Grosvenor v. Grosvenor, No. 42734

• Court: Supreme Court of Nebraska
• Writing for the Court: Galvin, Sioux City; Heard before KRIVOSHA; CLINTON
• Citation: 206 Neb. 395,293 N.W.2d 96
• Parties: Harold L. GROSVENOR, Appellee, v. Mildred E. GROSVENOR, Appellant.
• Decision Date: 10 June 1980
• Docket Number: No. 42734

Page 96

293 N.W.2d 96 206 Neb. 395 Harold L. GROSVENOR, Appellee,
v.
Mildred E. GROSVENOR, Appellant. No. 42734. Supreme Court of Nebraska. June 10, 1980.

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Syllabus by the Court

1. Statutes: Legislative Intent. Where, because a statute is ambiguous, it is necessary to construe it, the principal objective is to determine the legislative intention.

2. Statutes: Legislative Intent. The purpose of all rules or maxims for the construction or interpretation of statutes is to discover the true intention of the law, and the rules or canons of construction are merely aids for ascertaining legislative intent. The rules of construction are neither ironclad nor inflexible, and must yield to manifestations of a contrary intent.

3. Statutes: Legislative Intent. The legislative intention is to be determined from the general consideration of the whole act with reference to the subject matter to

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which it applies and the particular topic under which the language in question is found, and the intent deduced from the whole will prevail over that of a particular part considered separately.

4. Divorce: Property Division: Judgments. Nev.Rev.Stat. § 42-371(4) (Reissue 1978) gives to a court which has entered a judgment for property division payable in installments, authority to release or subordinate the judgment under the conditions prescribed by the statute.

5. Judgments. In the absence of statutory authority, a court ordinarily has no power to correct, amend, open, or vacate a valid judgment after the expiration of the term.

6. Judgments: Statutes. Statutes providing for the modification of vested judgments apply only to judgments rendered after the statute takes effect.

7. Equal Protection: Constitutional Law. Equal protection is the guarantee that similar people will be dealt with in a similar manner and that people of different circumstances will not be treated as if they were the same.

[206 Neb. 396] 8. Equal Protection: Constitutional Law. No state shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

9. Police Power: Equal Protection: Constitutional Law: Liens. The lien of a judgment is statutory and not a fundamental or basic right. Legislation affecting judgment liens is, on its face, economic and social welfare legislation. The standard by which a court reviews a classification established by such legislation is whether it has a rational basis and is at least arguably related to a legitimate function of government not prohibited by the Constitution.

10. Police Power: Equal Protection: Constitutional Law: Liens. There are sufficient differences between judgment liens in marriage dissolution cases and other types of judgments to support the legislative determination that such liens are entitled to a treatment different from judgments generally.

C. J. Galvin, Sioux City, for appellant.

Donald A. Fitch, South Sioux City, for appellee.

Heard before KRIVOSHA, C. J., and BOSLAUGH, McCOWN, CLINTON, BRODKEY, WHITE, and HASTINGS, JJ.

CLINTON, Justice.

This is an appeal from an order in a marriage dissolution proceeding entered under the provisions of Neb.Rev.Stat. § 42-371(4) (Reissue 1978), subordinating the lien of a previously entered monetary judgment, payable in installments, granted to the respondent wife in lieu of a division of property. The District Court for Dixon County, Nebraska, granted the relief requested and the wife, the judgment creditor, has appealed. She makes two principal contentions: (1) Section 42-371(4) is unconstitutional because it permits the court to order the release or subordination of judgments of certain types, i. e., those granted in marriage dissolution actions, while other judgment creditors cannot be so compelled; and (2) Section 42-371(4), properly construed, does not include the release of a monetary judgment granted in a division of marital property. We find [206 Neb. 397] the appellant's contentions are not meritorious and affirm.

Section 42-371(4) provides:

Whenever a judgment creditor under sections 42-347 to 42-379 refuses to execute a release of the judgment as provided in this section, the person desiring such release may file an application for the relief desired. A copy of the application and a notice of hearing shall be served on the judgment creditor either personally or by registered or certified mail no less than ten days before the date of hearing. If the court finds that the release is not requested for the purpose of avoiding payment and that the release will not unduly reduce the security, the court may release property from the judgment lien. As a condition for such release, the court may require the posting of a bond with the clerk in an amount fixed by the court, guaranteeing payment of the judgment.

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On March 19, 1975, the District Court modified the previous judgment in the dissolution proceeding and overruled a pending motion for a new trial. The modification decree, insofar as is pertinent to this appeal, made an award to the wife in the sum of $67,500, payable $7,500 forthwith and the balance in equal annual installments of $6,000, together with interest on the unpaid balance. The court, in its decree, made it clear that the monetary judgment was a division of property by specifically noting that it was making no award of alimony.

Thereafter, the appellee, who is the owner of several tracts of farmland, filed this proceeding under the provisions of § 42-371(4), asking that the judgment lien above described be subordinated to the lien of a mortgage which he proposed to make to the Federal Land Bank upon an 80-acre tract owned by [206 Neb. 398] him and also to subordinate the judgment lien to the same mortgage on another 80-acre tract which he proposed to purchase with the loan proceeds. At the time of the filing of the application, the balance of the judgment was $36,000, plus interest, and payments were current. The evidence would indicate that other unencumbered property owned by the appellee provided adequate security for the balance owing, and that he has not been delinquent in his previous payments.

A brief account of the legislative history of statutes for release or subordination of judgment liens in domestic relations cases is somewhat enlightening and tends to indicate the reasons why the Legislature has treated the lien of such judgments differently from the liens of other types of judgments. An...