Grost v. United States
| Decision Date | 04 May 2014 |
| Docket Number | EP-13-CV-158-KC |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas |
| Parties | CRISTINA CRUZ GROST, M.D., Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant. |
On this day, the Court considered the Motion to Dismiss (the "Motion") filed by Defendant United States of America ("Defendant"), ECF No. 13, in the above-captioned case (the "Case"). For the reasons set forth herein, the Motion is GRANTED.
On May 8, 2013, Plaintiff Cristina Cruz Grost ("Plaintiff") filed her Original Complaint in the Case, ECF No. 1. On May 25, 2013, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (the "Amended Complaint"), ECF No. 4. As is appropriate at this stage of the proceedings, the Court takes as true the following factual allegations in the Amended Complaint:
Plaintiff is a psychiatrist. Beginning in 2006, Plaintiff practiced psychiatry at William Beaumont Army Medical Center ("WBAMC") in El Paso, Texas without complaints by patients or staff. Am. Compl. 4. Defendant owned, operated, and controlled WBAMC, but it did not employ Plaintiff directly; instead, Plaintiff worked as an independent contractor pursuant to a contract with Spectrum Health Care, Inc. ("Spectrum"). Id. at 1, 4.
In 2008, certain employees of Defendant were transferred to WBAMC, among them Col. Ron Moruzzi ("Moruzzi") and Maj. Artin Terhakopian ("Terhakopian"). Id. at 4. Soon thereafter, Moruzzi and Terhakopian started to manufacture complaints about Plaintiff, and made false statements about her to her employer, in an effort to have her employment terminated. Id.
Beginning in May 2011, Defendant's employees, including Moruzzi and Terhakopian, began to professionally harass, verbally abuse, and threaten Plaintiff, and subject her to offensive conduct. Id at 2. This conduct was intended to inflict emotional distress and anxiety on Plaintiff and cause her to quit her job. Id. Defendant had actual and constructive notice of its employees' behavior but took no steps to reduce or eliminate it. Id.
Also beginning in May 2011, and continuing through January 2012, Defendant's employees, including Moruzzi and Terhakopian, made knowingly false statements about Plaintiff to the Chief of the Department of Behavioral Health and to Spectrum in an effort to have Plaintiff's employment terminated.1 Id. at 5. The false accusations concerned patients' length of stay and the use of electronic medical records. Id. Defendant's employees provided no documentation of their complaints when they were asked to do so. Id. Defendants' employees mistreated Plaintiff, favored other workers, and excluded her from professional and social activities, all of which were intended to cause her emotional distress and anxiety. Id.
At some point, Plaintiff protested to the Chief of the Department of Behavioral Health and to the Chief of the Hospital Clinical Command that she was being mistreated and falsely accused. Id. At that or another time, Plaintiff "report[ed] poor patient care, violations of regulations and deficits in clinical safety to the proper authorities." Id. at 7. Defendants' employees, including Moruzzi and Terhakopian, then retaliated against Plaintiff by severelylimiting her patient contact, thereby leaving her with long periods of inactivity. Id. at 5. These "biased interventions [] ostracized [] Plaintiff." Id. at 6. However, despite the mistreatment Plaintiff faced, she "persevered in completing her tasks." Id. Defendant's employees then further retaliated against Plaintiff "by causing the staff [of the unit in which she worked] to ostracize her." Id.
The work climate at WBAMC caused Plaintiff severe emotional and professional harm. Id. Specifically, it caused her to "terminate her business relationship with Spectrum Healthcare Resources."2 Id. at 7. Defendant and its employees interfered with Plaintiff's "past and future employers," thereby preventing her from obtaining other suitable employment. Id. at 6.
