Grove v. United States

• Decision Date: 10 February 1959
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 2471.
• Citation: 170 F. Supp. 176
• Parties: William C. GROVE, Sr. and Rozalia Miller, administratrix of the Estate of William C. Grove, Jr., deceased, Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES of America and Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia

170 F. Supp. 176

William C. GROVE, Sr. and Rozalia Miller, administratrix of the Estate of William C. Grove, Jr., deceased, Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES of America and Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 2471.

United States District Court E. D. Virginia, Norfolk Division.

February 10, 1959.

Howard I. Legum, Norfolk, Va., for plaintiffs.

John M. Hollis, U. S. Atty., Norfolk, Va., Wolcott, Wolcott & Payne, Edward W. Wolcott and Daniel H. Payne, Norfolk, Va., for defendants.

WALTER E. HOFFMAN, District Judge.

This is a controversy over the proceeds of a life insurance policy in the sum of $4,000 issued by defendant, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, pursuant to the provisions of the Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance Act of 1954 (5 U.S.C.A. §§ 2091-2103), on the life of William C. Grove, Jr., who died on March 8, 1956, a resident of the City of Norfolk, Virginia, in which city he was, during the later years of his life, employed by the federal government in a civilian status. The insurance company paid the proceeds of said policy to the duly qualified guardian of a child born as the result of a purported marriage between decedent and one Nan M. Grove.

The action was originally instituted by plaintiffs against the United States of America as the sole defendant. Upon the hearing on a motion to dismiss as filed by the United States of America, the Court expressed the view that, under the facts of this case and the Act in question, an action could be maintained against the sovereign only if it could be shown that the Government had failed to cause the issuance of the insurance contract in the proper amount according to decedent's salary earned as an employee. Deferring any ruling on the motion to dismiss, the Court permitted plaintiffs to add the insurance company as a party defendant. At the time of trial, plaintiffs conceded that no evidence could be produced to refute the fact that $4,000 was the proper amount of insurance to be issued. The United States of America was thereupon dismissed as a defendant.

The issue presented for determination is whether a child of a marriage deemed null in law is entitled to the proceeds of a Federal Employees Group Life Insurance policy, where no beneficiary is designated by the decedent and there is no lawful widow.

The statute, 5 U.S.C.A. § 2093, provides, in part, as follows:

"Any amount of group life insurance * * * in force on any employee at the date of his death shall be paid, upon the establishment of a valid claim therefor, to the person or persons surviving at the date of his death in the following order of precedence:

"First, to the beneficiary * * as the employee may have designated * * *;

"Second, if there be no such beneficiary, to the widow * * *;

"Third, if none of the above, to the child or children of such employee and descendents of deceased children by representation;

"Fourth, if none of the above, to the parents of such employee."

William C. Grove, Sr., claims the proceeds of said policy as the father of decedent, contending that the language of the statute contemplates a "legitimate child" as the only eligible child entitled to receive. He draws an analogy to the provisions of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 401 et seq.; the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 51; the National Service Life Insurance Act, 38 U.S.C.A. § 802(g); the various state Wrongful Death Acts; and the first World War Veterans Act, 38 U.S.C.A. § 421 et seq.

The plaintiff, Rozalia Miller, in her capacity as administratrix of the estate of William C. Grove, Jr., originally claimed the proceeds as assignee of Nan M. Grove, but counsel conceded that this plaintiff was not entitled to recover.

The facts are not essentially controverted. The deceased failed to exercise his privilege by way of beneficiary designation. According to Nan M. Grove, she and the decedent were married by a Justice of Peace in Burlington, North Carolina, on December 24, 1937. Her maiden name was Nan Laura Roberts and she had been previously married to Leo Mulvaney who died on November 9, 1934. The parties lived together as husband and wife from the time of the alleged marriage ceremony until the fall of 1946 when they separated while living in Asheville, North Carolina. In the interim they had also lived in Bluefield, West Virginia, and Lynchburg, Virginia. The child, who is the recipient of the proceeds of the insurance policy in question, was born in Bluefield on November 19, 1938; the birth certificate reciting that Margaret Cameron Grove was the daughter of William C. Grove and Nan M. Grove. Following decedent's death in 1956, the decedent's sister, Rozalia Miller, notified Nan M. Grove and Margaret Cameron Grove, and they came to Norfolk to attend the funeral.

