Gross v. School Committee of Town of Glocester
| Citation | 333 A.2d 417,114 R.I. 358 |
| Decision Date | 04 March 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 73-222-A,73-222-A |
| Parties | Kenneth GROSS et al. v. SCHOOL COMMITTEE OF the TOWN OF GLOCESTER. ppeal. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island |
This is a civil action by the plaintiffs, owners and operators of school buses, and residents of the town of Glocester, to enforce an alleged oral promise to renegotiate certain school bus contracts, and to enjoin the defendant School Committee of the Town of Glocester from entering into a 3-year school bus contract with Hipkins Transportation Co., Inc., the intervenor in this action. The plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction was denied by a Superior Court justice. The case was then tried to a different Superior Court justice, sitting without a jury, who filed a written decision and thereafter entered a judgment denying the plaintiffs' prayer to enforce the oral promise and further denying, without prejudice, the plaintiffs' prayer to enjoin the defendant from continuing the contract with the intervenor Hopkins Transportation Co., Inc., beyond June 1973. The plaintiffs, the defendant, and the intervenor have each filed appeals to this court.
It appears that plaintiffs were owners and operators of school buses and had been providing bus service to school pubils in Glocester on the basis of 5-year contracts with defendant expiring in June of 1972. These contracts had been entered into as a result of negotiations between plaintiffs and defendant in 1967. Toward the end of these 5-year contracts it was decided by defendant that future contracts would be advertised for bid instead of being conducted by negotiation with the various bus owners. The specifications provided that the proposed contracts would be for a 3-year period commencing September 1, 1972, and ending June 30, 1975, and that separate bids would be required for different routes. The bids were to be limited to residents of the town of Glocester.
The plaintiffs and intervenor submitted bids on all the routes designated in the specifications. The defendant awarded contracts to plaintiffs for routes on which they were the low bidders and to the intervenor for those routes on which the intervenor was the low bidder.
In April 1972, after the results of the bidding were known, plaintiffs instituted an action to enjoin defendant from executing a 3-year school bus contract with intervenor, Hopkins Transportation Co., Inc., and to order defendant to renegotiate a school bus contract in accordance with an oral promise allegedly made to plaintiffs by defendant in 1967 during the negotiations on which the previous contracts were based. Allegedly plaintiffs were to be given an opportunity to confer directly with defendant and discuss the possibility of a new contract and its terms. All of the basic facts are undisputed except the alleged oral promise.
While the suit was pending, defendant entered into a contract with intervenor to provide bus service for 3 years, 1972-1975. At the time of the execution of the contract, defendant Glocester School Committee consisted of three members, one whose term expired in June of 1973, one whose term was to expire in June of 1975, and one hhose term was to expire in June of 1977.
At the hearing on the prayer for preliminary injunction, the trial justice found that the alleged oral promise had in fact been made, but he was unable to determine its precise intention or scope. The case was assigned for hearing before a different Superior Court justice, and during a pretrial conference on the merits, plaintiffs were granted leave by the court to file an amended complaint. The trial justice decided under Super.R.Civ.P. 42(b) 1 to determine the legal issues alone and directed counsel to file written memoranda. The plaintiffs then filed the amended complaint, and defendant and intervenor each filed 'Defendant's Objection to Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint.' The trial justice construed the 'Objections' as motions to dismiss under Super.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). 2
The plaintiffs allege that the trial justice committed error in construing 'Objections to Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint' as motions to dismiss under Super.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), stating that the 'Objections' are in fact only flat statements of objection which fail to seek dismissal and set forth no particular defense under Rule 12(b). The plaintiffs further argue that even if 'Objections' are construed as motions to dismiss for failure to present a claim for which relief could be granted under Rule 12(b)(6), this same rule requires that such a...
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Spaziano v. Spaziano, 77-391-A
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Hanley v. State
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