On February 21, 2012, Plaintiff filed suit against Moruzzi and Terhakopian in state court in El Paso, Texas, "appear[ing] to bring claims for libel, slander, intentional infliction of emotional distress, breach of contract, and others." Order at 1, Grost v. Terhakopian, No. 3:12-CV-114-KC (W.D. Tex. Apr. 20, 2012), ECF No. 4. On March 29, 2012, the defendants removed that case to this Court. See Notice of Removal, Grost v. Terhakopian, No. 3:12-CV-114-KC (W.D. Tex. Mar. 29, 2012), ECF No. 1. Upon the United States' motion, the Court dismissed Moruzzi and Terhakopian and substituted the United States as the proper defendant. See Order at 3, Grost v. Terhakopian, No. 3:12-CV-114-KC (W.D. Tex. Apr. 20, 2012), ECF No. 4. On July 12, 2012, the Court dismissed that case, holding that the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") because Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies prior to filing suit. See Order, Grost v. Terhakopian, No. 3:12-CV-114-KC (W.D. Tex. July 12, 2012), ECF No. 11. Even though Plaintiff was at that timeeither "in the process of filing her claim" or intended to file a claim in the future, her suit was barred because she had not yet exhausted her administrative remedies. Id. at 4.
Shortly before the Court dismissed Plaintiff's original lawsuit, Plaintiff submitted an administrative claim to Defendant. See Resp., Ex. B. Plaintiff represents that she filed the administrative claim "in order to meet [the] jurisdictional requirements of this [C]ourt." Resp. 1. By letter dated July 2, 2013, Defendant informed Plaintiff that it had received the administrative claim, and explained that Plaintiff would be allowed to file suit under the FTCA six months after she filed the claim, provided the claim was properly filed and adequately documented. See Resp., Ex. B.
As noted, Plaintiff thereafter filed the instant Case on May 8, 2013, alleging the above-referenced facts. Though the Amended Complaint is not a model of clarity, the Court understands that the Amended Complaint asserts causes of action for tortious interference with contractual relations, breach of contract, libel, slander, intentional infliction of emotional distress, premises liability, violations of 29 U.S.C. § 660,3 retaliation and hostile work environment under federal and/or state antidiscrimination laws, and, under six separate theories, negligence. See Am. Compl. 1-7.
On August 2, 2013, Defendant filed an answer to the Amended Complaint, ECF No. 5 ("Answer"), and thereafter filed the Motion on February 26, 2014. By the Motion, Defendant moves to dismiss all of Plaintiff's claims. See Mot. 14. Plaintiff has filed a response to the Motion, ECF No. 16 ("Response"), in which she withdraws or disclaims her allegations of libel, slander, and breach of contract. See Resp. 6 (stressing that "at no time did Plaintiff allege acts ofslander or libel except as couched in terms of inflicting emotional distress"); Id. at 7-8 (). The Response also adds a new claim alleging that Defendant violated 10 U.S.C. § 2409, which prohibits retaliation against employees of government contractors for reporting misconduct or dangerous conditions. See Resp. 8; 10 U.S.C. § 2409. Finally, Defendant has filed a reply to the Response, ECF No. 17 ("Reply").
Defendant moves to dismiss the Case under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). As explained below, the Court construes the Motion, to the extent it is made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), to be a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). The Court therefore also sets forth the standard for a Rule 12(c) motion.
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., 545 U.S. 546, 552 (2005); People's Nat'l Bank v. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency of the U.S., 362 F.3d 333, 336 (5th Cir. 2004). Without jurisdiction conferred by statute or the Constitution, federal courts lack the power to adjudicate claims. Exxon Mobil, 545 U.S at 552; People's Nat'l Bank, 362 F.3d at 336. A party may challenge a district court's subject matter jurisdiction by filing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).
A federal court must consider a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) before any other challenge because a court must have subject matter jurisdiction before determining thevalidity of a claim. Moran v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 27 F.3d 169, 172 (5th Cir. 1994). The party asserting jurisdiction constantly bears the burden of proof that the jurisdiction does in fact exist." Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001). Where the motion to dismiss is based on the complaint alone, the court must decide whether the allegations in the complaint sufficiently state a basis for subject matter jurisdiction. See Paterson v. Weinberger, 644 F.2d 521, 523 (5th Cir. 1998).
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) challenges a complaint on the basis that it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must accept well-pleaded facts as true and view them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Calhoun v. Hargrove, 312 F.3d 730, 733 (5th Cir. 2002); Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2000). Though a complaint need not contain "detailed" factual allegations, a plaintiff's complaint must allege sufficient facts "to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)); Colony Ins. Co. v. Peachtree Constr., Ltd., 647 F.3d 248, 252 (5th...
To continue reading
Request your trial