Gross v. United States

• Decision Date: 12 January 1953
• Docket Number: No. 13193.,13193.
• Parties: GROSS v. UNITED STATES.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

201 F.2d 780 (1953)

GROSS v. UNITED STATES.

No. 13193.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

January 12, 1953.

G. G. Baumen, Los Angeles, Cal., for appellant.

Ed Dupree, Gen. Counsel, Office of Rent Stabilization, A. M. Edwards, Jr., Asst. Gen. Counsel, Nathan Siegel, Solicitor and William A. Moran, Sp. Litigation Atty., ORS, Washington, D.C., for appellee.

Before STEPHENS, HEALY and BONE, Circuit Judges.

BONE, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal from a judgment directing appellant to make restitution of rental overcharges pursuant to Section 206(b) of the Housing and Rent Act of 1947, as amended, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 1896(b). The complaint was in one count and prayed for restitution of rental overcharges and injunctive relief pursuant to Section 205(a) of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, as amended, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 925(a), and for injunction, restitution, and statutory (treble) damages pursuant to Sections 205 and 206 of the Housing and Rent Act of 1947, as amended, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, §§ 1895, 1896.

The complaint alleged that at all times prior to July 1, 1947, appellant's housing accommodations¹ described in the complaint had been subject to maximum rents authorized under the Price Control Act of 1942, as amended; that at all times on and after July 1, 1947, the same accommodations had been subject to maximum rents authorized and in effect pursuant to the said Housing and Rent Act of 1947, as amended, and that at all times mentioned the premises had been within the Los Angeles defense-rental area.

A schedule attached to the complaint (later amended by stipulation) contained the names of the persons using and occupying the accommodations designated and described in the complaint, the period of the occupancy, the rents charged and received by appellant from these persons, the amount of the applicable maximum rent, and also the amount of the overcharges. The parties stipulated and agreed "that assuming that the premises * * * were in fact subject to rent control during the period mentioned in plaintiff's complaint then the amended schedule * * * correctly sets forth the names of tenants, the unit occupied by each tenant, the period of overcharges,^* the amount of rent paid, the maximum rent that would be applicable and the amount of overcharges to each tenant."

Appellant, by his agreement in the stipulation, did not concede or admit that the premises were at any time subject to rent control or that there was any maximum rent applicable or that there had been any "overcharges" as to any of the tenants named in the amended schedule. In short, his position is that at all times mentioned in the complaint he was operating a motor court which was exempt from rent control under the 1947 Act, as amended.

Issue was joined by appellant's answer in which he generally denied all material allegations of the complaint. By separate defenses he asserted that the complaint failed to set forth facts sufficient to constitute a claim upon which the relief demanded could be granted, and alleged that the premises in question were, at all times from the year 1929 to the date of suit, a motor court and as such not "controlled housing accommodations", under the Act of 1947, as amended.

Appellant demanded a jury trial;² this demand was stricken on motion of appellee. Thereafter, the lower court denied a motion of appellant to dismiss the action based on the contention that the complaint did not state a good claim for relief. It also granted the motion of appellee for an order that appellant had the burden of proof of establishing that the premises were a motor court.

The trial court found that the premises here concerned were subject to rent control during the periods involved. It entered judgment for the amount shown by the amended schedule (above referred to) and directed that payment of this amount be made to those shown by the schedule to be entitled to restitution. It denied the prayer for an injunction and refused to award damages in any sum. On this appeal the appellee does not assail the judgment but merely seeks affirmance.

In this posture of the case the principal question for decision is noted in appellant's fourth specification of error and is whether under the evidence the trial judge properly and correcty found that appellant's premises were "housing accommodations" subject to the Act of 1947, as amended, and were not a "motor court" exempted from rent control. Applicable law and regulations are now considered, and in this connection we point out that appellant emphasizes the absence of a reference to "transient guests" or "transient occupancy" in the language used in the law or the regulations defining the term "motor court."

Section 202(c) states what accommodations are subject to the Act (of 1947), as follows:

"The term `controlled housing accommodations\' meaning housing accommodations see note 1 in any defenserental area, except that it does not include * * *."

