Gross v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd.
Decision Date | 10 January 1975 |
Citation | 118 Cal.Rptr. 609,44 Cal.App.3d 397 |
Parties | Alta E. GROSS, Petitioner, v. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD of the State of California et al., Respondents. Civ. 34714. |
Court | California Court of Appeals |
Barry J. Williams, Frank J. Reilly, Levy, Van Bourg & Hackler, Oakland, for petitioner.
Robert L. McCartney, Hanna & Brophy, Oakland, for respondents American Baptist Homes and Argonaut Ins. Co.
On the application of petitioner Alta E. Gross, we review the legality of an award of the Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board.
The facts are not disputed. Petitioner, 44 years of age, was employed as a trayline worker at a home for the elderly. Among her duties she would customarily lift tubs of ice or trays of milk weighing up to 20 pounds. She was considered a 'valuable employee' and a 'top dietary aid.' She had had no prior back trouble; so far as her back was concerned she was asymptomatic. A January 18, 1971, medical examination showed 'everything normal, including the back'; the examining doctor reported her to be 'in excellent health.' She was in no way restricted in the duties of iher employment, and appeared to have no physical impairment or disability.
On February 1, 1971, petitioner, in the course of her employment, slipped and fell on a wet floor. As a result she developed 'pain across the low back.' After medical examination and treatment she was able to continue in her employment, but 'quite a bit of pain in the low back' persisted. Then on June 3, 1971, while cleaning out a refrigerator at work 'her back popped,' and the pain increased. As a result of those incidents, and following proceedings before the board, she was given a permanent disability rating of 32 percent. The board however, apportioned this rating 16 percent to the industrial injuries, and 16 percent to a medically reported 'pre-existing but asymptomatic osteoarthritis and degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine generalized,' a condition of which petitioner had had no knowledge. An award, based only on the 16 percent industrial disability found, was entered by the board. That award is here in dispute.
The issue is whether, on the entire record, the award is sustained by substantial evidence. (See LeVesque v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 1 Cal.3d 627, 637, 83 Cal.Rptr. 208, 463 P.2d 432.) 'Substantial evidence' is not synonymous with 'any evidence.' "It must be reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value; it must actually be 'substantial' proof of the essentials which the law requires in a particular case." (People v. Bassett, 69 Cal.2d 122, 138--139, 70 Cal.Rptr. 193, 203, 443 P.2d 777, 787; White v. State of California, 21 Cal.App.3d 738, 759, 99 Cal.Rptr. 58.)
The record leaves no doubt that at the time of her two industrial injuries, petitioner had the preexisting 'osteoarthritis and degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine,' found by the doctors. The condition had taken many years to develop; with time it could be expected to become progressively worse. It is equally true, as reported by one of the two doctor witnesses, that the 'Twist of February of 1971, and later in June of 1971 caused a flare up of symptoms in this back, . . .' And until that 'flare up of symptoms,' petitioner was able, without restriction or discomfort, to perform all of the duties of her employment.
Respondents first offer Labor Code section 4750 as legal justification for the apportionment ordered by the board. That statute states:
(Emphasis added.)
We observe that the elements of the term 'disability' as used in the workmen's compensation act are '(1) Actual incapacity to perform the tasks usually encountered in one's employment and the wage loss resulting therefrom, and (2) physical impairment of the body . . ..' (Emphasis added; Allied Compensation Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 211 Cal.App.2d 821, 831, 27 Cal.Rptr. 918; and see State of Cal. v. Ind. Acc. Com., 135 Cal.App.2d 544, 550, 288 P.2d 31.) Here petitioner suffered from no 'actual incapacity to perform the tasks usually encountered in (her) employment,' prior to the industrial injuries sustained by her.
We next note the statute's alternative requirement for its operation, i.e., suffering from a 'previous . . . physical impairment.' "Impairment" as used in the pertinent Labor Code sections "is not an unknown condition but one that causes loss of function of the body in whole or in part." (State of California v. Ind. Acc. Com., 147 Cal.App.2d 818, 823, 306 P.2d 64, 68 ( ).) Here again petitioner, before her injuries, suffered from no total or partial 'loss of function of the body.'
Faced with a problem somewhat akin to ours, the court in State of Cal. v. Ind. Acc. Com., supra, 135 Cal.App.2d 544, 551, 288 P.2d 31, 35, stated: 'We can find neither in the original (workmen's compensation) act, nor in its present form, any indication that the Legislature intended that either the term 'disability' or 'impairment' as used therein was not to be limited to Actual manifest and symptomatic disabilities which antedated an industrial injury.' (Emphasis added.)
It will be seen that Labor Code section 4750 is inapposite.
Labor Code section 4663 is also cited as support for the board's apportioned award. It provides:
'In case of aggravation of any disease existing prior to a compensable injury, compensation shall be allowed only for the proportion of the disability due to the aggravation of such prior disease which is reasonably attributed to the injury.'
This statute has received repeated judicial construction. 'It is settled that the section must be read in the light of the rule than an employer takes the employee as he finds him at the time of the employment. Accordingly, when a subsequent injury lights up or aggravates a previously existing condition resulting in disability, liability for the full disability without proration is imposed upon the employer, and the appeals board may apportion the disability under the section 'only in those cases in which part of the disability would have resulted, in the absence of the industrial injury, from the 'normal progress" of the preexisting disease.' (Ballard v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 3 Cal.3d 832, 837, 92 Cal.Rptr. 1, 4, 478 P.2d 937, 940; and see authority there cited.)
Here it is patent that petitioner's injuries 'lighted up' and 'aggravated' a 'previously existing condition' which had caused her neither 'disability' nor 'physical impairment,' according to the applicable definitions of those terms.
We look to the record for evidence supporting a theory that one-half of petitioner's post-injury permanment disability of 32 percent would nevertheless "have resulted, in the absence of the industrial injury, from the 'normal progress" of (her) preexisting disease.' (See Ballard v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., supra, 3 Cal.3d 832, 837, 92 Cal.Rptr. 1, 4, 478 P.2d 937, 940.)
In this inquiry we bear in mind the mandate of Labor Code section 3202 which provides: 'The provisions of Division 4 and Division 5 of this code (i.e., the workmen's compensation act, including § 4663) shall be Liberally construed by the courts with the purpose of extending their benefits for the protection of persons injured in the course of their employment.' (Emphasis added.)
This statute applies equally to 'the courts' and to the Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board. (See Beaida v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 263 Cal.App.2d 204, 208--209, 69 Cal.Rptr. 516.) 'When workmen's compensation statutes are equally susceptible of interpretations which are alternatively beneficial or detrimental to the affected employee, they must be construed favorably to the employee.' (Amborn v....
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