue, 537 F.3d 117, 128 (2d Cir. 2008).
In the instant case, the ALJ found Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since April 19, 2011, his alleged disability onset date, AR at 17, Plaintiff suffers from the severe impairments of generalized anxiety disorder, unspecified depressive disorder, and unspecified psychotic disorder, id., but that other conditions noted inPlaintiff's medical history, including substance abuse (marijuana), and cyclical vomiting syndrome are not medically determinable and, thus, and, as such, are not severe impairments. AR at 17-18. The ALJ further found Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of impairments meeting or medically equal to the severity of any listed impairment in Appendix 1, id. at 18-19, and that Plaintiff retains the RFC to perform the full range of light work, with limitations including inability to crawl, climb ladders, ropes, and scaffolds, can...
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