When Nan M. Grove made application for the proceeds of the insurance as the "widow", an investigation developed that decedent had previously married one Ruth Harris. Subsequently, on August 8, 1938, decedent was divorced from Ruth Harris Grove by decree of the General County Court of Alamance County, North Carolina. Assuming that decedent and Nan M. Grove went through the form of a marriage ceremony on December 24, 1937, the marriage was obviously a bigamous one. There is no contention that decedent and Nan M. Grove ever went through any other ceremony. Although Nan M. Grove made an effort to secure documentary evidence of her marriage to decedent, she was unable to do so, and she apparently did not ascertain the facts of her bigamous marriage until after decedent's death. The State of North Carolina does not recognize a common-law marriage. § 51-1, General Statutes of North Carolina.

With one minor exception hereinafter noted, all friends and members of decedent's family were of the opinion that the marriage was lawful during decedent's lifetime. The many letters, cards, and notes from the decedent, his mother, and sister mailed to Nan M. Grove and her daughter, Margaret Cameron Grove, conclusively prove that all parties treated the marriage as lawful. Indeed, on February 14, 1956, three weeks prior to his death, decedent sent a Valentine greeting card to Nan M. Grove upon which is imprinted, "To My Wife on Valentine's Day," and signed in decedent's handwriting, "I love you, Buster." On the same day, decedent sent to Margaret Cameron Grove a card upon which is imprinted, "A Valentine for Daughter," and signed in decedent's handwriting, "Love, Daddy."

Decedent's father, William C. Grove, Sr., who would be entitled to receive the proceeds of the policy if wrongful payment was made to the child, testified that, in 1955, decedent told him, "Nan and I were never married." The statement was not amplified by the witness. Even if the statement was made as related by plaintiff, it proves nothing but an inference. Perhaps decedent was merely giving his legal conclusion as to the status of the marriage in view of his knowledge that any marriage was bigamous because of his prior marriage to Ruth Harris Grove. More probably, however, he intended to convey the impression that any ceremony entered into on December 24, 1937, was a fraud in that no recordation of any such marriage existed. At no time did decedent ever state that he did not go through the form of a marriage ceremony with Nan M. Grove.

The question as to whether decedent and Nan M. Grove ever went through a marriage ceremony, even though it be a nullity, is important to a determination of this case. A child born of a purely meretricious relationship is not made legitimate under § 64-7 of the Code of Virginia, 1950, the pertinent portion of which is as follows:

"The issue of marriages deemed null in law * * * shall nevertheless be legitimate."

It follows, therefore, that the law of Virginia contemplates a marriage ceremony. If the word "child" as used in the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Act is to be interpreted under state law, and not federal law, a marriage of some kind is necessary to legitimatize the issue which is the result of intercourse. Vanderpool v. Ryan, 137 Va. 445, 119 S.E. 65. The parties are in substantial agreement that the law of Virginia is controlling for the purpose of determining the familial relationship, and Virginia is particularly appropriate in this case as the law of the decedent's domicile (Virginia) controls the distribution of personalty.

When we examine the authorities on the subject, we find the existence of a strong presumption of marriage arising from the good faith declarations of the parties to the effect that they were married; that they lived together and demeaned themselves as husband and wife; that the family thought the marriage to be valid; and that the general reputation supported a marriage. In many instances the failure to produce a marriage certificate or registry has been deemed unnecessary as proof of the marriage. Reynolds v. Adams, 125 Va. 295, 99 S.E. 695; Newsom v. Fleming, 165 Va. 89, 181 S.E. 393; McClaugherty v. McClaugherty, 180 Va. 51, 21 S.E.2d 761; Womack v. Tankersly, 78 Va. 242. There is, of course, a sharp distinction between proof of marriage and proof of a valid marriage. Newsom v. Fleming, supra. In Eldred v. Eldred, 97 Va. 606, 34 S.E. 477, 484, the presumption of marriage is stated:

"This strong presumption is especially true in a case involving legitimacy. The law presumes morality; marriage, and not concubinage; legitimacy and not bastardy."

In the more recent case of Coureas v. Allstate Insurance Co., 198 Va. 77, 92 S.E.2d 378, 381-382, it is said:

"Where a man and woman live together and demean themselves toward each other as husband and wife, the law presumes that they have been legally married. While `"`cohabitation and repute do not constitute marriage they do constitute strong evidence tending to raise a presumption of marriage, and the burden is on him who denies the marriage to offer countervailing evidence.'"'"

Where an attack is made upon the...