Section 202(c) of the Act deals with the motor court exemption. As enacted in 1947 it provided in part:

Section 202(c) (2). "any motor court, or any part thereof; or any tourist home serving transient guests exclusively, or any part thereof; or * *." 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 1892(c) (2); effective July 1, 1947, to April 1, 1948.

This Section was amended in 1948 by Section 201, Public Law 464, 80th Congress to read in part as follows:

Sec. 202 (c) (2). "any motor court, or any part thereof; any trailer or trailer space, or any part thereof; or any tourist home serving transient guests exclusively, or any part thereof; or * * *." 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 1892(c) (2) approved March 30, 1948, effective April 1, 1948.

A further amendment in 1949 appeared in Section 201(b) of Public Law 31, 81st Congress which then in part read:

Sec. 202(c) (2). "any motor court, or any part thereof; any trailer, or trailer space, used exclusively for transient occupancy or any part thereof; or any tourist home serving transient guests exclusively, or any part thereof; or * * *." 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 1892(c) (2); Amendment approved March 30, 1949, effective April 1, 1949.

Pursuant to the Act, Housing and Rent Regulations were issued June 30, 1947, effective July 1, 1947 (12 F.R. 4331) which defined "motor court."³

So much for applicable law and regulations.

Appellant's Specifications of Error

Appellant demands reversal of the judgment on the basis of four alleged errors of the trial court: (1) Refusal to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it did not state a claim upon which relief could be granted, (2) the granting of appellee's motion to strike appellant's demand for a jury trial, (3) granting appellee's motion for an order placing the burden of trial proof on appellant on the issue whether the property involved is a motor court, and (4) in finding that the accommodations involved were not a motel or a motor court under the Housing and Rent Act of 1947, as amended, and determining that such accommodations were controlled housing accommodations under that Act, as amended.

As to his first specification of error appellant argues that since the appellee relied on a purely statutory liability and the statute contains a limitation or exception in the clause creating or defining the liability, such limitation or exception must be negatived in the complaint; that the complaint failed to do this hence it did not state a claim upon which relief could be granted. This particular contention was considered and rejected by this court in Bowles v. Wheeler, 9 Cir., 152 F.2d 34, 41, and cases cited therein. See also Martino v. Holzworth, 8 Cir., 158 F.2d 845, 847. It will be noted that in the cases cited in the Wheeler case, the rule applied in our Wheeler case has also been applied in criminal cases.

The complaint in this case contained a short simple statement of the claim showing that appellee was entitled to relief under the Housing and Rent Act, as amended, and it apprised appellant of the character of the claim so that he could adequately answer and prepare for trial. Appellant does not contend that he had any difficulty whatever understanding the nature of the claim against him. Furthermore, his answer denied that the premises were housing accommodations and by separate defenses he alleged that the accommodations were not controlled housing accommodations because at all times here material they were a motor court. The material issues and the basic contentions of the parties were thus clearly defined and were squarely before the court when the case came to trial. Appellant suffered no prejudice in this regard.

Appellant's second claim of error has to do with denial of a jury trial. On this point he argues that before the court could determine whether there was any basis for restitution, injunction or damages of any type, it first had to decide the question of fact as to whether the premises were or were not controlled housing accommodations. Based on this claim appellant urges that on his demand for a jury it was error to refuse to first submit this fact question to a jury.⁴ But the court did decide this particular question of fact and made specific findings thereon which set forth that at all times here involved the premises were not a motor court but to the contrary were housing accommodations within the purview of the Housing and Rent Act of 1947, as amended; also that the characteristic of the tenancies was overwhelmingly that of permanent occupancy and not that of transient occupancy. We are unable to say that these findings of fact are clearly erroneous and therefore they are binding on this court and on the parties.

The problem whether the premises were or were not controlled housing accommodations was also a fact issue common to both the law and equitable claims before the court and this fact issue can not be arbitrarily cataloged and set to one side as one involving an exclusive common law transaction. But appellant seems to...