Grout v. Alexander

• Decision Date: 12 July 1973
• Docket Number: No. 19661,19661
• Citation: 260 S.C. 655,197 S.E.2d 826
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: Janie Alexander GROUT, Appellant, v. Clarence E. ALEXANDER, Respondent.

Page 826

197 S.E.2d 826

260 S.C. 655

Janie Alexander GROUT, Appellant, v. Clarence E. ALEXANDER, Respondent.

No. 19661.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

July 12, 1973.

Eddie R. Harbin, Greenville, and James B. Stephen, Spartanburg, for appellant.

Harry A. Chapman, Jr., and James C. Blakely, Jr., Horton, Drawdy, Dillard, Marchbanks, Chapman & Brown, Greenville, for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

The parties to this action were divorced by a decree of the Greenville County Family Court dated August 9, 1967. The decree awarded equal custody of the couple's sixteen-year-old son, who was allowed to choose how much time he should spend with each parent. The husband, hereafter called respondent, was required to pay all necessary medical, dental and educational expenses of the child and $20.00 per week to the wife, hereafter called petitioner, for the maintenance of the child while living with her.

On February 25, 1971, the wife filed a petition in the cause alleging that respondent had made no support payments, as ordered by the court, since January 1, 1970. The petition further alleged that because of the child's mental condition he was unable to provide for himself and needed constant supervision and attention, for which additional support payments were required.

A hearing was held on March 5, 1971, on issues joined by the petition and an oral general denial interposed by husband. No record of the testimony was preserved. Three months later, inferably when counsel for petitioner pressed for a decision, the court instructed him to present an order exonerating respondent from support payments accruing prior to March 5, 1971, but requiring payment of $20.00 per week thereafter, directing that the parties share future medical and dental expenses and directing that petitioner bear the expense of any special schooling for the child. Counsel served notice of intention to appeal, and presented such an order, which the court declined to sign because, according to the court-settled statement of the case, it 'contained some matters which had not been included in the oral directions of the Court.'

On July 20, the court advised counsel for petitioner and respondent to negotiate an agreement as to the child's future, indicating that another hearing would be scheduled if they failed to agree. When efforts in this direction failed, counsel for petitioner requested another hearing, which the court scheduled for November 17, 1971. Instead of conducting a hearing on that date, quoting from the court-settled statement, '(T)he Court announced it had determined that the Petitioner's request for increased weekly support payments from the Respondent had not been substantiated by the evidence (which had been taken more than eight months before, interpolated). Further, in light of the Respondent's financial situation, the Court held that he had more than adequately discharged his duty to provide support for the child of the parties and should not be held in contempt. The Court also noted that the child of the parties had become twenty-one (21) years of age on October 20, 1971. ¹ Counsel were instructed to prepare an order denying the relief sought in the Petition of Appellant dated February 25, 1971.' An order of this tenor was presented and signed February 22, 1972, only a few days short of one year after petitioner had sought relief in the Family Court and after the only testimony taken had been heard. Either by inadvertence or design, the court's Sua sponte imposition on petitioner of one-half of medical expense and all of...